Category Archives: Theological Method

The Argument From Confusion is Weak

One of the mainstays of atheist rhetoric is the Argument from Evil (AfE), that there exist evils in the world, of such a quality or quantity, that it is irrational to believe in a good Creator.

This post is not directly about the Argument from Evil.  Instead, I want to address the Argument from Confusion (AfC).  This is the argument that no good God—especially one that wants everybody to believe in some specific religion such as Christianity—would allow the extent of human religious confusion that exists in the world.  (Including a plurality of contradictory religions, but also atheism/agnosticism.)  True, Christianity is the largest religion in the world, with over 2 billion people claiming to be Christians of some sort or another, but this is still a minority.  Why doesn’t God reveal himself more clearly?  The AfC claims that this is by itself good reason not to believe in God, or at least a specific religion such as Christianity, etc.

The AfC must of course be distinguished from the general AfE.  The world includes lots of unpleasant stuff (like cancer etc.), and it might be possible to view religious confusion as just a subset of such evil.  It isn’t totally obvious—except on some highly specific religious views about the necessary conditions for salvation—that religious confusion is the worst evil in the world.  So we could treat the AfC as just a special case of the AfE.  Here, I want to instead treat it as a separate argument, and see how it fares when detached from the rest of the AfE.  If you think it is overwhelmingly likely that if God exists there would be no evils whatsoever, then you probably don’t need an AfC.  The AfE suffices.  But let’s suppose that God might have some reason to permit some evil, and allow human life to be difficult in various ways.  Then, let’s ask whether the AfC specifically, changes the situation.

It cannot be denied that the AfC has emotional appeal.  What I want to argue in this post is that the argument actually has very little rational force.  Specifically, it depends crucially on equivocating between different scenarios.  Once we specify the scenario more clearly, we find that there is not much reasonable work for the AfC to do.

Specifically, I want to break the AfC into subcases based on the following:

  1. Is the argument supposed to be about (a) myself and my own confusion?  [By the first person pronouns here, I mean whichever individual is considering the AfC as a possible objection to Christianity.]  Or, is the argument supposed to be about (b) the confusion of other people besides me?
  2. Apart from the AfC (let’s abbreviate this important concept as AFTAFC) would such persons be (i) rationally justified in believing in Christianity, or (ii) not rationally justified?

To be a little more technical about 2, we could adopt a Bayesian framework where people have credences in various propositions such as Christianity (which are subjective probabilities between 0 and 1, based on the evidence available to that person, and their prior sensibilities).

By contrast, let us consider belief in a religion to be a binary (yes/no) decision.  After all, from the point of view of making a decision, I need to either live my life as if God exists (going to Church, praying, asking for forgiveness of sins, taking sacraments etc.) or else not bother to do this stuff.  And the simplest way that credences could be related to beliefs, is that that there exists some threshold probability t, with 0 < t < 1, such that if my credence p satisfies p > t, then rationally I should believe, whereas if p < t, then rationally I should not believe.  I won’t discuss in this post where the threshold t should be set, and why; all that matters is that it exists somewhere.

[We could consider more complicated decision theories, e.g. a range of probability for which either stance is permissible, or belief for-purpose-X but withholding judgment for-purpose-Y.  I think that making things more complicated is unlikely to change the final conclusion much, so let’s keep things simple.]

(a)(i) Let us start by considering the case (a)(i), when the argument is about me and my own confusion, but I nevertheless think I am AFTAFC-justified in believing in Christianity.  By ATAFC-justified, I mean that I would be rationally required to believe when taking into account all arguments except the AfC itself.

(This of course, includes on the one hand the positive arguments for Christianity; on the other hand, all other arguments against Christianity, including that portion of the AfE that doesn’t intersect with the AfC).

Now, what should I conclude in this case?  Unless perhaps I am very close to the threshold credence t—it seems to me that the AfC shouldn’t make much difference at all in this case.  After all, the premise, that God has left me in confusion, isn’t really true if I admit that I otherwise have enough evidence to rationally compel me to believe in Christianity.  In that case, the premise, that I am religiously confused, isn’t sufficiently true to make a convincing argument.

Surely, the AfC isn’t allowed to just exist as a circular self-fulfilling prophecy!  As in: “The AfC is sound because the AfC is sound because the AfC is sound…”  It can only be valid if it is based, non-circularly, on some other reason to disbelieve, other than the AfC itself.  But by stipulation, this is not true in case (a)(i).

The only way I can see that the AfC would still work in this scenario, is if I believe something much stronger about God’s actions, than simply that God should give me enough evidence to rationally warrant belief.  I would need to believe that God is obligated to make me even more certain than this.  In other words, I would need to believe something like the following objection:

Obj 1. God is not allowed to place me in a situation where I have to exercise the virtue of faith.

That is of trusting in God, even in the face of whatever psychological uncertainty remains.  And in this case, everyone should concede that such faith would be a virtue, since we are stipulating that AFTAFC there is sufficient evidence to require me to rationally believe in God.  (In particular, not believing would be morally wrong, again AFTAFC itself.)  But this assumption is quite implausible.  Especially if we are considering a religion like Christianity, which claims that faith is one of the most important theological virtues and something that brings us closer to God.

It follows that we can drop the assumption AFTAFC.  In this scenario, faith is simply rationally justified, and the premise of the AfC is simply invalid.

(a)(ii) Now let us consider the scenario where I think I am not AFTAFC-justified in believing in Christianity.  In this case, the premise of the AfC now appears to be correct, but now it doesn’t seem to be doing any useful work.  That is, by stipulation I already have a good reason not to believe.  Adding the AfC doesn’t change this, so it doesn’t change my decision to disbelieve.

You might think, well it at least gives me an additional reason to disbelieve, so as a result I can be more fully confident in my disbelief.  But a moment’s reflection shows that this isn’t really true in any sense that matters for decision making.  Suppose that on some grounds g, I disbelieve in Christianity, and then I try to take comfort in that fact that even if g ends up being incorrect, the AfC still works.  Well, but if I ever lose my confidence in g, that again will retrospectively invalidate the AfC, putting me back in situation (a)(i)!  After all, I would be discovering that I was wrong, and that I do in fact have sufficient rational evidence to believe.

OK, but could I make an argument about how God should have revealed himself to me at an earlier time in my life, while I still thought that the reasons g were good?  But that won’t fly, unless I believe that:

Obj 2God is not allowed to wait for the most opportune time to reveal himself to a person.

But this objection also seems highly implausible.  Human life is a chronological thing, in which we develop our capacities progressively over time, starting off as a baby who can hardly do anything.  And anyone who eventually comes into a relationship with God, has by definition resolved their confusion sufficiently to obtain this relationship.  See the discussion here on Just Thomism (especially the 1st comment by St. Brandon).

Furthermore, if salvation implies that we get to live forever with God in the next life, then we get this benefit even if we have a deathbed conversion.  Furthermore, the period of time when we were living apart from God, might well have served some sort of educational or other purpose—and by stipulation, it has culminated in coming to see that (AFTAFC) it is rational to believe in God.  So in this case again, the AfC should have very little force.

Because of this chronological consideration, I cannot even take the AfC as an additional reason to think it is unlikely that my grounds g for disbelieving in God will later be removed by divine action!  Because, if they are removed, that would retrospectively invalidate the AfC, making the scenario no less plausible than it would have been otherwise.

Now when we turn to case (b), a new problem presents itself.  Specifically, it is very hard for us to know the spiritual state of another human being.  For me to look at another person and judge them by saying Deep down, this person secretly knows that God exists but he is intellectually dishonest, and thus suppresses the truth in his heart vs. This other person is totally honest and not resistant to God’s grace, is something very difficult for human beings to know (except perhaps in a few, very rare cases, where the behavior of the other person makes it totally obvious).   And Christianity itself, at the very least strongly discourages us from judging other people in this way.  As if we ourselves could look into their hearts the way that God can.

Furthermore, Christianity also says that we are all sinners, making it clear that no human but Jesus was completely non-resistant to God’s grace.  So, the category of human adults who are totally non-resistant to God’s grace is presumably the empty set.

Nevertheless, we can still abstractly consider the 2 possible cases:

(b)(i) The argument involves other people, and they are rationally obliged to believe in God—they just irrationally (and perhaps culpably) don’t do so.  This case is thus resolved the same way as (a)(i).  By definition these people aren’t sufficiently confused here, they are making a willful decision not to believe in God even though they have enough evidence.  Only if you buy something like Obj 1, is the AfC convincing in this case.

To be sure, this isn’t the end of the story for people in this class.  “All have sinned and fall short of the glory of God” (Rom 3:23), and resisting grace is indeed one of the ways that this sin manifests, both in the lives of non-Christians and Christians.  But, “Christ came into the world to save sinners” (1 Tim 1:15).  Most Christians have stories about how once they were once running away from God, but God came and saved them anyway.

So, I am not saying that all such individuals will be condemned in the end.  My point is only that, by the definition of class (b)(i), their present disbelief is their own fault and choice.  So it has an adequate moral explanation, in terms of human freedom.

It is certainly true that God could have appeared with such dramatic and undeniable miracles so as to force everyone to believe.  But apparently he doesn’t (yet) want to do that.  St. Pascal wrote somewhere that God,

…wishing to appear openly to those who seek him with all their heart, and hidden from those who shun him with all their heart, he has qualified our knowledge of him by giving signs which can be seen by those who seek him and not by those who do not. There is enough light for those who desire only to see, and enough darkness for those of a contrary disposition.

Pascal thought that God hid himself in order to condemn those who were unworthy of his mercy.  But in my view, on the contrary, God hiding himself from those who don’t want to believe in him is itself an act of mercy and compassion.

If God revealed his holiness to us with total clarity, our only choices would be to accept him as he is, or rebel like Satan and become utterly wicked.  But instead God gives us enough space that we don’t have to believe, in this life.  (The same applies, of course, to the various ways in which Christians are still faithless—the point here isn’t just about atheists.)  This allows even atheists to still seek out a good life in earthly terms, one that still allows for the pursuit of ideals like truth and justice and benevolence.  Perhaps eventually, some day, they will come to realize how these qualities point to God.  But in the meantime, they don’t have to think of themselves as rebels defying God.  Instead they can live what they think of as a normal human life, in friendship with other people, trying to follow whatever they perceive as good.

So, if God gives to people who really don’t want to believe in him, sufficient space to live their lives without such belief, I don’t feel that such people are in a position to complain.  They are getting what they wanted!  And—conditional on them not wanting to believe—it is quite plausibly spiritually better for them than the alternative (being forced to believe by overwhelming evidence) would be, as I don’t think this is the sort of belief that God is looking for.

(b)(ii) The argument involves other people, and they do not in fact have sufficient evidence to rationally believe in God.

Except in some cases involving young children, and/or people-groups who have never heard the gospel, it is difficult to know for sure who belongs to this category.  But I don’t doubt that there are some people in it.

A person might then without logical absurdity say, well I myself have AFTAFC-justified belief, but I see that other people do not have enough evidence to believe.  And all things considered, I think that tells against Christianity enough that—by taking into consideration the AfC—in the end, I don’t believe.  Thus, here at last we have a case where the AfC could logically have some force.

But I don’t think it is a lot of force.  The reason is simple: how are we in a position know that God will not form a saving relationship with such persons at some time in the future?  If we have good reason to think a benevolent God would always do so, why then that is a good argument that he will.  We simply aren’t in a position to know that he won’t.  If the main obstruction to a person’s relationship with God, is simply a lack of evidence, then we have every reason to believe that (when Christ eventually makes his reign obvious, through his Second Coming in glory) this lack will eventually be remedied.

So again, this is only a problem if we think that 1) there are intellectually honest people who sincerely would want to seek God, but 2) they do not have enough evidence to rationally believe, and yet 3) God will never reach out to them in the future.  I can see how we might come to believe (1) or even (2) about someone specific, but how could we ever come to be confident in (3), which involves a blanket statement about all future time?

We might be in such a position to know (3) with high probability, if we additionally subscribe to the following doctrines about salvation, commonly held by many Evangelicals:

Doct I. It  is impossible for any adult to be saved, without an explicit and conscious faith in Christ, of a sort that (apart from rare cases, like e.g. last-minute deathbed conversions) is usually clearly observable from the outside.

Doct II. This faith must come before death; there is no possible chance to be saved after death.  All those who die without such faith necessarily go to Hell.

I do, in fact, concede that doctrines (I) and (II) would together make the AfC very concerning, as it does seem to be an empirical fact that the majority of people on Earth are not saved if (I) and (II) are the criteria.  But I don’t believe that the Bible in fact teaches these doctrines, when it is properly understood.

In particular, (I) implies that we are often in a position to negatively judge the spiritual state of (those who are not in any obvious way) Christians.  But the Bible specifically says we aren’t in a good position to judge other people’s hearts: “Who are you to judge another man’s servant?  By his own master he will stand or fall.” (Romans 14:4).  In some cases I think we can be reasonably confident in a positive view of another Christian’s salvation, but in this life I don’t think we can ever look at a non-Christian and say, God has given up on this person.

Secondly, there is surprisingly little support for (II) in the Bible, and some passages (such as 1 Peter 3:18-4:6) appear to say the opposite.

My view is that, while salvation does come through faith in Christ, we should reject (I) and (II) in the specific forms that they are stated above.  Then it seems like the AfC is only a major concern if we have something like the following objection:

Obj 3.  God has to reveal himself to everyone (of a given generation, I suppose) at the same time.  He isn’t allowed to reveal himself to humans in some particular order, so that some persons have sufficient reason to believe before other persons do.

But I also don’t see a good reason to subscribe to this.  Why should it be true?  Revealing himself to some people before others, would be fully compatible even with a Universalist scenario where all are eventually saved!  (Indeed, the very notion of “generations” already implies that some people come to God before others are even born.)

It will be noted that all three of Obj 1-3 involve thinking we know better than God how to construct a world, and that he is obligated to conform to our expectations.  But a God who has to conform to our expectations isn’t a God at all.   In fact, the notion of a crucified Messiah, the central paradox of Christianity, would not even be possible in a world with no religious confusion!  If there were no such thing as religious confusion, there could be no Christianity!

Furthermore, by revealing himself first to the prophets and apostles, who in turn evangelize others, God makes Christians into a community (the Church).  This is a great good, that would not so obviously occur if we all received our understanding from God in a direct way from heaven, that was totally disconnected with the witness of others.

Speaking of witnessing, if it is our Christian responsibility to share the good news, and make it credible by our lives, then it seems inevitable that our (many) failures to do so will result there being some people who don’t yet have good reasons to believe.  You could imagine God making a world where our actions couldn’t affect anyone else spiritually, but I don’t think such a world would be better than the one we live in.  (Indeed it would be less of a “world”, in the sense of a system of interacting persons and things…)

Again, this is not the end of the story.  But it is a reason for things not to be 100% clear right here and now.

To summarize: If there is enough evidence for me to rationally believe, the Argument from Confusion is unsound and thus should be rejected.  But if there isn’t enough evidence for me to rationally believe, the argument is redundant with my other reasons to disbelieve, and thus serves no purpose.

Or suppose I think there is enough evidence for me, but not enough evidence for other people.  In this case, the Argument from Confusion only speaks against Christianity if I put myself in a role of a judge and say that I know who is intellectually honest, and I also put myself in the role of a prophet and say that I know that God will nevertheless reject such people.  But in fact, I am not in a good position to know that God does indeed ultimately reject such people!  Instead, I should pay attention to the insight that I do have, and follow it as best I can.  Without getting sidetracked by saying to God: “What about this other person?”  Why should God reveal to me his plans about somebody else?  What matters is if I myself have enough light to come to Christ.

