A reader asks:
After a lot of reading, I've come to realize that the Bayes factor for the resurrection is quite high that if the event in question wasn't a supernatural occurrence, no rational person would think that the event did not occur. However, I've stumbled upon an argument by a philosopher who argues against the resurrection argument by using bayes theorem as well.
I've included a link of a debate where he presented his arguments in a long mathematical form in case you wanted to refer to it, but the gist of his argument is that the prior probability of God raising Jesus from the dead is always going to be magnitudes lower than that of God *not* raising Jesus from the dead. He is a theist himself, so he argues that he does't follow Hume in his argument against miracles, but rather he claims to be making an argument from natural theology: Every experimental confirmation of a scientific theory that we observe counts as evidence of the fact that God created and ordered the world in an orderly and causally closed way and does not intervene. In another presentation, he puts forth a statistical inference of this sort(I didn't copy and paste it so it might be a flawed syllogism, but I think it captures the gist of what he's saying):
(1) For every dead person, 99.9999...% of the time God does not intervene
(2) Jesus died
(3) Therefore, we can be 99.9999....% certain that God did not intervene in Jesus' death
He argues that for every instance of a "miracle" being reported, we have experimental confirmations of the laws of nature of a much higher frequency. So, he concludes from all of this that the prior probability that God would raise Jesus from the dead is so astronomically low that however high our Bayes factor is *for* the resurrection, the prior improbability of God wanting to intervene with the laws of nature is always going to be much higher such that the posterior probability (or final probability) of the resurrection is always going to be really low.
This argument is unlike any other because it doesn't assume naturalism, in fact it assumes theism. It doesn't assume that God cannot or could not have raised Jesus from the dead, but that it is highly improbable that God would have intervened.
As a scientist, what do you think of this argument (Since your career involves seeing confirmations of God's love for order in the universe everyday?)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XCCmDqQ7qgI
[Dr. Robert Cavin vs. St. Calum Miller](He presents his argument from the 14th minute to the 30 minute mark)
What do you think of this argument?
(1) For every American citizen who lives during a presidential election, 99.9999...% of the time they do not become President.
(2) St. Barack Obama was a living American citizen in 2008.
(3) Therefore, we can be 99.9999....% certain that Barack Obama did not become President of the United States.
Clearly there is something wrong with this argument. What's wrong with it is that Obama is not a randomly selected [or typical] citizen. He belonged to a special class of people who is unusually likely to become President (a Senator, a charismatic speaker, wanted to become president, went on to receive the nomination of a major party...). Since we have additional information, it is fallacious to use the background rate to decide the chances of him becoming President. [And of course, we also have excellent posterior evidence, coming from the period after the election, that he did in fact become President.]
In the same way, Jesus is not a randomly selected human being. He was a person who claimed to be the Jewish Messiah and the Son of God, fulfilled certain prophesies, did other miracles, and so on. So the prior probability that God will dramatically intervene shortly after Jesus' death, is a lot larger than the probability that he will dramatically intervene when one of my uncles dies. (Although, actually God DOES plan to raise 100% of human beings from the dead when Jesus returns, the difference in the case of Jesus is that he did it right away.)
The reasonable question is, what is the prior probability that God would make some special person to be the Messiah and raise that person from the dead? (Just like, we could ask what is the probability that any person becomes President.) Once we believe that somebody is going to be President, or that somebody is going to be the Messiah, we shouldn't be all that surprised to learn that any one particular person turns out to be President, or the Messiah, so long as they are qualified for the position.)
The argument in the video is even more fallacious. First of all, I should say you should be VERY SUSPICIOUS of any person who starts their argument by making concessions that huge to the other side. Factors of
are ridiculous numbers that should never be thrown around in almost any real life situations, and if he concedes something that ridiculous to his opponent, he ought to be guaranteed to lose, plain and simple. He's like a stage magician who makes a big show of how he's blindfolded and his hands are tied behind his back and so on. You can be very sure there's a trick somewhere, and that all that patter is there to distract you from the way he actually does the trick.
(The other guy, St. Calum Miller, is also making a fallacy, when he quotes a liklihood factor of
for the Resurrection; this number incorrectly assumes that the evidence from each apostle's testimony counts independently. The odds of a group conspiracy to lie are certainly bigger than
, which is an astronomically tiny number. No real historical event is ever that certain. That being said, he's right that the evidence for the Resurrection is extremely strong, as far as historical evidence goes! It's just that nothing in life is really that certain.)
By the way, Cavin is derisive about St. Craig Keener's statement that there are a hundred million miracle reports, but this is not actually all that silly of a number. If 2% of the world's population claims to have seen a miracle, that's 140 million right there, assuming none of the events are redundant. So I don't think this claim can be dismissed quite so easily.
Anyway, in his argument, Cavin compares the likelihood ratios of L (the laws of nature are always valid), M (at least once, God acts miraculously), and ~(M v L) (neither one is true). The last comes in because L and M are not exhaustive, since there might be neither laws of nature nor divine interventions.