Therefore, in none of these configurations is the AfC particularly convincing.  And of course, if the subcases (a) and (b) are unconvincing when considered separately, they will also be unconvincing when combined together into a single argument.

Comparing Religions XII: Summary and Concluding Thoughts

This is the summary and conclusions for the Comparing Religions blog series.  We went through a series of questions about what you should ask to identify if a religion is true and good.  In my experience, a lot of skeptics don’t even try to answer these questions.  They just assume they know what answer they would get if they tried, so they don’t bother…

It was only when this series was mostly written that I realized it maps onto the statement in the Nicene Creed about the Christian Church:

I believe in one holyuniversal, and apostolic Church…

ONE
Regarding the first term “one”, I didn’t say much about Unity—disputes about this tend to have more to do, ironically, with all the arguments that Christians have with each other—see my post on Seeking Christian Unity for some thoughts about it.  But it is certainly probable that if Christians spent more of their energy on loving each other than fighting each other, as Jesus said we were supposed to do, then Christianity would also look more supernatural to outsiders.  I suppose one could check various religions for their degree of internal harmony and unity, but I didn’t.  Of course this would depend on quite a few contingent historical factors, such as how long the religion has had to splinter into different rival groups…

The whole thing kicked off with this blog post: Theology: Less Speculative than Quantum Gravity, in which I came up with a list of questions (quoted below) that seemed reasonable to ask when comparing the merits of various religions.

Then I had the (perhaps foolish) idea, sometime around 2016, to actually try to give my own answers to these questions!  Obviously, I had to start by making various disclaimers:

Part I: Introduction

which at least satisfies the ONE condition by—well read the Roman numeral, it clearly says one on it!

UNIVERSAL
Regarding the universality (also known as catholicity) of the Christian Church, its credibility on this topic could be treated with respect to space:

II. World Evangelism: Has the religion persuaded a significant fraction of the world population, outside a single ethnic group, to believe in it?

or it could be treated with respect to time:

III. Ancient Roots: How does the religion relate to previous and subsequent religions?

APOSTOLIC
The Apostolicity of the Church has to do with its claim to be founded, not primarily on any kind of vague philosophy or mysticism, but on concrete historical events—the teaching, miracles, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ—which were witnessed and reported by a specific group of people, the Apostles.

(Obviously, this principle is in some tension with universality, as the witnessing of a specific historical event, must happen at a specific time and place, even if the testimony later goes out into the whole world.  It is this type of tension that keeps life interesting…)

The first question is whether a distinctive claim of supernatural revelation is being made at all—there are lots of things out there that people call religions, which don’t have this!  (And they might not even claim to.  They may be perfectly nice political, philosophical, or spiritual movements nevertheless, but they aren’t competing directly with the main Christian claim:

IV. Supernatural Claims:  Did the religious founder claim his message came from supernatural revelation, or is it only the reflections of some wise philosopher who didn’t claim to have divine sanction for their teaching?

The next questions have to do with whether the supernatural features fall under the category known as myths, that is traditional fun stories people tell about gods and heroes in the distant past, that have no real claim to be based on historical testimony:

V: Historical Accounts: This one was a double feature: 

Are the primary texts describing some sort of mythological pre-history, or are they set in historical times?
&
Related, does it sound like fiction, or does it sound like history?

If it does claim to be history, how good is this claim?  Too long of a time interval, and the claim is suspect:

VI: Early Sources: How long was it between the time when the supposed supernatural events took place, and when they were first written down (in a document that has had copies of it preserved).  Is it early enough to suggest the text is based on testimony rather than later legends?

Finally, even if it is history, who cares?  Couldn’t it just have been a normal non-supernatural event?

VII: Natural Inexplicability: What are the odds that the purported supernatural events could have occurred for non-supernatural reasons?

Or could it have just been a pack of lies?  If so, there might be signs of it in the historical data:

VIII: Honest Messengers: Another double feature:

Did the main witnesses benefit materially from their testimony, or did they suffer for it?
&
Is there significant evidence of fraud among the originators of the religion?

(I also wrote a bonus post IX: Delayed Return on the issue of Christ’s prophecy of his Second Coming, because the overall issue of fulfilled or unfulfilled prophecy tends to come up frequently in dialogue between different religions.  I’m not really sure this post belongs with the rest, as it doesn’t discuss the issue across a broad section of different world religions, but I gave it a number so I can’t leave it out!)

HOLY
Obviously, while historical credibility is the main concern here, the question of identifying fraud starts to raise more general questions about what is the moral and spiritual credibility of various religious movements.  The Christian Church claims thinks of this function as related to holiness, a certain sort of closeness to God which Jesus enables in those who follow him.  Something related to moral goodness, but which goes beyond mere conscientiousness, into something more like sacred presence.

Although the whole point of holiness is that it mixes together goodness and spirituality in a non-separable package deal, in this series we considered the two aspects separately.  First we looked at moral profoundness:

X: Moral Depth: What is the general moral character of the religious teaching?

and then at the sense of felt spiritual contact with the divine:

XI: Spiritual Experience: Do people who are serious about this religion generally feel that they are put into an actual relationship with the divine?

Of course, this wraps back around to the question of universality—is this religion actually for everybody?  The various topics bleed into each other and can’t be fully separated.

Concluding Thoughts

First, I would like to recommend a couple of books.  I cannot give credit to all the numerous material I have read about different religions over the years.   But one particularly interesting book I read recently about minor religious traditions is Heirs to Forgotten Kingdoms, by a former UN and British diplomat who talks about various (mostly persecuted) minor religious groups in the Middle East: the Zoroastrians, Mandaeans,  Samaritans, Yidzis, and more!  This is not an apologetics book, it is sociology, but if you manged to make it through all of these posts, you’ll probably be interested to read about the modern experiences of some of these groups.

More foundationally, in some respects my approach in this series is secretly following St. Chesterton’s The Everlasting Man.  I owe to him, the idea that most Comparative Religion proceeds on the basis of essentially false parallels.  He proposes dividing up the pagan religious world on quite different lines:

In this sketch of religious history, with all decent deference to men much more learned than myself, I propose to cut across and disregard this modern method of classification, which I feel sure has falsified the facts of history. I shall here submit an alternative classification of religion or religions, which I believe would be found to cover all the facts and, what is quite as important here, all the fancies. Instead of dividing religion geographically and as it were vertically, into Christian, Moslem, Brahmin, Buddhist, and so on, I would divide it psychologically and in some sense horizontally; into the strata of spiritual elements and influences that could sometimes exist in the same country, or even in the same man. Putting the Church apart for the moment, I should be disposed to divide the natural religion of the mass of mankind under such headings as these: God; the Gods; the Demons; the Philosophers. I believe some such classification will help us to sort out the spiritual experiences of men much more successfully than the conventional business of comparing religions; and that many famous figures will naturally fall into their place in this way who are only forced into their place in the other.

To be sure, St. Chesterton does not do so as a professional historian but as an early 20th century amateur relying primarily on the work of Wells, and it often shows.  But he gets something essential right that a lot of smart people get wrong.

I’m not sure I ever responded anywhere to the inane atheist canard: “We are all atheists about most gods, I just disbelieve in one more than you do.”  While it should be obvious to anyone who carefully read this series, it is worth emphasizing that this facile dismissal really gets the terrain regarding comparative religion completely and totally backwards.

It is quite false, actually, that religions have to assert that all other religions are 100% wrong.  In fact, as a committed Christian I cannot do so, because any time Christianity and another religion X agree on some proposition P, logically I have to think that religion got P right, because my only other option is to think that Christianity is wrong about it.  This is not sycnretism, it is just logic.

It is NOT in fact true that there are a large number N of religions, each of which believes in N different gods, and disbelieves in the existence of all the other N-1 gods.  Rather, the landscape of comparative religion mainly involves two fundamentally incompatible ideas:

1) Polytheism (worship of multiple gods, usually viewed as beings of limited power and goodness who were born at some finite time in the past), and

2) Monotheism (the belief there is only one God worthy of worship, who is viewed as the Creator of all things and supremely good).

Within each of these two groups, the atheist canard is inapplicable.  When educated members of two different monotheistic traditions meet, we do NOT typically assert that the other group’s God does not really exist.  Rather, we recognize that the term “God” (or “Elohim”, “Allah”, “The Great Spirit”, among some ancient philosophers “Zeus”) is a reference to the one actual God who created everything.  We may have somewhat divergent beliefs about this God, but we also typically agree on quite a lot, in terms of divine attributes!  (When one of my Muslim friends offers to pray for me, I don’t say to him “No I don’t believe in Allah”.   Because “Allah” just means “God” in Arabic, and whatever important things we disagree on, we both agree that God exists and answers prayer.)

Somewhat similarly, when two groups of pagan polytheists meet, they seldom assume the other nation’s gods are not real.  They might identify them, or add them as new members to their pantheon, or claim that “my god can beat up your god”.  But there is no need to deny their existence.  The whole point of poly-theism is that you can worship (and a forteriori, accept the existence of) multiple deities at once!

The only time claims of “nonexistence of deities” come up, between different theistic traditions, is when Monotheists critique Polytheism.  In principle Monotheism and Polytheism could be combined in a henotheistic setup (one chief Classical Theist God, and also lots of little-g Homeric-style gods).  But the Monotheistic tradition of Judaism and its descendants also adheres to Monolatry, the exclusive worship of one real Deity.  Even though no denial that spirits higher than human beings exist (e.g. angels and demons), they are regarded as strictly finite beings, unworthy of being worshipped by free men and women.

This implies that polytheism is, at the very least deeply confused about the spiritual realm.  Which is not to say there are no truths in paganism, either.  As a Christian I do still see a lot of value in pagan myths at the level of imagination, and even foreshadowing of Christ!

Certainly, no decent pagan would agree that we owe no respect or piety to whatever beings are responsible for our food, rain, and birth.  That is in fact an important proposition P that Christianity and Paganism are in agreement about.  In other words, I would regard even pagans as being much closer to reality on this point, than atheists are.

For a sympathetic expression of pagan values—and for an understanding of the “agnostic” way that most pagans relate to the divine—it is best to consider an example from somebody who actually understands such a religious tradition from the inside.  Miyazaki, the greatest animated film-maker of all time, gives us a glimpse of the psychology of the thing, in his iconic My Neighbor Totoro.  (One of the few movies suitable for both 3 year olds and adults.)

I am not referring to the perspective of Mei in the film, who has actually met the big Totoro (there are three), but rather the perspective of the Dad, who I think provides a more typical Japenese attitude towards religion.  Earlier in the film, the Dad says he “believes” his little daughter when she claims to have met the forest spirit Totoro.  So they all take a bike ride up to the giant tree that Mei fell into earlier…

Father: What a beautiful tree it is. This tree’s been here, oh, since before anyone can remember. You know, a long time ago, men and trees were the best of friends. It’s actually because of this tree that I decided to buy our house in the first place. And you can bet Mommy’ll like it when she sees it. So, what do you say we thank the king of the forest and get back for our lunch?

Satsuki: I have to meet Michiko after lunch to get ready for an exam.

Mei: I’m coming too!

Father: Atten-tion! (to tree) Thank you for all you’ve done for Mei. Please look after her and protect her forever.  (All three bow.)

Mei & Satsuki: Thank you so much.  (Father turns and runs)

Father: Last one home’s a rotten egg!

Satsuki: Hey, that’s not fair. You cheated!

Mei: Wait! Hey! Hey, wait up!

This is neither a creedal statement in the Christian sense, nor is it disbelief in the Atheist sense.  It occupies a sort of in-between, uncanny space, of respect to higher and unknown powers, but without any sort of clear dogma about what those powers look like.

As Chesterton explains paganism:

Two facts follow from this psychology of day-dreams, which must be kept in mind throughout their development in mythologies and even religions.  First, these imaginative impressions are often strictly local.  So far from being abstractions turned into allegories, they are often images almost concentrated into idols.  The poet feels the mystery of a particular forest; not of the science of afforestation or the department of woods and forests.  He worships the peak of a particular mountain, not the abstract idea of altitude.  […]

The second consequence is this; that in these pagan cults there is every shade of sincerity—and insincerity.  In what sense exactly did an Athenian really think he had to sacrifice to Pallas Athena?  What scholar is really certain of the answer?  In what sense did Dr. Johnson really think that he had to touch all the posts in the street or that he had to collect orange-peel?  In what sense does a child really think that he ought to step on every alternate paving-stone?  […]

But he who has most sympathy with myths will most fully realise that they are not and never were a religion, in the sense that Christianity or even Islam is a religion.  They satisfy some of the needs satisfied by a religion; and notably the need for doing certain things at certain dates; the need of the twin ideas of festivity and formality. But though they provide a man with a calendar they do not provide him with a creed.  A man did not stand up and say ‘I believe in Jupiter and Juno and Neptune,’ etc., as he stands up and says ‘I believe in God the Father Almighty,’ and the rest of the Apostles Creed. Many believed in some and not in others, or more in some and less in others, or only in a very vague poetical sense in any.  There was no moment when they were all collected into an orthodox order which men would fight and be tortured to keep intact.  […]

The substance of all such paganism may be summarised thus. It is an attempt to reach the divine reality through the imagination alone; in its own field reason does not restrain it at all.  It is vital to view of all history that reason is something separate from religion even in the most rational of these civilisations.  It is only as an afterthought, when such cults are decadent or on the defensive, that a few Neo-Platonists or a few Brahmins are found trying to rationalise them, and even then only by trying to allegorise them.  But in reality the rivers of mythology and philosophy run parallel and do not mingle till they meet in the sea of Christendom.  Simple secularists still talk as if the Church had introduced a sort of schism between reason and religion.  The truth is that the Church was actually the first thing that ever tried to combine reason and religion. There had never before been any such union of the priests and the philosophers […]

The crux and crisis is that man found it natural to worship; even natural to worship unnatural things. The posture of the idol might be stiff and strange; but the gesture of the worshipper was generous and beautiful.  He not only felt freer when he bent; he actually felt taller when he bowed.  Henceforth anything that took away the gesture of worship would stunt and even maim him for ever.

To be absolutely clear, I don’t, in fact, have the same dismissive attitude towards paganism that the New Atheists claim I should have towards pagan religions.  I just don’t think they are revelation in the same sense that the Bible is.  Nor do I think that, for the most part, pagans made such claims, even though they did of course mostly believe that the gods were real.

But the amount of religious commonality becomes much greater if you look at the other Abrahmaic religions, which between them share about 50% of the world population.  If Christianity is right, then the teachings of Judaism are approximately 100% true (just not complete).  And Islam is perhaps 90% true, if you focus on essentials.  (Even though obviously Christians can’t accept Mohammad’s claim to be a true prophet, it’s obviously not a big fat coincidence either that so many of his teachings—the ones that agree with previous monotheistic prophets—were correct!)

But, this does not mean that Jews and Muslims—let alone monotheists on purely philsophical grounds—have 100% of the full truths that Christians have.  It makes a difference that God came in human flesh.

The doctrines of the Trinity and Incarnation and Resurrection and so on, are indeed revolutionary and important and salvific religious truths.  But accepting them doesn’t at all require saying that everybody else is 100% wrong about everything!  In fact, they build on other ideas, that are broadly shared by a wide variety of religious traditions.  Which is why, when Christians share the good news, they can and should assume that their audience typically already has some idea of what they mean by “God”, and the idea that we need some sort of forgiveness or redemption.  These ideas might require correction, but not total repudiation.  That’s what it looks like when somebody has part of the truth, but is offered even more.

Nor, of course, do Christians claim to know 100% of the truths about God.  Far from it!  Like everyone else, we only know what was revealed to us, and there is plenty that remains mysterious.

Comparing Religions XI: Spiritual Experience

11. Do people who are serious about this religion generally feel that they are put into an actual relationship with the divine?

Of all the questions I have been asking, this is by far the most difficult to write about in an objective style.  By its nature, it is far more subjective and anecdotal than most of my criteria, yet leaving it out would be even more misleading.  It would be lopsided to only think about the “objective” criteria.  Even if the more “subjective” side of religion is something which each person must discover for themselves, one cannot leave it out of the accounts.  We can at least ask people what they have experienced, and then look into our own hearts as well.

One person can have a mystical perception of God, while another person thinks he sees subtle traces of his presence in subtle ways in Nature and other people, while a third person claims never to have had any special religious experiences at all.  As far as one can tell from external observation, any or all of these three people may be telling the truth about themselves!  One person saying “I have experienced God!” in no way contradicts another person saying “I have not!”.

Yet, just because the criterion is subjective does not mean we should wallow in a religious relativism where “anything goes”.  If the Monotheistic tradition that goes back to St. Abraham is correct, then there is only one God who created everything, then we have no right to idolatrously remake God in our own image.  He is the Reality, our job is to conform ourselves to that reality.  This contrasts with the imaginative riot of Polytheism, Pantheism, or New Age spirituality, which is pleasing at the level of the imagination because it allows each person to make up their own conception of divinity to suit their own fancy.  Yet if you choose to serve gods of your own making, this threatens to be a roundabout way of worshipping yourself, a subtle snare that prevents one from humbly acknowledging flaws and the need for spiritual growth.

If the God of Monotheism exists, then this is an transcendent, metaphysical reality, which does not depend in any way on our own opinions.  Similarly, if he has intervened miraculously in history, this is an objective fact which can be investigated using historical tools.  On the other hand, if God has relationships with individual human beings, then he might relate to each of billions of different people in a billion slightly different ways.  Yet if there is only one God, then it is the same God for all of them.

Now in Christianity, we believe that God is love in his essential being.  Since love is a relationship between persons, even God, even though he is one being, has in himself something analogous to a loving communion of persons, whom we call the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.  Although the Son and Holy Spirit exist with the Father eternally, he has also sent them into the world in order to reveal himself tangibly and empirically to human beings.  It is because of this revelation that we know that God is love.

The Son is revealed historically, as the person of Jesus Christ, who could be touched and seen, who suffered on the cross and rose from the dead.  The Spirit testifies to the work of the Son, in part by doing the miracles, but also by working inside people’s hearts to show them the true meaning of Christ’s sacrifice.  Hence, any Christian apologetic that ignores the subjective side of things is fundmantally lopsided, since it neglects the work of the Third Person of the Trinity, who is just as much divine as the Father and the Son.

Now Christianity says that the Holy Spirit dwells, not just in prophets or clergy, but in every single believer.  Accordingly, each of us is put into a personal relationship with God through Jesus Christ.  (This is particularly emphasized by Evangelical Protestants like myself, but it is not absent from other Christian traditions.)

The Bible indicates that this was God’s plan from the beginning, although at first the people of Israel were not ready for it.  When Moses was asked by Joshua to stop two elders who were prophesying in his camp, he rebuked him, saying “Are you jealous for my sake?  I wish that all the Lord’s people were prophets and that the Lord would put his Spirit on them!” (Num. 11:29).

Hundreds of years later, the prophet Jeremiah described the New Covenant which would come through the Messiah:

“But this is the New Covenant I will make with the people of Israel after those days,” says the Lord. “I will put my instructions deep within them, and I will write them on their hearts.  I will be their God, and they will be my people.  And they will not need to teach their neighbors, nor will they need to teach their relatives, saying, ‘You should know the Lord.’  For everyone, from the least to the greatest, will know me already,” says the Lord.  “And I will forgive their wickedness, and I will never again remember their sins.”  (Jeremiah 31:33-34)

Making some allowances for Eastern hyperbole, this is a good description of the way in which the Christian religion differs from the Jewish one that preceeds it: (1) It will involve the Spirit guiding people’s hearts (rather than being an external code of laws for a nation), and (2) the forgiveness of sins will play a central role in the New Covenant.  As St. John writes:

I am writing these things to you about those who are trying to lead you astray.  As for you, the anointing [i.e. the Holy Spirit] you received from him remains in you, and you do not need anyone to teach you.  But as his anointing teaches you about all things and as that anointing is real, not counterfeit—just as it has taught you, remain in him.  (1 John 2:26-27)

Now, I suppose there must be some people in all theistic religions who claim that their religion has put them directly in touch with God (or one of the gods).  At the very least, the founder of the religion usually claims to be some kind of prophet.  So I’m not going to make the strong claim that nobody ever feels like they have a personal relationship with God in a non-Christian religion.  But I am going to claim that it’s much rarer for the rank-and-file members of other religions to feel that way.

Nor am I going to make the strong claim that all Christians have exactly the same kind or degree of experience of God, that they all “hear God speaking to them” in the exact same ways.  I am trying to speak in generalities here.  Of course, there are a large number of nominal believers who are Christian only in a cultural sense, and aren’t really seeking God with their whole heart.  But even among serious believers, there is no promise in the New Testament that everyone gets the exact same thing (regarding such spiritual experiences).

St. Paul taught that each person in the Church has a different set of spiritual gifts, and that we need each other to be complete.  Jesus said “Blessed are those who have not seen and yet have believed” (John 20:29).  What matters is that God is working through you, inspiring you to love other people.  As Jesus said, “The wind blows wherever it pleases.  You hear its sound, but you cannot tell where it comes from or where it is going.  So it is with everyone born of the Spirit” (John 3:8).  If God is love, then you can tell that God is working in a person’s life when they start being transformed into his likeness.

Now as far as I can tell, the percentage of Jews and Muslims who would claim to have this kind of intimate relationship with God is quite small.  They don’t usually claim that God has spoken to them personally, or that he dwells within their hearts, or anything along those lines.  These religions don’t really encourage that kind of attitude; it probably seems presumptuous to them.  (My experience is somewhat limited by living in an English speaking country where Christianity is the most common religion, but I do not think this fully accounts for the differences.)

Yet, when I go to various churches, I regularly hear people talking about how God spoke to them, or led them to do various things.  I myself have often felt like his Spirit was guiding me when I had to make some decision, or had some difficulty.  (I have also had mystical experiences of a more dramatic kind, but let’s leave that aside for now.)  Maybe once every month or two (though sometimes at much longer intervals) and often at unexpected times, I feel like I’m being guided by a presence that I recognize.  Sometimes one also gets what seems to be confirmation of the message, from the words of other Christians.  (Once a woman told me they had received the exact same message that I had just shared with the church, and it wasn’t anything obvious either.)

This does not mean there have not been many times when God seemed to be completely and frustratingly silent, or where I wasn’t at all sure whether some thought was from God or just my own subconscious.  I really don’t want to present a false impression here.  Two weeks after some really dramatic spiritual event, I’ll be wondering just like the rest of you why God doesn’t speak more clearly.  So my faith is not all that strong.  But an inability to remember and cling to the truth seems more like my own fault, than his.  So yes, I do believe God talks to me, and to other Christians, from time to time, even if it is not as often as I personally might prefer.

Of course, the other side of prayer is us talking to God.  For a great many pious Jews and Muslims, such “prayer” seems to mean reciting a prescribed set of words, in a specific language (which they may not even understand!) at certain times of day, according to a prescribed set of rules.  Now there is nothing wrong with saying prayers that have been written by other people, if that is helpful to you.  And there is no reason why somebody couldn’t genuinely mean the exact same words each day either.  So I’m not trying to speak against set prayers per se.  But when prayer becomes a mere ritual obligation, it dies.

To me, prayer is the pouring our your deepest needs before your God and Savior.  It is speaking your thoughts, as if to your closest friend; reverently yes, but also boldly, because you are trying to make an actual connection with the Power that made the stars!  It is seeking his deepest will, knowing that you would not be seeking him, if he were not first seeking you.  It is life and breath, not a mere recitation of words!

In my own American context, I’ve talked to several practicing Jews and Muslims about their religion, and while many of them were trying to obey the rules, none ever seemed to think about their religion in this passionate, heartfelt way.  There may be exceptions, but I haven’t met them.  (Except for one Jewish friend, whom I myself encouraged to have a more personal relationship to God in prayer, but he later became a Christian as a result.)

An exception might be Sufism, a mystical school of Islam that seems to encourage a more inner relationship with God.  I don’t really know enough about this movement to comment very meaningfully, but any religious tradition capable of producing pop songs expressing love for God must be doing something right.  Unfortunately it’s hard to get into this material as an English speaker.  For a Christian version, I would suggest the song “All the Way” by the band Delirious?:

Come close to me, too close for words
And still my beating heart
I find your thoughts without one glance
We’re going all the way

With you I’m washed as white as the snow
And all crimson stain becomes just a shadow
You know I would be blind without you
So light up my way to find my way home again
Today, today, today, we’re going all the way

A skeptic might wonder whether this kind of intimate relationship with God is merely a form of self-deception, tricking oneself into believing things based on the expectation of the community around us.  But if so, it should only appear in people who are properly brainwashed.  I have a friend from St. John’s College who at the time went by the name of Stella.  She used to dabble in Wicca, but became a Christian during our sophomore year from reading the Gospel of John, and Augustine, and perhaps a little bit of my influence as well.  “My sheep hear my voice,” Jesus had said in a seminar reading, and it struck home to her.  A few months later, she went down the aisle in a church and rededicated her life to Christ (she had been baptized as an infant in the Catholic church, but her mother had left it quite early in her life).

A while after her conversion, Stella came to me with a concern.  Apparently, God was beginning to speak quietly to her in strange ways, giving her little bits of advice and so on.  Not always with words, “body language” she called it.  Evidently, she’d had no expectation whatsoever that this was going to happen.  In fact she was concerned it meant she was going crazy or something!  I explained to her that this was a perfectly normal occurance, not necessarily correlated with any other sort of insanity, just part of the package deal for Christians.  I also explained that she shouldn’t expect it to happen all the time; that there might be long periods of silence and that this didn’t necesarily mean she’d done anything wrong.

Scoff if you like about what we call people who hear voices in their heads, obviously it is just not true that all these ordinary Church-goers have schizophrenia.  Indeed, the weird thing about hearing the voice of God, is that it doesn’t feel like going crazy, it feels more like being in tune with someone who knows your deepest, most authentic self.  It is stablizing, centering.  It tells you to do things which seem hard at the time (like confessing sins) but which ultimately promote spiritual growth.  And to me this voice speaks with the same voice as Christ in the Gospels.  I’ve read and loved many fictional characters, but none of them have ever entered my brain and become a living fountain of new and profound advice.

For a sympathetic (but at times critical) anthropological analysis of God talking to Evangelical Christians, the book When God Talks Back by T.M. Luhrmann is pretty interesting.

It probably should be explictly said that this can sometimes go terribly wrong in certain churches when the expectation to have such experiences is too high (or when certain Christians start thinking the Devil—who is not known for being particularly stablizing and centering—is speaking to them).

If God isn’t talking—other than through the Bible of course—but you have an emotional need that he speak to a situation, there can certainly be a temptation to manufacture experiences.  And there are times when I’ve probably convinced myself that fragmentary thoughts or images popping into my mind were more meaningful than they actually were.  Only now, in retrospect, do I realize the (nevertheless at the time obvious) emotional need that was in some cases (but not all) driving my attitudes.

And yet, revelation from God is an inextricable part of Christian experience.  And (rarely, to some people) that revelation becomes more intense and harder to deny.  So, as St. Paul said, “Though there is nothing to be gained by it, I will go on to visions and revelations of the Lord.” (2 Cor 12:1)  Specifically, I will talk about more dramatic cases in which I am still quite sure that some communication occurred, where I would only doubt it if I were doubting that God communicates to anyone.

Some Personal Experiences

When I was 20 years old, in my senior year of college, I had a vision of God while I was in church on Sunday.  Let’s back up and put this in context.  The previous day I had been hiking up Atalaya, a gorgeous mountain visible from St. John’s College, with my friend Stella.  We spoke about many things, among them a question about my best friend (the Jewish guy I alluded to above): I had been accepted to grad school at U Maryland, and because his parents lived in Arlington, he thought it would be a great idea to live in an apartment together somewhere in DC area.  I wondered out loud whether this was a good idea because it seemed—and it’s going to be pretty hard for me to justify this thought, because I now can’t anymore see it as well-motivated—like it might be some sort of immature “failure to move on” from the college experience.

The next day, I was in Church.  That semester, I was attending Holy Trinity, the Antiochian Orthodox Church that I mentioned in my post on Seeking Church Unity.  Although as a Protestant I couldn’t take communion there, during their Divine Liturgy on Sunday they distribute a different loaf called “peace bread” to visitors and other members of the congregation.  As I ate the bread, I had an overwhelming sense of the love of God the Father, as obvious as anything one could imagine, and I started involuntarily but quietly laughing with joy.

(At the same time—but this played only a very minor role in the experience—I had a sort of strong visual imagination like an array of solid pillars and pools in between them; a little bit like the Wood Between the Worlds in the Narnia books; or like the adjacent jacuzzi tubs at my parents’ timeshare on Kaua’i (but without the bigger pool, just the smaller ones.)

There were no words and no rebuke.  Yet it was instantly obvious that the concerns I’d had the previous day about “moving on” were frivolous and absurd; inconsistent with the character of the divine love.  It was as if that thought had been unable to withstand contact with the holy presence of God, and had been purged with fire.

The fact that I was tired from hiking and had eaten no breakfast might of course have had something to do with what happened.  Another mystical experience, which I’d had the previous year, also came when eating after breaking a fast of many hours (this was after an urgent visit to the hospital with Stella, not a deliberate religious exercise).

In my mind, this bodily aspect is no reason to doubt the reality of these experiences.  As a Christian I believe that the body and spirit are a sacramental unity, and that something having a biological cause does not in any way prevent in from being a vehicle for God’s Spirit to communicate to us.  This is one reason why the Eucharistic Body and Blood is the central element of Christian worship.  In our human experience, love, sin, and salvation are all messy bodily realities, involving not just abstract spirituality, but also sticky bodily fluids.  This is the domain in which we live as embodied animals, and this is the domain in which the Gospel says that Christ was Incarnate (that is, become flesh) to save us.

As it happened, my best friend and I did get an apartment together for my first year.  And while in many ways that year was a difficult and lonely time for us, that was the year when he courageously told his parents that he was considering converting to Christianity.  (He was very afraid that his father would disown him, as rabbinic law technically requires, but I’m glad to say that he didn’t!  Even though it was very difficult for their family for a while.)

And yes, I do know of situations where God told people to do things which only made sense in light of circumstances which they didn’t already know.  For example, St. Wesley Tink (the former pastor of the church I attended in Princeton), once woke up very early in the morning and felt like God was telling him to drive to his mother-in-law’s house, several hours away.  When he got there, she was in a diabetic coma.  The doctors said she probably would have died if he hadn’t stopped by.  Go ahead; sit down and calculate the odds of him having that urge at the exact right time.  I’ll still be here when you get back.

Another time, when I was a postdoc in Santa Barbara, we were about to go to Europe when we learned that our professional cat-sitter had died!  But one of my wife’s friends offered, out of the blue, to look after our cat Lily.  She knew we were going to Europe, but she had no idea what had happened, and we’d travelled many times before.  When I asked her why, she hesitated a long time and then said that she felt God prompting her to make the call. (Evidently, despite what the Zoroastrians teach, God loves cats too!)