The actual fallacy in his argument is displayed on the slides at the 33:45 mark of the video. He claims that ~M (i.e. not M, which would include both L and ~(M v L)), because it is maximally unspecific and does not necessarily predict that there are any laws of nature at all, is disconfirmed every time anything happens in accordance with a natural law. Then he claims that M, because it only adds to ~M the claim that at least one miracle happens, is at least as bad off as ~M!
But this is clearly quite absurd. Not even the most ardent believer in the supernatural thinks that every time I drop a ball, there is a 50% chance that it will miraculously fall up instead of down. Not even the most tempestuous skeptic really halves their chance that God does miracles, every single time they see a ball drop!
Obviously, miracles don't happen all the time. What Christians actually believe is:
M': the usual laws of Nature are almost always valid, but on rare occasions (especially at important moments in salvation history) God intervenes to perform miracles.
(By important moments in salvation history, I mean things like: critical events in ancient Israel, the ministry of Jesus and the Apostles, times when missionaries preach the Gospel to a group of people for the first time, or sometimes for the conversion of a particular individual. Aside from this, sometimes God heals people in answer to prayer and so on, but my point is that miracles are not randomly tossed into history like darts shot into a dartboard; they tend to happen in specific kinds of situations.)
Now M' clearly does predict that balls will normally fall down. So it is just as good as L (the laws of nature always hold) for purposes of everyday life. So his huge probability factor of
goes away. But M' is better than L in situations like Jesus' ministry, where there is significant historical evidence that miracles really occurred.
Incidentally, this implies that he was quite wrong to rank the probability of ~M (no miracles) so low. Even though it is a very unspecific hypothesis, we shouldn't consider randomly selected examples of ~M, instead we should focus on whatever are the most plausible versions of ~M. And clearly, the most plausible versions of ~M are scenarios where the laws of nature are followed, at least most of the time. In fact, the most plausible version of ~M is L. Thus he is guilty of a clear-cut violation of the laws of probability theory here, since he simultaneously argues that ~M is very improbable, and L very probable, even though L actually implies ~M! This is an example of the Conjunction Fallacy:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Had St. Miller realized this, he could have totally eviscerated Cavin's argument in a couple seconds, in a way that would have been completely humiliating and decisive. However as far as I can tell (I skimmed through his remarks very quickly) he mostly just ignored that argument and presented the positive case for the Resurrection.
Similarly, the most plausible version of M is not a scenario where God intervenes half the time we do a science experiment (I agree THAT is ruled out), instead it is a scenario along the lines of M' or similar.
To give another illustration, consider the famous proposition
W: All swans are white.
For a long time, Europeans noticed that every swan they ever looked at was white. You could take this as huge experimental confirmation for W. Every time you look at a swan, W predicts it is white and therefore is confirmed by a factor of at least 2 over ~W (and that's if there was only one other color besides white), which says the swan could be any color. Since there were millions of observations of white swans, doesn't this mean that W is a gazillion times more probable than ~W?
And yet, there are black swans!
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
The fallacy is to assume that the most plausible version of ~W is that each individual swan's color is random. In fact all the swans in Europe are white; the black swans are not only rarer, they live in Australia. So it is no surprise the Europeans didn't notice them until they came to Australia. So actually ~W was almost as good of a theory as W, aside from being slightly more complicated.
As a scientist, what do you think of this argument (Since your career involves seeing confirmations of God's love for order in the universe everyday?)
That is indeed the exact point. We worship a God who loves order, and therefore he does not do miracles haphazardly. No scientific experiment can ever be evidence against miracles, unless you have some theological reason to believe that God would have been likely to intervene in that particular experiment. For most experiments, the opposite is true—it would frustrate the ability of his creatures to learn about the world, without providing any particular benefit.
(I am assuming here that the goal of the particular experiment was not specifically to look for evidence of God, as in e.g. prayer experiments. In that case, we all know that God does not usually respond to challenges to show his existence by striking a nearby tree with a lightning bolt. The fact that he doesn't do that may be evidence against a certain sort of deity, but even there I don't see what is gained by dressing up the challenge with a veneer of science, when the whole point is simply to challenge God to act.)
Note: I only answered this question as a special favor to the particular reader in question. I hate watching long web videos, and I tried to watch as few seconds of this one as I possibly could, to answer the question accurately! I much prefer to interface with texts, which can be read at the speed I want, and then quoted accurately using the copy-and-paste function!
[Edit: In an earlier version of this blog post I misspelled the name "Cavin"; I apologize for this mistake. Also, I would like to make it clear that, except in the portions of this blog post where I respond directly to the video debate, I am responding to the arguments as presented by my interlocutor, without asserting that it is necessarily an accurate summary of Cavin's position.
A few other changes made after the fact are in square brackets.]





