Another pastor I know, St. Dick Dickenson, once prayed over a man in the hospital whose appendix had burst.  He said he heard himself praying out loud that the poisons would collect at the man’s colon—wondering all the while why he was praying out loud the names of various organs, that he had only the sketchiest notion where they might be located—and the doctors opened the man up and, according to him, it was exactly so.  If you knew this man, you would find it difficult to believe him to be insincere.

Or should I tell the story of a modern day Jonah, who was told by God to be a missionary to India?  He didn’t want to go, so he said no to God.  Then he was diagnosed with a rare illness which made his body unable to control its own temperature.  For medical reasons he was forced to move to a more tropical climate…. so he went to India after all.  (When he returns to American churches to tell about his work caring for orphans, he has to wear many bulky layers of coats, but his joy and love is obvious.)

I could tell other stories as well, but let’s stop here.  Of course this sort of thing is “anecdotal” evidence.  But despite the sneering of skeptics, I believe that such anecdotes can have significant evidental value if certain conditions are met.  To me, a lot of their value is that they are drawn from the small sample of Christians I am acquainted with personally.  It’s easy to imagine that certain very rare coincidences might happen around the world, and then those stories might be passed around like gossip and even exaggerated.  But then one would not expect to encounter so many incidents, in a small sample of acquaintences.

If you read in the newspaper that somebody caught a coelacanth while fishing (an order of fish previously believed to have gone extinct around the same time as the dinosaurs), that would be consistent with them being extremely rare events, or perhaps a hoax.  But if several of your friends, living in different areas, each caught coelacanths, then you’d have to conclude they were actually pretty common.  So it seems to me that such “anecdotes”, assuming they are genuine and selected from a small enough sample of individuals, can in principle produce a quite significant Bayesian confirmation of the supernatural.  Of course, the degree of confirmation may differ from person to person, depending on your circle of friends (and whether you attend a church where people feel comfortable talking about this sort of thing).

In any case, the purpose of these posts is to compare Christianity to other claims of supernatural revelation, not to the non-religion of Naturalistic Skepticism.  If, for whatever scientific and historical reason you come to believe in a god who might reveal himself to people, and if you want to be a part of that, then of course it’s important to check which modern-day religious communities actually make people feel like they’ve gotten in touch with the divine.

The next question is, are there any other religions besides Christianity which can make similar claims to be directly confirmed by religious experiences?

A Mormon Parallel?

The closest parallel case I know of is the LDS church, a.k.a. Mormonism.

In one sense this religion is fairly close to orthodox Christianity, in that Mormons acknowledge the Bible as Scripture even though they add additional writings by Joseph Smith.  In another sense, they are a million miles away, since they are polytheists.  (Not only are the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit three separate beings, they believe that the “Heavenly Father” is merely an exalted human being, who started out like us, but worked his way up the cosmic pyramid scheme and became the god of our plaent, just as good Mormon patriarchs will eventually become gods of their own planets.)  And “Jesus” is God’s eldest son, not in the sense of being the eternal Word, but in the crassly literal sense of spirit-procreation with some sort of Heavenly Mother-figure (although unlike any other polytheists ever to have existed, they completely ignore her in their worship ceremonies, which makes no sense if she has an equal metaphysical status to the “Heavenly Father”).  So although Mormons use the words “God” and “Jesus”, they refer to a completely different kind of entity than what Christians mean by these terms.  (But, of course, since they read the Bible, they also believe these beings did many of the same things that our God and Jesus did, so from a historical point of view there is still a lot of overlap.)

I assume it is quite possible that at times, a Mormon in prayer may be in touch with the true God.  After all, that’s the one God that actually exists.  But obviously an orthodox Christian cannot endorse any supposed revelations which seem to support Mormon doctrines that conflict with biblical truth.

Now on any objective historical analysis, the Book of Mormon is going to lose.  It was written by an confirmed charlatan, it reads like bible “fan fiction”, and its description of American Israelite tribes is totally inconsistent with the archaeological record.  Similarly, from an ethical perspective, the history of the LDS church leaves a lot to be desired.  For this reason Mormon missionaries rely on a subjective approach, based almost entirely around feelings.  Mormons believe that whoever reads the Book of Mormon and sincrely prays to find out if it is true, will receive a “burning in the bosom” confirming the message subjectively:

Behold, I would exhort you that when ye shall read these things, if it be wisdom in God that ye should read them, that ye would remember how merciful the Lord hath been unto the children of men, from the creation of Adam even down until the time that ye shall receive these things, and ponder it in your hearts.  And when ye shall receive these things, I would exhort you that ye would ask God, the Eternal Father, in the name of Christ, if these things are not true; and if ye shall ask with a sincere heart, with real intent, having faith in Christ, he will manifest the truth of it unto you, by the power of the Holy Ghost.  And by the power of the Holy Ghost ye may know the truth of all things. (Moroni 10:4-5)

Not very surprisingly (especially if there some psychological pressure being applied by friends, prospective spouses, or missionaries), a certain fraction of the people who try this test will report getting a confirmatory feeling.  This can then be interpreted as divine approval to believe something that could never commend itself by an objective analysis.

Mormons are also encouraged to listen to personal revelations from God after their conversion.  While anyone can receive revelation, it is generally dispensed in a heirarchical fashion, with fathers receiving guidance for their families and submitting to the revelations of their bishops, apostles, and president.  If this revelation directly contradicts what came before—as when the Mormons reversed themselves on polygamy, and whether black people have the “mark of Cain” and therefore cannot be members in good standing—well there is a Mormon saying that “the living prophets always take precedence” over dead prophets, so don’t worry about it!

The moral here is not to try to rely purely on subjective factors, especially ones produced by people and organizations which are very good at emotional manipulation (and I think there is no doubt that Joseph Smith falls into that category).  Also, I cannot help but record my own personal impression—with apologies to any Mormon who happens to be reading this—which is that even though most Mormons seem like very nice people, there is an odor of fakeness about it; as if they are plastic people, who have to always put on the right appearence in order to be accepted.  I have had the privilege to know a few holy people, and that is not what authentic spirituality looks like.

A blogger named Tracing Woodgrains recently gave a painfully honest account of leaving Mormonism after trying very hard to confirm it with spiritual experiences.  What struck me most about this account was the huge amount of intense pressure placed on him (and by implication every other person his age) to spiritually perform in a certain way.  While my experience may not be fully typical, even very devout evangelical congregations (still more, Catholic or mainline ones) tend to be much more laid back about this stuff.  This is only one person’s experience but it seems to indicate that the browbeating culture of Joseph Smith continues to this day.

Doubtless there are other, more othodox Christian groups, which have similar pressures to conform to certain religious experiences—for example in certain kinds of Pentecostal churches, where “speaking in tongues” is regarded as a necessary sign of baptism with the Holy Spirit—and I don’t approve of such pressure in that context either.  Spiritual domineering can occur in any religion.  But I don’t think this kind of thing can explain all the examples I personally know of where people think that God is talking to them, where this sort of domineering was absent.

Amida Buddha?

A second case study is “Pure Land” Buddhism, which worships the Amitabha Buddha.  Now from an outsider’s perspective, the first thing to know about Amida was that (unlike Guatama Buddha) there’s no reason for a non-Buddhist to think he ever existed historically!  Instead, there are texts written hundreds of years after Guatama (the earliest evidence of Amida devotion dates to the 2nd century AD), in which Guatama is represented as claiming that (somewhere a long time ago, in a galaxy far, far away) Amida existed.  He was, they say, a monk who swore a solemn vow that—after becomeing an enlightened Buddha—he would use his enlightened powers to create a “Pure Land” in which it is actually easy to become enlightened.

Any time a religion seems too difficult, inevitably there are going to be wishful people who try to find “shortcuts” in order to make it easier.  (Similarly, if a religion seems too easy, some censorious people are always going to try to add more rules, in order to make it more difficult!)  Remember all of those lay Buddhists who weren’t willing to renounce their family and livelihood in order to become enlightened?  Well, simply by devoting yourself to Amida Buddha by (in one version) praying to him at least 10 times, or (in another version) reciting the following Sanskrit mantra:

namo amitābhāya tathāgatāya tadyathā
amṛtabhave amṛtasaṃbhave
amṛtavikrānte amṛtavikrāntagāmini
gagana kīrtīchare svāhā

you can guarantee that you will be reborn in your next life into the “Pure Land”, where everything is great and being a Buddhist is easy.  (There are various alternative paradises in Buddhist cosmologies, which you might get to by being virtuous in this life, but unlike the Pure Land those one’s mostly aren’t really all that great, because too much pleasure is actually a big distraction from becoming enlightened.)

The Pure Land is full of jewelled gardens and bodhisattvas; there is no pain or suffering, and people can live for as long as they want, with the promise that they are assured of eventually becoming enlightened themselves, without retrogressing.  Although some of the promises are a little creepy to Westerners, like everyone having an exactly identical appearence (to prevent envy, I suppose) and the promise that women will be able to renounce their gender (because it’s easier to be enlightened if you’re a man).

I’ve heard that in Japan, the Pure Land monks would go around trying to get anyone they met on the road to read the scroll with the prayer to Amida.  If anyone was willing to recite the syllables (knowledge of Sanskrit not necessary), then the monks would rejoice in their salvation, and move on to the next person.  Believe in Amida Buddha: your sins will be forgiven and you will go to Heaven when you die!  Many Pure Land Buddhists have a strong emotional attachment to Amida Buddha, and speak of his presence in their lives in terms somewhat reminiscent of Jesus.  It’s like a parody of Evangelical Christianity!

But the differences with Christianity are also important, and should not be forgotten.  One crucial difference, is that life in the Pure Land is technically still shit, just like every other plane of existence.  The one good thing about it is that it’s supposed to make it easier to find the Exit.  They may play up the earthly paradise parts to get worldly-minded converts, but the goal is still to extinguish your own identity.

Another important difference, which I can hardly emphasize enough, is that there’s no objective historical evidence that Amida existed!

Most ordinary people know they need a Savior.  It is perhaps not too suprising, that in cultures where Jesus was unknown, people come up with imaginary religious Saviors in order to meet their (quite real) spiritual need.  Yet Jesus is the actual, historical Son of God that meets that need; as St. Peter said: “Salvation is found in no one else, for there is no other name under heaven given to mankind by which we must be saved” (Acts 4:12).  Not because there is anything magical about the name JE-ZUS considered as a mantra, as a pair of syllables, but because the name stands for the historical reality of God’s salvation dwelling among us.  (Which is good, because the English version of Jesus’ name isn’t very close to the original pronunciation.)  In the Christian worldview, salvation is a matter of objective spiritual facts, not subjective warm fuzzy feelings.

Nevertheless, even if the worshippers of Amida have the wrong answer to the question, Christians should note that they are still asking the right question.  I believe that all those who are earnestly looking for a righteous Savior will—in this life or the next—find the true Savior that brings abundant life (not destruction of individuality) and learn to taste his goodness.

In the meantime, Amida Buddhism is a potent warning to Evangelical Christianity about the dangers of shallowness.  We must take care lest the “altar call” and “sinners prayer” become mere magical talismans, a superstitious ritual (much like reciting a Sanskrit mantra) for making sure you go to the right place after you die.  But I am convinced that if you really let Jesus (the living being, described in the Gospels) take control of your heart, he will change you in a way that goes beyond the placebo effect.  I’ve seen it change other people, and I’ve seen the effects on myself.

More Buddhist Experiences

That said, Amidism is a degenerate form of Buddhism.  What about a more authentic version?  I promised earlier to consider the claim that Buddhism can be supported by means of religious experiences obtained through meditation, particularly Vipassana (insight meditation) in which one contemplates one’s own experience very carefully to try to discern its three attributes of dukkha (unsatisfactoriness), anatta (non-self), and anicca (impermanence).

Early Buddhist texts describe a series of increasingly sophisticated alternative states of consiousness to be attained in sequence.  Eventually, one arrives at “infinite space”, then “infinite consciousness”, then “infinite nothingness”, and then the classical-logic defying description “neither perception nor non-perception”.  None of these count as Enlightenment yet.  They are just steps on the road to Nirvana, the complete release from all attachments (which is believed to prevent any further rebirths into the world).

(Other mystical meditation schools, such as those found in certain sects of Hinduism, may describe paths containing different numbers of steps, and different final goals.  It is unclear to what extent the final results of practicing in different traditions lead to similar outcomes, but in the remarks that follow I will mostly focus on Buddhism since I’ve studied it more closely.)

Some empirically minded people may find the idea attractive that in principle you could check the existence of these mental states yourself without needing to put faith or trust in any kind of supernatural beings.  Of course, these descriptions are obscure enough that you would probably still need a human teacher or guide, to make sure you’re really experiencing the same thing that previous generations of meditators have experienced.

Or perhaps, we could hook a monk up to a MRI machine and note which areas of the brain are active when they meditate.  This could scientifically confirm, if not the phenomenological content of the state, at least that they are objectively in a different brain-state than non-meditators, showing that they are not simply self-deluded.  (A Google Scholar search for the conjunction of “meditation” & “neuroscience” provides over a thousand results, so it appears this is a somewhat hot topic!)

So if all this were done, would this show that e.g. Buddhism is “true”?  Well, not exactly.  The thing is, even without doing these experiments, I already believe that meditators are able, with practice, to attain specific alternative psychological states.  (Just as I already believe that taking drugs can produce specific alternative states of consciousness.)  The question is not whether these states exist, but whether they have the metaphysical significance that Buddhists attribute to them.

To test this, we could try to compare the teachings of Buddhism to the current scientific theories about the brain, and if as some say they match (for example, by deflating certain notions of the “self”) then perhaps one could say that these teachings of Buddhism had scientific support.

However, from the perspective of logical consistency, there are a few things which no “experience” could possibly imply, because they would contradict the a priori preconditions for having experiences in the first place.  For example, no experience could imply Eliminativism (the belief that consciousness does not really exist), because experiences are conscious by definition.  (I am not aware of any Eastern religion that clearly teaches Eliminativism, but this example will help to illuminate the following points.)

Nor could any experience logically imply that dualistic logic is unreliable, because that would be a self-undermining and contradictory claim.  You cannot even say, “Dualism is false, Non-Dualism is true” without introducing distinctions and divisions between different ideas and concepts, affirming some and denying others.  (Note that some Buddhist teachers explicitly deny that Non-Dualism is an authentic part of Buddha’s teaching, while other Buddhist schools, like the majority of Hindus, accept it.)

Similarly, I also do not think any experience can really imply the complete non-existence of the self.  It might show me that my experiences have different properties than what I might naively think (e.g. that I perceive various objects in my visual field in rapid succession rather than simultanously), or that certain aspects of my “self” are socially constructed and that I can let go of them without suffering harm, or that the self changes in certain ways, or that it has parts that do not always cohere into a perfect unity.  But if I simply define myself as “whatever it is that is having `this’ experience”, then I do not see how any possible experience could refute this claim.  (It may be that what is really being taught is a pragmatic attitude of not valuing the self, even as defined in this minimal way, but that would have more to do with ethics than metaphysics.)  Even monks who claim to have achieved Enlightenment, still talk about it as something that happened to them, and they can distinguish it from the claim that somebody else was Enlightened.

(And while I do not believe that Christianity requires belief in an immaterial and immortal soul, I don’t see how the nonexistence of such a soul could be directly established by introspection either, since its existence need not itself be a direct object of experience.)

For the same reasons, Neuroscience cannot really imply Eliminativism or No-Self, because scientific theories are justified by their ability to explain our observations, and observation is just another word for collections of experiences.  So anything which is logically implied by all experiences, must be taken for granted whenever we do good Science.  In this sense, Science actually implies that certain strict forms of Physicalism are necessarily false, to they extent that they claim that the Laws of Physics suffice to explain phenomenological experience.  If some neuroscientists ascribe to such beliefs, this probably has more to do with their materialist philosophical presuppositions, than with anything really shown by brain research.

And of course, to the extent that we take the scientific method seriously as a guide to the nature of the world, Non-Dualism (in the sense of the rejection of all real distinctions between entities) must obviously be rejected from the get-go.  So a lot of these claims that Buddhism fits hand-in-glove with Neuroscience, seem to me to rest on philosophically dubious assumptions.

All of this only refutes certain types of Eastern thought.  It does not imply that no logically consistent form of Buddhism can be expressed.  Since Christianity includes mind-boggling paradoxes like the Trinity and the Incarnation that we believe on the basis of divine revelation, it wouldn’t be fair if I didn’t make similar allowances for some of the seeming logical contradictions in other religions (like Non-Dualism or No-Self), which might only be attempts to express the inexpressible, things that can only be known by having the relevant experiences oneself.

Thus, speaking as a Christian, my real objection to Buddhism mostly lies elsewhere.  It is that attaining these Buddhist experiences are not of primary religious significance to me (just as, I suppose, theistic experiences have no ultimate religious significance for the dedicated Buddhist whose only goal is eliminating suffering).  To me, the goal of religion is union with the wondrous God who created me and everything else.  Any insights into my own insubstantial and transitory nature would just show, by contrast, the importance of leaning on the changeless and eternal Creator, who cares for us as a Father cares for his children.

Christians and Meditation Practices

While there may be spiritual benefits from meditation, this Christian perspective downgrades them to the level of technique.  Vipassana (insight meditation), Samantha (concentration meditation), and whatever other meditation techniques there may be, are useful to the extent (and only to the extent) that they increase our love for God and for our fellow human beings.

From my own theological perspective, it seems to me that the goals of Metta (loving-kindness mediation) are relatively congruent with Christianity, while those of Patikulamanasikara (disgustingness meditation) seem much more dissonant with the Christian understanding of the value of the body.  But as they say, the proof is in the pudding.  If anybody feels that they have become a wiser or kinder person as a result of meditation, I have no reason to gainsay them (especially if it is visible in their treatment of others).

But since these Eastern meditation techniques were developed in a non-Christian religious worldview; certain aspects of them may be either inconsistent with faith in Christ, or else inappropriate for achieving Christian goals.  And those who attempt meditation practices like Vipassana (which is, in some sense, trying to break the brain’s normal way of processing experiences), should be careful because, like doing drugs, in some cases it can cause unpleasant long-term mental changes, like maybe a low-grade depression or feelings of depersonalization.  (Note: I have strong doubts whether Ingram, the author reviewed in the last link, is really explaining the authentic teachings of the Buddha, but my purpose here is simply to warn people about the possible side-effects of intense meditation.)

Thus, although elements of Eastern practices may be helpful to some, I would only feel comfortable recommending their study under the guidance of a Christian spiritual director.  (Unless it is taught purely as an exercise regime, this includes Yoga, whose religious presuppositions are very different from those of Christianity.)  Such a spiritual director would have to be familiar with the techniques in question, wise enough to see their limitations, and zealous enough to shun any hint of idolatry, possession by spirits, religious relativism, or anything else disloyal to the God of Israel—who is rightly jealous for our spirits, since we were made to find our joy in him alone.  (This is a tricky task for which few people would be qualified, and a much safer approach is to entirely avoid such syncretistic combinations.)

It seems to me, therefore, that Christians ought to avoid being “unequally yoked with unbelievers” (2 Cor. 6:14) in this respect; and if they wish to meditate, I would recommend the use of a Christian meditation discipline (e.g. the Lectio Divina).  While the Bible has much more to say about the spiritual practice of prayer, it does speak about meditation in a few places.  In context, this seems to involve deeply pondering the words of God and his righteous acts, rather than a quest for exotic psychological states.

And this is why I am not going to respond to Eastern mysticism by advocating here for some sort of Western mystical tradition focused on Christ, even though such traditions exist and have been pioneered by famous saints.  Why not?  Because I believe that mystical experiences, while potentially valuable, are not the primary method by which God reveals himself to ordinary human beings.  The Kingdom of God is far more frequently revealed in the mundane world of conscience, historical records, and human relationships.

Concluding Thoughts

And there is an important difference that Theism makes.  If God is personal and reveals himself at times and places of his own choosing, then no spiritual practice—ascetic meditation, “listening” during prayer, fasting, doing drugs, whatever it is—can force God to reveal himself in new ways, beyond what he has already given us in the Bible and in our past experiences.  There is no need for us to somehow ascend to heaven to find God, when God has already come down to us in Christ.

Yes, we need to be “open” to God’s voice if he speaks, but it seems presumptuous to try to force his hand and manufacture experiences of our own devising.  Instead, we need to wait patiently for God, to humbly see what he is going to do with our lives at a time of his own choosing.

If a particular person genuinely needs to have special information not contained in the Bible (e.g. if God wants to call a specific modern person to be a pastor), God is certainly allowed to do that.  But if Christianity is true, the main points of divine revelation have already been revealed to the prophets and apostles.  The continual presence of the Spirit shouldn’t be thought of as a continual revelation of new doctrines for our own emotional comfort, but rather as a Light that makes it possible for us to live what has been revealed.

And that is why I am not trying to replicate the conditions in which I have had mystical experiences in the past, nor am I signing up for Christian movements that promise that if only I follow a certain special method, I will have an extra-special relationship with the divine.  I already have that, and when I read about such methods, it seems to me that my Lord says to me, “What is it to you how I show myself to others?  You must follow me in the way of Not-Seeing”.

One day, faith will become sight and Jesus will make his glory obvious to everyone.  Until then, my duties are work, prayer, and rejoicing.

Comparing Religions X: Moral Depth

[It’s hard to believe it’s been nearly 3 years since the last post in this series; maybe writing about a “long delay” jinxed me.  Anyway I got pretty busy with academic stuff, but now I’m on sabbatical.  Like the rest of this series, the core of this post was written about 7-8 years ago, but I kept feeling like I needed to tinker around with it.  But it’s past time to release it into the wild, so here it is.—AW]

10. What is the general moral character of the religious teaching?

This is relevant for two reasons.  First, a good person is more honest, and therefore less likely to try to deliberately trick other people into believing something false (see my previous section on fraud.) People who make up religions are hardly likely to be paragons of moral virtue in other respects.  As Jesus said:

Watch out for false prophets.  They come to you in sheep’s clothing, but inwardly they are ferocious wolves.  By their fruit you will recognize them.  Do people pick grapes from thornbushes, or figs from thistles?  Likewise, every good tree bears good fruit, but a bad tree bears bad fruit.  (Matt. 7:15-17)

By “fruit” Jesus means, not simply conversions or quantity of pious devotions (which any fanatical cult can produce), but rather the moral character of those who claim to be prophets of a true religion, which serve as a test of their claims to be supernaturally inspired.

Second, if God is good and holy—which is a core article of faith for all Abrahamic religions, and also Platonism—then presumably any religion he reveals must also be good and holy.  In fact, one might well expect it to be supernaturally good, since if the religion merely taught ordinary human ethics, we could just as easily come to it by natural reason alone.  This does not, of course, imply that the people God reveals his laws to will be morally perfect (if they had no flaws, they wouldn’t need instruction) but the teaching itself should be morally good.

I. Making Moral Judgements

In comparing different religions for their degree of moral goodness, I am presupposing that moral virtue is not merely a matter of conformity to the arbitrary social conventions that one is brought up with, but rather that an open-minded person can recognize and appreciate goodness, even when it is embedded in a culture very different from their own.

In other words, I am assuming in this blog post that we will not allow ourselves to be bogged down by “Meno’s paradox”.  In a conversation with Socrates, Meno tried to argue that it was impossible for a person who didn’t already know what virtue is, to ever find out about it:

How will you search for it, Socrates, when you have no idea what it is?  What kind of thing from among those you are ignorant of will you set before yourself to look for?  And even if you happened exactly upon it, how would you recognize that this is what you didn’t know?  (Meno, 80d)

But as Socrates pointed out in reply, this argument is fallacious because (as he illustrates with an example from Geometry) we are sometimes capable of “recognizing” a truth, even when we are encountering it for the first time.  Put another way, we already have some sort of “germ of truth” inside of us, which helps us to recognize greater truth when we stumble across it.

Plato called this human ability ἀνάμνησις (recollection), and proposed that it was due to having known the truth in a previous existence.  But we don’t need to take this Platonic myth too literally to recognize the essential point about learning.  As Socrates says in this same dialogue:

I wouldn’t strongly insist on the other aspects of the argument [the stuff about reincarnation], but that we would become better men and braver and less lazy if we believe it is necessary to search for what one doesn’t know, rather than if we think that we can’t discover what we don’t know and should not look for it, for this I will fight strongly, if I am able, in both word and deed.  (86d)

Thus, if we want to search for the true religion in a reasonable and open-minded way (rather than take religious disagreements as an excuse not to think for ourselves) then we need to avoid two opposite extremes:

  1. The first extreme would be if we make a list of all our opinions about highly controversial ethical topics (e.g. abortion, vegetarianism, alcohol, specific sexual taboos…) and demand that a religion can be true only if it agrees with us about each one of these particular issues.  But this approach would absolutely preclude ever using religion to progress in our understanding of morality.                                                                                                                                           .
    It would, after all, be a very limited deity who didn’t know anything more about the conditions for human flourishing than we do.  And since people’s views about morality evolve with time, it would be quite a coincidence if God’s views happened to agree with e.g. early 21st century postmodern liberal mores in every single detail—even on points where we disagree with other places and times!  (And even, with many other people who live in the same country as us.)   Such an approach would only make sense, if I arrogantly assumed that I have nothing to learn from any being wiser than myself.                                                                                                                                           .                                                                                    .
  2. The opposite extreme—which is equally petrifying—would be to adopt a position of total moral helplessness, and take the attitude that we have no inherent knowledge of morality except for what we can learn through the dictates of some specific religion.  But such total deference would make it impossible to use morality as a measuring-rod to help us determine which religion is true.  After all, each religion will claim that its own moral system is right.  So this sort of helplessness, is no better than moral relativism!                                                                                                                                           .
    Even if we start out in a religion which was truly revealed by God, this particular type of fundamentalism would actually prevent us from ever truly internalizing a moral system—as this requires, not just blind obedience, but also learning to appreciate how a particular way of life is healthy and good, at least for human beings like ourselves.                                                                                                                                           . 
    A final and decisive objection is that it is simply incorrect!—in fact, human beings do have the ability to instinctively understand moral truths, in ways that are broadly similar; even if the details of how it expresses itself are modulated by our particular cultures and religious frameworks.

In summary, we should not expect our preconceptions to line up with every single teaching of a religion.  But taken as a whole, it should come across as something clearly better than what we would have on our own.

We can rationally take our agreement/disagreement on a particular moral topic to be evidence for/against a particular religion.  But, if we discover a religion which seems to have gotten many deep and important truths about humanity right, then we also need to take it seriously even when it makes claims that seem counterintuitive to us.  (A rational person can take such claims “on the credit of the system”, as St. John Newman memorably put it.)

Who is the Judge?

A closely related question is this: Do we come to religion with some degree of humility, and in the posture of someone willing to learn something new?  Suppose we imagine assembling all of the `holy books’ in the world, and looking through each one.  How will we pick the morally best one?

If we come in the posture of a cynic, then we will be looking for something in the book which morally offends us.  Once that happens, we will reject the book (unless somebody can convince us we were mistaken in doing so).  In other words, we are coming to the book with the intention of judging God.  Well, I cannot imagine any such person deciding to rank the Bible as the most moral of all religious books.  Yes, there is some good stuff in there, but there is a considerable amount of weird and violent stuff.  There are some inscrutable divine decrees, and several things which are foreign to modern sensibilities.

It is doubtful that such a person could be happy with any religion; but if they had to pick one, they’d probably be happier with some modernized religious community without much in the way of distinctive beliefs (like Unitarian Universalism, Reconstructionist Judaism, etc.)

On the other hand, we could also imagine somebody coming to a holy book as a penitent who needs spiritual healing, or as a confused person who wants wisdom.  If I take this attitude, then I (as a morally imperfect person) am looking for the holy book that is most able to judge me, to show the ways in which I fall short and can do better.  I want a book which can inspire me morally to a higher standard, and which illuminates the paradoxes and complexities which arise trying to live a spiritual life in the real world.  If you are looking to be judged in this way, then I am not aware of any book which is better for this purpose then the Bible.

(Note that this approach is quite different from “total moral helplessness”, since it still requires us to engage our minds!  We still need to decide whether the holy book speaks to our condition; whether its moral critique is incisive or superficial; whether it is calling us to a higher stage of moral development, or a lower one which we have already superceded.)

In other words, your assessment of the Bible’s ethics is going to depend in large part on what you are hoping to get out of it.  As the Bible itself says in multiple places, “God opposes the proud, but gives grace to the humble.”

A Product of Its Time

What a true revealed religion should definitely not be, is simply a reflection of the prevailing ethics of the time and place in which the claimed prophet lived.  There are lots of examples of ancient religious leaders prescribing barbaric acts, that were common in their era of history.  But in some ways, this phenomenon is more hilariously obvious when the ethical system being hawked has only quite recently gone out of vogue.

As an example of this, consider the early 20th century internationalist modernism endorsed by Shoghi Effendi (the grandson and first successor to the main prophet of the Bahái religion):

The unity of the human race, as envisaged by Bahá’u’lláh, implies the establishment of a world commonwealth in which all nations, races, creeds and classes are closely and permanently united, and in which the autonomy of its state members and the personal freedom and initiative of the individuals that compose them are definitely and completely safeguarded.

This commonwealth must, as far as we can visualize it, consist of a world legislature, whose members will, as the trustees of the whole of mankind, ultimately control the entire resources of all the component nations, and will enact such laws as shall be required to regulate the life, satisfy the needs and adjust the relationships of all races and peoples.  A world executive, backed by an international Force, will carry out the decisions arrived at, and apply the laws enacted by, this world legislature, and will safeguard the organic unity of the whole commonwealth.  A world tribunal will adjudicate and deliver its compulsory and final verdict in all and any disputes that may arise between the various elements constituting this universal system.

A mechanism of world inter-communication will be devised, embracing the whole planet, freed from national hindrances and restrictions, and functioning with marvellous swiftness and perfect regularity.  A world metropolis will act as the nerve center of a world civilization, the focus towards which the unifying forces of life will converge and from which its energizing influences will radiate.  A world language will either be invented or chosen from among the existing languages and will be taught in the schools of all the federated nations as an auxiliary to their mother tongue.  A world script, a world literature, a uniform and universal system of currency, of weights and measures, will simplify and facilitate intercourse and understanding among the nations and races of mankind.

In such a world society, science and religion, the two most potent forces in human life, will be reconciled, will cöoperate, and will harmoniously develop.  The press will, under such a system, while giving full scope to the expression of the diversified views and convictions of mankind, cease to be mischievously manipulated by vested interests, whether private or public, and will be liberated from the influence of contending governments and peoples.  The economic resources of the world will be organized, its sources of raw materials will be tapped and fully utilized, its markets will be cöordinated and developed, and the distribution of its products will be equitably regulated.

(“World Unity the Goal”, The World Order of Bahá’u’lláh [paragraph breaks added by me])

These words were written in 1936, and they are quite obviously a product of the time and place in which they were written.  For anyone who has seen the rest of the 20th century, the idea of placing our spiritual hopes for the future in the hands of a more powerful version of the United Nations—which in turn imposes a monoculture on the rest of the world—is too absurd to contemplate as a potential divine revelation.

Obviously, no real divine revelation was needed to come up with this idea.  Effendi (and to a lesser extent Bahá’u’lláh) were simply taking up the “spirit of the age”—what the internationalists and socialists of that time were already striving for—and recasting it as a principle of their own religion.  But a universally valid moral system ought to transcend the prejudices of the particular time and place in which it was originally developed.

(The one somewhat prescient aspect of this passage is that humanity did indeed come up with a global “mechanism of world inter-communication”: a.k.a. the Internet.  Kudos for that.  But the Internet is a highly de-centralized system, which allows for cultural diversity, and which certainly does not require a omnicompetent world-state in order to function.  And as we are all now acutely aware, the Internet doesn’t actually solve our moral coordination problems, it just transfers them to a new sphere.)

If what you care about most is maximizing ethical niceness, but you also want a religion which is a few centuries old (and thus not simply a repackaged version of contemporary morals) you could always try Sikhism—about which I know relatively little, but it seems to be one of the ethically nicer religions out there (notwithstanding being the religion of a warrior caste).  However, I haven’t been able to get much out of reading its holy book (the Guru Granth Sahib) at an intellectual level, as it mainly seems to repeat the same basic ideas over and over again.  Probably the point is not so much to be intellectually stimulated but to absorb the main idea by singing it over and over again.  But, I suppose that is the sort of benefit that one would only get by actually joining a religion…

II. Christianity

So is there a system of religious ethics which does transcend its particular time and place, sufficiently to be credible as having a transcendental origin?

Surprisingly, Jesus’ moral teaching, as recorded in the Gospels, e.g. the Sermon on the Mount, actually passes this test.  [If you’ve never read it before, stop and read the whole thing right now, starting with “Blessed are the poor in spirit” in chapter 5 and ending at the statement of the crowds being astonished by his teaching at the end of chapter 7.]  It is still an impressive spiritual standard, still relevant even after 2,000 years of humanity’s moral development, and it has inspired even non-Christian activists such as Gandhi to greater moral heights.

(The Sermon does contain a few minor cultural references to religious institutions of the time; for example Jesus mentions the practice of offering gifts to the Temple at Jerusalem, and also the Sanhedrin which was the supreme court for religious practice in Israel.  But it seems clear that all these references are inessential to the basic principles Jesus was preaching.)

Jesus cuts away the legalism common to many religious traditions, and puts the focus on integrity in the heart:

You have heard that it was said to the people long ago, `You shall not murder, and anyone who murders will be subject to judgment.’  But I tell you that anyone who is angry with a brother will be subject to judgment.  Again, anyone who calls his brother ‘Raqa’ [Empty-headed] is answerable to the Sanhedrin, but anyone who says, ‘fool!’ will be in danger of the fire of hell.

Therefore, if you are offering your gift at the altar and there remember that your brother or sister has something against you, leave your gift there in front of the altar. First go and be reconciled to them; then come and offer your gift.  (5:21-24)

In other words, if you want to be righteous, it’s not sufficient to just not kill people.  Even somebody who doesn’t express their hatred in words, may be murdering their brother in their hearts (many times over), and that contempt comes out in the words we use to speak about other people.  So if you want to cut to the root of the matter, you have to begin with the way you regard others in your mind.

The same sort of deepening applies to the other commandments as well:

You have heard that it was said, `You shall not commit adultery.’  But I tell you that anyone who looks at a woman lustfully has already committed adultery with her in his heart!…

It has been said, ‘Anyone who divorces his wife must give her a certificate of divorce.’  But I tell you that anyone who divorces his wife, except for sexual immorality, makes her the victim of adultery, and anyone who marries a divorced woman commits adultery.

Again you have heard that it was said to those of old, `You shall not swear falsely, but shall perform your oaths to the Lord.’  But I say to you, do not swear at all…  Let your ‘Yes’ be ‘Yes,’ and your ‘No,’ ‘No.’  For whatever is more than these is from the evil one.

(5:27-37, excerpts)

Jesus’ radical new interpretation of the Torah shows us the real source of misdeeds—our own desire to get what we want, even at the price of manipulating others.  They show that no amount of following of technical justifications—”it’s okay that I left my wife for another woman because I filled out the proper legal paperwork”; or “I don’t have to keep this promise because I didn’t swear I would do it”—can prevent us from doing wrong.  Instead, we need for our own internal motivations to be right.

Beyond Legalism: Children, not Slaves

Most religions tend to focus on regulating externals of behavior.  They are obsessed with figuring out the answer to the question “What is the minimum acceptable standard of behavior?”  This process tends to produce an elaborate law-code, often (as in the case of rabbinic Judaism) becoming more and more complex with time.

But Christianity says that God doesn’t want slaves, who obey mindlessly out of fear, without knowing the reasons why.  It is true that his awe-inspiring glory deserves our worship and submission.  Yet the New Testament says he wants to treat us as his adult children (who can be trusted with freedom after learning what is good) and as his close friends (who know his plans and thoughts).  As far as I know, this attitude is unique among theistic religions.  It would be quite presumptuous, if God had not taken the initiative by drawing near to us, in order to share the mind of his Spirit with us.  Yet now that I have been granted these privileges, giving them up again in order to serve a more distant deity would be disappointing.  To draw back from this intimacy, from the thoughtful responsibility he has entrusted me with, seems more like immaturity than humility.

Love your Enemies

When Jesus goes on to say:

But I tell you, do not resist an evil person.  If anyone slaps you on the right cheek, turn to them the other cheek also.  And if anyone wants to sue you and take your shirt, hand over your coat as well.  If anyone forces you to go one mile, go with them two miles.  Give to the one who asks you, and do not turn away from the one who wants to borrow from you.

You have heard that it was said, ‘Love your neighbor and hate your enemy.’ But I tell you, love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you, that you may be children of your Father in heaven.  He causes his sun to rise on the evil and the good, and sends rain on the righteous and the unrighteous.  (Matthew 5:39-45),

these sayings are far from trivial to implement, yet actually this is the only practical suggestion—the one that actually works in practice, e.g. in the Civil Rights movement in America—for creating peace between those who hate each other, other than wiping one of the groups out.

Christians have differed as to whether Jesus’ words imply total Pacifism (I don’t think so myself), but I do think that these words introduce us to a nonviolent form of power which, when applied intelligently, is far greater than the power of violence; because it has the power to move people to freely become better, in a way that no amount of external coercion can ever do.

America’s greatest 20th century political activist, St. Martin Luther King Jr., explained the meaning of this passage as follows:

The ultimate weakness of violence is that it is a descending spiral begetting the very thing it seeks to destroy, instead of diminishing evil, it multiplies it. Through violence you may murder the liar, but you cannot murder the lie, nor establish the truth. Through violence you may murder the hater, but you do not murder hate. In fact, violence merely increases hate. Returning violence for violence multiplies violence, adding deeper darkness to a night already devoid of stars. Darkness cannot drive out darkness; only light can do that. Hate cannot drive out hate; only love can do that.

(Where do we go from here: Chaos or Community)

These words are not mere idealism, as in: wouldn’t it be nice if people behaved this way, but we know they never will.  For King, these words described a highly practical strategy for social change.  He had hands-on experience using Jesus’ method to reform the segregationist South.   Of course, King also paid the price for it.  It can be seen from this example that nonviolence does not imply submissively accepting the status quo; rather it is a creative way of seeking justice by appealing to people’s better nature.

As far as I can see, Jesus’ radical ethic of love, forgiveness and acceptance is morally better than anything else on offer.

I do not of course mean to imply that the ethical duty to love one’s enemies was absolutely original in all respects when stated by Jesus.  It was anticipated by Plato, and certain parts of the Hebrew Bible, although Christ emphasized it more forcefully.   The point is not so much that it was utterly new, but that it was right, even though it was not a truth generally appreciated in Jesus’ culture, nor indeed in any culture not influenced by Christianity.  (Sometimes I’m not too sure about Christians either!)

Two Potential Stumbling Blocks

Although it should be indisputable from the above that Jesus’ ethical teaching calls his followers to an extremely high ethical standard, there are still a couple of ways in which his morality might still seem alienating or “bad” to many nonreligious readers.  It is worth highlighting these issues briefly, although each would really justify a long post of its own:

Road Bump #1: God the Father

The first point is that Christianity is unavoidably and distinctively theistic, through and through.  Without denying that there are some aspects of Jesus’ teaching which could be applied with profit by non-religious people, much of what he says simply makes no sense, when separated from the idea of a God whose character we can count on.  Even when Jesus announces a moral rule that atheists might be able to get behind, he nearly always appeals to theological reasons—for example, imitating the character of God—to explain why the rule should be followed.

I have seen pastors who tried to put forward Jesus’ teachings as a sort of “worldly wisdom” that can be appreciated and put into practice even by those who aren’t yet religious.   But, apart from a few tidbits, I’m not sure this approach is a very coherent way of introducing seekers to Christianity.

The fact is, it makes no sense to give up your earthly life and goals for the sake of eternal happiness, if in fact there is no God to take care of us, and to keep his promises, and to be blessed by being in communion with him.  Anyone who wants to “try it out”, will quickly see that Jesus’ commands cannot be separated from Jesus’ teaching about our generous and kind Father, whom we are urged to trust to provide for our needs:

“Ask and it will be given to you; seek and you will find; knock and the door will be opened to you.  For everyone who asks receives; the one who seeks finds; and to the one who knocks, the door will be opened.

Which of you, if your son asks for bread, will give him a stone?  Or if he asks for a fish, will give him a snake?  If you, then, though you are evil, know how to give good gifts to your children, how much more will your Father in heaven give good gifts to those who ask him!”  (Matthew 7:7-11)

This does not necessarily mean that an agnostic cannot begin to try to obey some of Jesus’ teachings—but I do not see how they could possibly do so, without at least hoping or wishing that a God like this exists, and that following Jesus’ teaching might put them in some kind of relationship with something like this deeper reality that Jesus called Father.

Given that we are currently evaluating different forms of religious ethics, this is only to be expected.  If you do not yet currently believe in a God, then understanding Jesus’ teaching will require you to imaginatively “suspend your disbelief” on this point.  There is no point in taste-testing a religion for its ethical truth, if you aren’t prepared to grant, at least hypothetically, its most essential premise.

Having granted this premise, what is most distinctive in Christianity is not just whether we believe in God, but rather than nature and character of the God being described, and the way in which his goodness can be taken as a model to transform our own lives.

The second potential road-block is this:

Road Bump #2: Final Judgement

A second, more sensitive issue, is the fact that Jesus repeatedly warns people about the fact that there is a final judgment coming at the end of history, and that even though God loves us, it is quite possible—in fact easy, if a person takes no care to avoid it—for that person to be condemned to Hell.  This is a feature which is bound to seem unpalatable to anyone who doesn’t feel that their degree of guilt (or perhaps, anyone’s guilt) would warrant such a stiff sentence.  And of course, the higher the moral standard we are expected to uphold, the scarier these threats are.

As Bertrand Russell argued:

There is one very serious defect to my mind in Christ’s moral character, and that is that He believed in hell. I do not myself feel that any person who is really profoundly humane can believe in everlasting punishment. Christ certainly as depicted in the Gospels did believe in everlasting punishment, and one does find repeatedly a vindictive fury against those people who would not listen to His preaching—an attitude which is not uncommon with preachers, but which does somewhat detract from superlative excellence. You do not, for instance, find that attitude in Socrates. You find him quite bland and urbane towards the people who would not listen to him; and it is, to my mind, far more worthy of a sage to take that line than to take the line of indignation.   (Why I am not a Christian)

Of course, belief in post-mortem punishment is far from unique to Christianity.  Any religion which believes in both human freedom and life after death, necessarily has to grapple with the question of what happens to people who sink into a self-chosen state of moral corruption.  Even most Buddhist sects believe in various hells (generally regarded as finite, but astronomically long, in duration).

A complete discussion of the topics of Heaven and Hell goes well beyond the subject of this blog post, the purpose of which is not to share my own personal ideas about how this theology could be justified.  One could note however that the possibility of damnation would seem to be logically inherent in any theological system which satisfies the following criteria:

  1. All humans will live forever;
  2. It is impossible for humans to be happy forever without loving God;
  3. God does not force humans to love him, if they choose not to.

On these premises, if anyone would prefer to be immoral (and thus unhappy) rather than to love God, then there does not seem to be any obvious alternative to a system of indefinite incarceration, for those who reject Heaven.

The Offer of Grace

What is unique to Jesus’ teaching, is the extent to which these warnings are side-by-side with the most forceful declarations of God’s mercy and grace towards sinners:

What do you think?  If a man owns a hundred sheep, and one of them wanders away, will he not leave the ninety-nine on the hills and go to look for the one that wandered off?  And if he finds it, truly I tell you, he is happier about that one sheep than about the ninety-nine that did not wander off.  In the same way your Father in heaven is not willing that any of these little ones should perish.  (Matthew 18:10-24)

We do not have to be saved by our own efforts; instead the Good Shepherd comes looking for his lost sheep in order to save it.  Jesus welcomed the prostitutes and the dishonest tax collectors, because God is a loving Father whose heart goes out to all his children, no matter what they have done.  God doesn’t want anyone to perish, but for everyone to come to him and be saved.

If anyone is outside the scope of God’s forgiveness, it is not because God runs out of patience and kindness, but rather because that person is trapped in their own hatred and failure to forgive others.  In other words, the only unforgivable sin is to reject the Holy Spirit, even when he makes his goodness clear to you.  All who repent and turn to Christ can be saved, no matter what they have done.

Not “Meek and Mild”

Jesus’ own ways of reaching out to people were highly controverisial.  Shockingly for the time, he took women on as close disciples.  He was criticized for going to parties with notorious sinners, for healing people on the Sabbath, and for telling religious people that their hypocrisy was an abomination in God’s eyes.  As he himself noted, a life of real virtue leads to persecution.

They also accused him of blasphemy, for saying things which sounded as if he was claiming some sort of equality or association with God himself.  (This is also something which we have to come to terms with in deciding what Jesus really was, since as many people have pointed out, if he was wrong that would make him a delusional megalomaniac.)

I remember reading the Gospel of Matthew for the first time as a child and being surprised by the continual extremeness of Christ’s teachings.  My parents are devoted Christians and I was very pious, so you would think I would already have known what to expect, but still—the words of Jesus were shocking.  It seemed appropriate that Christ’s words were typed in red ink in my mother’s Bible, as if they were going to burn through the page like acid.  As St. Chesterton wrote in The Everlasting Man (a rethinking of comparative religion from a Christian perspective):

A man reading the Gospel sayings would not find platitudes.  If he had read even in the most respectful spirit the majority of ancient philosophers and of modern moralists, he would appreciate the unique importance of saying that he did not find platitudes.  It is more than can be said even of Plato.  It is much more than can be said of Epictetus or Seneca or Marcus Aurelius or Apollonius of Tyana.  And it is immeasurably more than can be said of most of the agnostic moralists and the preachers of the ethical societies; with their songs of service and their religion of brotherhood.  The morality of most moralists ancient and modern, has been one solid and polished cataract of platitudes flowing for ever and ever.  That would certainly not be the impression of the imaginary independent outsider studying the New Testament.  He would be conscious of nothing so commonplace and in a sense of nothing so continuous as that stream.

He would find a number of strange claims that might sound like the claim to be the brother of the sun and moon; a number of very startling pieces of advice; a number of stunning rebukes; a number of strangely beautiful stories.  He would see some very gigantesque figures of speech about the impossibility of threading a needle with a camel or the possibility of throwing a mountain into the sea.  He would see a number of very daring simplifications of the difficulties of life; like the advice to shine upon everybody indifferently as does the sunshine or not to worry about the future any more than the birds.  He would find on the other hand some passages of almost impenetrable darkness, so far as he is concerned, such as the moral of the parable of the Unjust Steward.  Some of these things might strike him as fables and some as truths; but none as truisms.  For instance, he would not find the ordinary platitudes in favour of peace.  He would find several paradoxes in favour of peace. He would find several ideals of non-resistance, which taken as they stand would be rather too pacific for any pacifist.  He would be told in one passage to treat a robber not with passive resistance, but rather with positive and enthusiastic encouragement, if the terms be taken literally; heaping up gifts upon the man who had stolen goods….

The statement that the meek shall inherit the earth is very far from being a meek statement.  I mean it is not meek in the ordinary sense of mild and moderate and inoffensive.  To justify it, it would be necessary to go very deep into history and anticipate things undreamed of then and by many unrealised even now; such as the way in which the mystical monks reclaimed the lands which the practical kings had lost.  If it was a truth at all, it was because it was a prophecy.  But certainly it was not a truth in the sense of a truism.  The blessing upon the meek would seem to be a very violent statement; in the sense of doing violence to reason and probability….

Something of the same thing may be said about the incident of Martha and Mary; which has been interpreted in retrospect and from the inside by the mystics of the Christian contemplative life.  But it was not at all an obvious view of it; and most moralists, ancient and modern, could be trusted to make a rush for the obvious.  What torrents of effortless eloquence would have flowed from them to swell any slight superiority on the part of Martha; what splendid sermons about the Joy of Service and the Gospel of Work and the World Left Better Than We Found It, and generally all the ten thousand platitudes that can be uttered in favour of taking trouble—by people who need take no trouble to utter them.

(“The Riddles of the Gospel”, in The Everlasting Man)

But if Christ really came down from Heaven, you might expect him to teach a morality which is of a different nature than any Earthly cultural code.  Just as if you were sent back in time thousands of years to the ancient world, you would inevitably react with dismay at many atrocities which the ancients took for granted; so too Jesus preached just as if he came from another world, where life operates on completely different lines than what we Earthlings are used to.

Humble Service

Another of these paradoxes was Jesus’ idea about the nature of leadership.  To the first leaders of his Church, he says:

“You know that the rulers of the Gentiles lord it over them, and their high officials exercise authority over them.  Not so with you!  Instead, whoever wants to become great among you must be your servant, and whoever wants to be first must be your slave—just as the Son of Man did not come to be served, but to serve, and to give his life as a ransom for many.”  (Matthew 20:20-28)

And here the Theology of Christianity—that God sent his Son to forgive his enemies and save us from destruction—is in perfect consonance with the Ethics.  Jesus’ actions were not hypocritical; he lived a life (and died a death) of self-sacrifice and forgiveness.  Healing the sick and crazy, welcoming social outcasts and telling them their sins were forgiven, feeding the hungry, raising the dead, preaching the good news to the poor.  Jesus’ character makes the commonplace seem miraculous and the miraculous commonplace.

It is certainly true that the doctrine of the Atonement—that Jesus’ innocent victimization on the Cross is the method by which God forgives our sins—can be perplexing and disconcerting, when considered from the point of view of ordinary human justice, especially if it is explained using inapt metaphors.

If your notion of the divine does not allow for elements of mysterious depth, if you insist that nothing can transcend your own understanding, then I have no way of getting you past this third potential stumbling block.  All I can say is that a supposed divine revelation would be quite impoverished indeed if it contained nothing strange or difficult.  When we study subatomic matter, out of which we ourselves are made, we find the bizarre mind-bending paradoxes of Quantum Mechanics, which can be described mathematically but nobody can agree on what’s going on metaphysically.  It would be strange indeed if our interactions with God—a being coming in from outside our physical world entirely—did not have a comparable degree of weirdness!

A Spiritual Kingdom

Finally, Christianity says that Jesus conquered death itself at his Resurrection from the grave.  He did not meet the Jewish expectations of a world revolution, but he did something greater, triumphing over all the strong things in the world with his tender weakness.  That is why he proclaimed that the kingdom of heaven was very near, and would be a revolution in the hearts and minds of anyone willing to be born anew, in order to enter it with humility, like a small child.

If this did not happen and—as some believe—the Messiah is yet to come, can he possibly be greater than this?  After Jesus, anyone else would be an anticlimax.  Even if you were to write a fictional story to try to imagine a superior Messiah, the only way you could make your fictional Messiah morally satisfying is by including enough elements of Jesus’ character, that the story would really owe its emotional and moral depth to him.  (Or one could simply accept the moral retrogression back to the military leader trope, as is largely the case in e.g. the Dune mythos.  This leads to a satisfying story for a novel, but if it happened in reality, it would not answer the deepest spiritual needs of the human race.)

Christians believe that Jesus’ teaching is the Way (the Tao) which comes down from Heaven.  Unlike the Torah or the Quran, the New Testament contains no instructions for setting up an earthly theocratic government; instead it is a spiritual kingdom:

Jesus said, “My kingdom is not of this world.  If it were, my servants would fight to prevent my arrest by the Jewish leaders.  But now my kingdom is from another place.”  (John 18:36)

Therefore, his followers have no excuse for engaging in religious persecution on Earth.

Jesus and Hypocrisy

Although many have tried.  Let me say right away that I do not consider any religion to be refuted merely by the hypocrisy of those who come in later generations.  I am asking how glorious the original teachings are, not how well they have been followed.  Christians, like others, are frequently hypocrites.  In fact, one might well expect the religion with the highest ethical standards to provide the greatest temptation to hypocrisy, since those are the standards which are hardest to live up to.  So when people complain about how the Church is full of hypocrites, they thereby testify that they know that the Christian standards are (at least in certain respects) good and right.  We don’t usually complain when people fall short of a religious standard which we don’t approve of!

And if you hate hypocrisy, bear in mind that you probably owe this very insight to Jesus’ teaching.  Just as the weekend comes from the Judaeo-Christian practice of Sabbath keeping, so the modern Westerner’s sensitive conscience on this point comes, directly or indirectly, from the New Testament.  There is no religious text which speaks more forcefully against hypocrisy.  Jesus’ denunciations of this sin were spectacularly harsh.  And yet his severity was clearly needed, given the later conduct of many of his own followers.

Because these warnings are in the DNA of the Christian Church, it can never remain permanently fossilized in legalism and spiritual decay.  There will always be a revival.  If you are sincerely worried about becoming a hypocrite yourself, and if you want to pick the religious teacher most likely to prevent you, if you follow him sincerely—surely, Jesus is the one.

(Although, I can’t help but notice that the people who complain about religious people being hypocrites, seldom seem all that worried that they might be hypocritical in other respects.  Shall we coin a term and call that “meta-hypocrisy”?)

Of course, hypocrisy is not at all the same as simply not living up to one’s own moral standards.  Otherwise there would be no difference between the self-righteous Pharisee and the repentant tax-collector!  We all fail to live up to what morality requires, but some people sincerely repent of it, while others don’t care or try to pretend everything is okay.  If you ever find a religious group which succeeds in keeping their own moral standard, you should run away from them as fast as you can!  Because if they can meet it, it must be abysmally low.  At least if people fall short of the standard they set by their preaching, they leave open the possibility of repenting and doing better in the future.

Other Religions

The moral teachings of other religions, might indeed have been improvements on what went before, but are limited and defective in comparison with Christianity.  I don’t mean of course to imply that there’s nothing ethically good in other religions.  But they don’t impress and amaze me, to the same degree that Christianity does.

III.  Judaism

Although Christians believe the Torah to be genuinely revealed by God, even this must be regarded as “limited”, since according to Christianity it is  incomplete in nature, and its ceremonies pointed the way to something better, to come later.  Since Christianity came from Judaism, a Christian cannot consistently say that the core ideas of Jewish ethics were mistaken.  But, we can point to the place where Jewish ethics has reached its highest point of fulfilment, which is in the teachings of Jesus.

But first, what is the most distinctive feature of Jewish ethics?  One of the main innovations of Judaism was the unification of religion and morality.  God is believed to be both righteous himself, and the one who demands righteousness on Earth.

In paganism, the concepts of sin (that which offends God) and moral wrongdoing (injustice) can come apart; an act may please one god and yet offend another.  But in Jewish theology, sin and wrongdoing are coextensive: one can never offend God by a righteous act nor please him by a wicked one.  To be sure, the implication goes in both directions, meaning that a Jew might sometimes need to submit to a difficult divine command, the reasons for which are obscure.  But it is always implied that when this is so, the moral limitation lies with us humans, rather than with God.  Hence, obedience is itself a righteous act, and is never merely a craven submission to a more powerful being, as in much of paganism.

Before anyone marches in with a Dawkins-esque caricature of the “God of the Old Testament”, let me say right away that there is simply no comparison here to the moral universe of pagan mythology.  Not even the most hardened blasphemer would deny that the God of the Bible is at least moralistic in his character.  He is always portrayed as actively defending moral norms, with acts of justice or mercy.  When a reader objects to one of the Old Testament God’s verdicts, they usually do so for one of three reasons [not all of which are applicable to each case]: (1) because the punishment seems too harsh, or (2) involves collective justice on groups, or (3) involves offenses against archaic codes of conduct which we no longer accept.  In a certain Nietzschean sense, one might say that the biblical God is more frequently accused of an excess of morality (at least in the sense of punishing sins), rather than a deficit of morality.  But the God of the Old Testament does not ever simply disregard morality to gain personal advantage; nor does he, like Zeus, commit adultery with his neighbor’s wife and then turn her into a animal to cover up his hijinks.  In this sense the Hebrew tradition, even at its most distressing, can be objectively seen to reside on a higher moral and metaphysical plane than pagan polytheism.

And it should be noted that the Israelites themselves, comparing their beliefs to others, did not view their own God as being especially implacable in wrath.  Rather, they characterized him as a “gracious and merciful God, slow to anger and abounding in love, a God who relents from sending calamity” (Jonah 4:2).

A critic might say that, simply by asking the question which religion is morally good, we are already begging the question massively in favor of Judaism and its offshoots, since it was Judaism that popularized this idea in the first place.

And yet none of us can completely transcend our roots.  When Western skeptics critique the moral sensibilities of Jewish scriptures, they are usually doing so on the basis of moral assumptions which they learned, indirectly, from Christianity.  Since Christianity is deeply rooted in Judaism, this really means that their ammunition against Judaism comes indirectly from sources within Judaism itself.  Had Judaism and Christianity never existed, it is quite probable that most modern “civilized” people would have no concept of universal human rights.  Hence: less emphasis on protection of the weak and victimized, more tolerance for barbaric practices like slavery, torture, and gladiator fights, etc.  There have been plenty of civilized pagan cultures (Greeks, Romans, Chinese, Japanese) in which these concepts have not played a major role.

(This does not mean that there were no ways that e.g. Greco-Roman pagan religion intersected with morality.  There were a few specific moral violations that were viewed as likely to be punished by the gods, such as violations of hospitality or oaths, or violence against parents.  And of course, Egyptian polytheism eventually developed some very precise notions of divine judgement in the afterlife.  But for the most part, appeasing the gods was regarded more as a practical necessity, than a moral one.  For a good overview of the way that most pagans in the Roman Empire viewed their religious rituals—which had very little in common with what most modern people would regard as “spiritual”—see this excellent blog series by a very entertaining historian.)

Proceeding to more specific observances, there are indeed many parts of the Torah which are still very morally inspirational today, such as the Ten Commandments, or the laws about ensuring justice and mercy for widows, orphans, and strangers:

Do not deprive the foreigner or the fatherless of justice, or take the cloak of the widow as a pledge.  Remember that you were slaves in Egypt and the Lord your God redeemed you from there.  That is why I command you to do this.

When you are harvesting in your field and you overlook a sheaf, do not go back to get it.  Leave it for the foreigner, the fatherless and the widow, so that the Lord your God may bless you in all the work of your hands.  When you beat the olives from your trees, do not go over the branches a second time.  Leave what remains for the foreigner, the fatherless and the widow.  When you harvest the grapes in your vineyard, do not go over the vines again.  Leave what remains for the foreigner, the fatherless and the widow.  Remember that you were slaves in Egypt. That is why I command you to do this.  (Deut 24:17-22)

When looking at passages like this, we can indeed agree with the Psalmist that:

The judgments of the LORD are true, being altogether righteous.  They are more precious than gold, than much pure gold; they are sweeter than honey, than honey from the comb.  (Psalm 19:9-10)

Yet, although much in the Torah is splendid and righteous, and many of its ceremonies seem beautifully significant, other provisions are difficult to justify except as concessions to the prevailing culture—as in the case of divorce, where Jesus justified his own teaching on the subject by saying that “Moses permitted you to divorce your wives because your hearts were hard.  But it was not this way from the beginning” (Matt. 19:8).

It is then, an option for a Christian to critique other morally repugnant provisions in the Torah, as making similar allowances to the barbaric conditions of the time, rather than being perpetually prescriptive norms.  Such provisions might include e.g. the rules allowing warfare to be waged against civilians (Deut. 20:10-15), the rules allowing Israelites to buy non-Israelite slaves (Lev. 25:44-46, but cf. Deut 23:15-16 for a contrasting rule concerning refugees), and indeed the subordinate position of women in a patriarchal society (not that this is a major topic of legislation in the Torah, it’s more that it’s taken for granted).

Of course this raises questions for Christians (like myself) who believe that these commandments were revealed by God to Moses.  It might be possible to justify these legal provisions as “perfect” in the limited sense that it these were the best set of laws that could be given to the Israelites at the time God gave them.  However, there’s been considerable moral progress since then.  Thus—although it remains in the Christian Bible as a perpetual record of God’s past guidance to his people—in its literal application, the Torah is simply no longer a contender for the best moral code for humanity.

(Given Christian ethics, the hardest commandment in the Torah to defend is probably the order to wipe out the Canaanite tribes.  Now defending genocide is one of those things that is no longer quite so respectable as it used to be, and rightly so!  Nevertheless, I tried my hand here at explaining several ways in which this divine command is meaningfully different than what e.g. Hitler did.)

Turning to Judaism in its modern rabbinic form, it is still somewhat racially narrow, and often more concerned with technical legalistic observances than with the heart.  After the destruction of the Temple, the Pharisees—the spiritual ancestors of modern day Rabbinic Judaism—reformed and modernized their religion, but also took many liberties of interpretation, some of which are staggering in their perverseness.  For example, the Pharisees interpreted Exodus 23:2:

Do not follow the crowd in doing wrong.  When you give testimony in a lawsuit, do not pervert justice by siding with the crowd.

as implying the right of a majority of rabbis to effectively (re)interpret Scripture, even though the literal meaning of the text specifically says not to follow the majority in doing wrong.

Of course, this rabbinic flexibility does allow for religious mores to be progressively updated in response to social changes, but it also tends to produce a game in which each new rule spins off an increasingly complex chain of further legislation via interpretation.  Since this process has been going on for thousands of years, the results can get very strange.

For example, the rabbinic prohibition on mixing milk with meat somehow emerged from the Torah commandment: “Do not cook a baby goat its mother’s milk” (a better generalization might be: Don’t be a jerk to beings that are totally in your power).  This in turn spun off the additional rule to keep separate dishware for meat and dairy, and so on.  Then one identifies various loopholes, allowing you to get around certain rabbinic rules when they become too onerous, and so on.  All of this seems like a major distraction from actual ethics and spirituality.

Although, taking a more positive point of view, there is a certain attractiveness (at least in an outsider’s view) of an Orthodox Jewish piety; in which minute decisions are continually referred back to the Talmud and to divine law; so as to dedicate the smallest mundane details of family life to the service of a Name that is too sacred to even be spoken out loud.  From the Christian perspective, this is indeed very instructive as an image of what the word “holiness” means, total dedication to God.  But to take such a lifestyle as a matter of obligation differs from the Christian relationship to God which is based more on the guiding presence of the Holy Spirit than in following a particular code of laws.

Another positive effect of all these rabbinic disputations, which should probably be mentioned, was to produce a culture of vibrant intellectual debate.  Even separated from its original religious matrix, this culture of questioning seems to persist in the case of secular Jews.  This is one possible explanation for the enormous Jewish impact on philosophy, science, and culture (far exceeding what one would expect from the total Jewish world population).

IV.  Zoroastrianism

In Zoroastrianism, the commandments seem to be more concerned with ritual purity than with ethics, to a far greater extent than in Judaism.  Yes, honesty and fair-dealing are considered important, but the most important rules concern things like burial practices and hygiene codes.

While I don’t think these punishments are enforced in modern times: in the Venidad (part of traditional Zoroastrian scripture), many purely ceremonial offenses are considered worse than murder, and are punishable by being flogged with hundreds or even thousands of lashes of the whip.  Unforgivable sins (those which cannot be expiated with any amount of punishment) include: burying the corpse of a man or dog, homosexuality, and voluntarily committing “the unnatural sin” [masturbation, according to some translators].  For these acts there can be no atonement whatsoever!  (At least for those who are already members of the religion.  Those who converted, back when that was a thing that happened, apparently got a pass, as long as they promised never to do it again.  Though nowadays, I imagine that most of these rules about punishments aren’t seriously practiced.)

Zoroastrians are Dualists: they believe the world was made by two gods, one of them good and the other evil.  Unlike the Judaeo-Christian worldview, which affirms the essential goodness of creation, Zoroastrianism teaches that certain aspects of Nature were created by the Devil, and are inherently evil and impure.  For example they believe that cats were created by the Evil God, while dogs were created by the Good God.  Therefore it is considered is a righteous deed to kill cats, but a grievous sin to kill a dog.  Speaking as a cat person, I think this is pretty clearly drawing the line between good and evil in the wrong place!  It is simply not ecologically or ethically sound to simplistically divide animal species into “good” and “evil”, as if we lived in a children’s animal fable.  Even if there is a good case to be made for fewer bloodsucking mosquitoes!

(Islam has a completely different take on this, as Mohammad seems to have also been a cat person.)

However, Zoroastrians also strongly emphasize the importance of free will, and the ability of rational creatures (even the gods!) to choose between good or evil.  There is even an amusing Zoroastrian legend that the Devil created the Peacock just to prove that he could make something good, if he wanted to.

(Oddly, this is not the only Devil-Peacock connection one comes across in comparative religion.  The Yazidi venerate the “Peacock angel” Melek Taus, whom they identify with Iblis—an Arab word for the Devil.  In the Quran, Iblis refuses God’s command to prostrate himself before the newly created Adam, and as a result loses his position as chief over the angels.  But in Yazidi mythology, Iblis refuses to venerate Adam out of a misguided loyalty to God, and he is eventually restored to his former position as the most exalted manifestation of God’s glory.  Needless to say this belief, easily confused with a more malign Satanism, has led to considerable misunderstandings with the surrounding Muslim cultures, and the Yazidis have suffered many severe persecutions, most recently under ISIS.)

So, if you want to think of yourself as a participant in an epic battle between good and evil, Zoroastrianism is a pretty cool religion.  But the lines between good and evil are drawn in some pretty arbitrary seeming places.  I don’t really see much ethical wisdom here which can’t be obtained more easily from Judaism (plus Judaism actually accepts converts if you ask persistently enough).

V.  Islam

The Islamic religion preaches racial harmony, generosity to the poor, and sincere piety.  In the tradition of Ethical Monotheism, the Quran proclaims that God is firmly on the side of moral behavior and fair conduct:

God commands justice, doing good, and generosity towards relatives and He forbids what is shameful, blameworthy, and oppressive.  He teaches you, that you may take heed.  Fulfil any pledge you make in God’s name and do not break oaths after you have sworn them, for you have made God your surety: God knows everything you do.  Do not use your oaths to deceive one another—like a woman who unravels the thread she has firmly spun—just because one party may be more numerous than the other.  God tests you with this, and on the Day of Resurrection He will make clear to you the things you differed about.  (Haleem translationSura 16:90-92)

On the other hand, the Quran does not pass modern standards for the treatment of women.  It permits the sexual exploitation of women through slavery, polygamy, and easy divorce; and in several cases its laws discriminate explicitly against females, e.g. Sura 2:282, which considers the testimony of two women equivalent to one man.  (Although Mohammad must be given credit for banning infanticide against female babies.)

In the Hadith, Mohammad legislated the death penalty for apostates (those who stop believing in Islam).  And in numerous passages, the Quran encourages warfare and violence against pagans and those viewed as enemies of Islam, sanctioned by reward and punishment in the afterlife:

God has purchased the persons and possessions of the believers in exchange for the Garden [i.e. Paradise]—they fight in God’s way; they kill and are killed—this is a true promise given by him in the Torah, the Gospel, and the Quran.  Who could be more faithful to his promise than God?  So be happy with the bargain you have made, that is the supreme triumph.  Those who turn to God in repentance; who worship and praise Him; who fast, bow down and prostrate themselves; who order what is good, forbid what is wrong and observe God’s limits.  Give glad news to such believers.  It is not fitting for the Prophet and the believers to ask forgiveness for the idolaters—even if they are related to them—after being shown that they are the inhabitants of the Blaze [i.e. Hell].  (HaleemSura 9:111-113, brackets are my own added interpretation)

It is certainly possible to exaggerate the extent to which the Quran commands religious warfare.  There are also some passages which advocate for peace (although many of these were from the early stages of Mohammad’s ministry, leading some Muslim scholars to argue they were abrogated by later revelations).  But no one can deny that warfare is a frequently recurrent theme; even if the applicability of these verses to the modern day is, of course, a matter on which different Muslims have many different opinions.

The time has long passed when I last had the experience of finding a new book in my Bible.  If the voice that spoke in the Quran, had been the same voice that speaks to me in the Bible; if it had wooed me with divine paradoxes that call out to the depths of the spirit, cutting through all my excuses like a sword, and dazzling me with the promises of hidden glory; then I think I would have gladly listened to it, even if the price it asked me to pay (leaving behind my own family’s religious convictions, and joining a new community) was high.

But as I see it, the Quran is not even trying to reveal a paradoxical reality or an awe-inspiring ethical code; it is really just a kind of civilization-building compromise; a simplification which attempts to combine the universalism of the Christian message with some of the ritualism of the Jewish system.  Despite the intense focus of the Quran on the rewards and punishments of the afterlife, Mohammad’s kingdom was very much of this world; therefore his followers do fight.

Despite being later in time, Islam does not uphold nearly as bracing a moral standard as Christianity, and it is arguable whether it is even a moral improvement on the Torah.  In this respect it appears to be a moral retrogression—which might be justifiable if it had been intended for a limited cultural setting, but it is a severe problem in a supposedly final revelation for all humanity until the Day of Judgement.

Even Muslims can see that much of the legislation in the Quran is merely concerned with being good enough, setting a minimum standard of decency for what had previously been a barbaric time and place.  As one thoughtful Persian argued in a medieval debate with a Christian:

I have said, I say and I will say that good and beautiful is the Law of Christ and much better than the earlier Law, but that mine [the Quran] is superior to both.  Therefore consider what I am going to say, you may hear something that you do not condemn altogether.  Your law, I say, is beautiful and good, but it is very hard and very burdensome and can not easily be useful.  These remedies are too bitter to taste.  So there is no error in believing it is not completely perfect.  The Law of Mohammed follows the middle path and proclaims ordinances which are bearable and in sum gentler and more humane.  Hence it is moderate in all respects and takes precedence over other laws.  Indeed, the shortcomings of the old Law it fills by the supplements which it brings; on the other hand it reduces the exaggerations of the Law of Christ.  There is also what it prunes visibly from both Laws, and suddenly it quite prevails over them.

It also avoids, I think, the mediocrity and the imperfection of the Law of the Jews on the one hand, and on the other hand, the elevation and height of the precepts of Christ, their harshness, that they are excessive and impractical so far for men, because they force, so to speak, our terrestrial nature to mount up to Heaven.  It thus avoids both faults and strives for moderation in everything.  Thereby it appears better than all the Laws that have preceded it.

The virtues, you know, consist of avoiding excesses and keeping exactly to a happy medium.  That’s what we call virtue, and what virtue is.  What is virtue is a happy medium, and what is not such is not virtue.  This is the doctrine of all the ancients, and you yourself have said the same earlier.

But tell me, is it to stay in the happy medium—’to love one’s enemies, to pray for them’, to provide them with food when they are hungry;—And what is amusing—allow me this freedom—to ‘hate his parents and brothers and even his own soul;—’to he who took your shirt, to give him also your coat’;—’to give without distinction to he who asks’ until you appear more naked than a stick and ridiculous in the eyes of those who would then make your property the loot of the Mysians, by pretending to be in need;—to he who strikes ‘on one cheek, to turn the other; to never stand up to evil’;—to have ‘no stick, no bag, no money, nor two tunics’;—‘to not worry about tomorrow’?  “Who is the man of iron, diamond, more insensible than stone, who will bear all these things,—who will bear the offence and cherish the insulter;—who will do good to he who is ill-disposed towards him;—who by his extra bounty will invite the people of this species to gorge on him like vultures on the corpses of the dead?

[We should probably make allowances for the fact that this debate was hosted by Christians, and recorded by them, so that the Persian scholar might not have felt free to attack Christianity in the strongest possible terms.  Nevertheless, the viewpoint being argued seems plausible enough as an honest statement of opinion by a real Muslim.]

From a Christian perspective, the basic mistake here is thinking of the law of Christ as if its main purpose was to be a terrestrial law code.  From this perspective, a law could deviate from perfection either by being “too strict” or by being “too lax”, given the realities of human nature.  Yet Christianity is not primarily meant to be a new code of laws, but rather it is a means of experiencing supernatural grace.  From that perspective it is an attraction, that the law of Christ cuts deeper than anything we could obey by our own efforts.  Suppose that our “terrestrial nature” is indeed destined “to mount up to Heaven”; not indeed by our own efforts, but rather by the grace of God redeeming sinful people, and conforming us to the supernatural standard of goodness set by Jesus?  Then we need to know what truly heavenly people would look like, and Jesus provides that picture.

Muslims admire Islam for the reasonableness of its requirements.  For example, if you are physically unable to prostrate or to go on pilgrimage, then God understands that, and you can just do whatever you can do.  On the other hand, while Christians certainly believe God makes allowances for our weakness, we admire the Gospel message more for its unreasonableness by human standards.  God demands that which exceeds our abilities; but then gives us the grace to fulfil his commands.

Islam and Prophets

This issue is closely connected to the Islamic theology concerning prophets.  Most Muslims believe that all prophets are sinless, which would blatantly contradict the Bible in numerous places.  However, I have come to conclude that this doctrine was never taught by Mohammad; in particular it seems to explicitly contradict the Quran, which contains multiple examples of prophets sinning (e.g. there is a story of Jonah similar to the Bible, Mohammad is rebuked by God for doing certain things, etc).

Nevertheless, there is still a significant difference when it comes to the overall tone of respect which the Quran has for prophets, as compared to the Bible which consistently emphasizes the flaws and sins of nearly all of its major protagonists, except for Jesus.  Leave aside the villains; let’s look at the saints: Noah gets drunk; Abraham lies about his wife; Isaac plays favorites; Jacob tries to trick everyone; Joseph’s brothers sell him into slavery; Judah visits a prostitute; Aaron makes a golden calf; Moses loses his temper; Jephthah swears a rash vow; Samson is a violent hothead; David commits adultery with Bathsheba; Solomon is led astray to idolatry; Hezekiah boasts to the Babylonian envoys; Zechariah doubts the angel; Peter repeatedly wavers in his faith; Paul is quarrelsome.  Even Mary, the Blessed Mother of the Lord, comes to try to take Jesus home to cool off, after the rest of his family decides he’s gone nuts!  This is all rather astonishing, especially given the tendency of other religious literature (including later Christian chronicles and legends) to succumb to pious hagiography.  To my mind this moral realism is one of the most striking effects of divine inspiration, in the narrative parts of the Bible.

(Conversely, one of the most striking aspects of those parts of the Bible in which humans talk to God—like the Psalms and Job—is the brutal honesty with which the saints are allowed to express their feelings to their Lord.  Here too, I know of no real parallel outside the Judaeo-Christian tradition.  It is certainly not a common practice in Islam.)

The Muslim attitude is, how can you trust a prophet if he’s a sinner?  Which makes perfect sense if you think that sin is just a matter of disobeying some reasonable code of conduct which any decent person is capable of following.  But the Bible provides the more bracing truth that everyone is a sinner who needs salvation (Christ alone excepted).  Even heroes of nonviolence, like Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr., can commit quite serious sins (as a close look at their biographies will reveal).

The Gospel passes judgement even on its own messengers, “so that every mouth may be silenced and the whole world held accountable to God” (Romans 3:20).  The Christian doctrine of original sin is much maligned, but as St. Chesterton pointed out, its actual effects are to promote sympathy and solidarity between human beings.  We are all in the same leaky boat, and we all need rescuing!  Righteousness is something which we cannot achieve by merely human efforts, even if those efforts take the form of religious rituals (praying X times a day, going on pilgrimage, donating to charity etc.)

What is Grace?

Another way of putting this: Islam is inherently Pelagian in its theology of human nature.  (St?) Pelagius—despite the fact that he was himself a very devout and pious man—was condemned for his heretical and destructive teachings by the Catholic Church.  The problem was that he taught that human beings are morally capable of obeying the law without needing to undergo a radical spiritual transformation.  On a Pelagian (or Islamic) view of salvation, the main spiritual need of humanity is to be educated and informed about what it is that God commands.  Having learned the correct way to live, our task is choosing to submit to God’s commands and obey them, which we have the power to do.  But orthodox Christianity teaches, that what humans need is not primarily instruction, but rather an infusion of new life which comes from on high.

What kind of grace do we need?  The Quran portrays God as merciful to believers, but he does not show extravagant love to sinners as he does in the Bible.  Indeed the Quran seems more frequently to relish in the damnation of evildoers, rather than mourning them.  Compare this to the biblical tradition: “As surely as I live, declares the Lord God, I take no pleasure in the death of the wicked, but rather that they turn from their ways and live!” (Ezekiel 33:11).

In my experience, it can be a bit difficult for Christians to communicate our theology of grace to Muslims, since it is easy to overstate the difference between the two religions, when in fact there is a lot of common ground.

If you try to tell your Muslim friend that it is impossible to be good without divine help, they will almost certainly agree with you!  This is just common sense, in any tradition of ethical monotheism.  Pelagius himself would never have said that God doesn’t help us to do good works, or that it is wrong to pray for his assistance in being good.  After all, God created us, and nothing in the world can even continue to exist without his active sustenance.  (Even the most hard-core Calvinist ideas about divine predestination have parallels in Islamic theology.)

If you try to talk about God’s mercy—well it is also very important to Muslims that God is merciful.  In all five of their prescribed daily prayers, they invoke “the Name of Allah—the Most Compassionate, Most Merciful” (Sura 1:1).  If you ask them whether it is always possible for even the most sinful person to repent and be forgiven by God, again your Muslim friend will probably agree.  Assuming the sinner is sincere in their repentance, and they earnestly desire to live a righteous life going forwards, why wouldn’t God accept them?

But as we have seen, what the Bible means by grace goes deeper than this.  In the New Testament, God pours out his love and grace even to those who are currently his enemies.  There is no analogue in the Quran to divine “love” in the sense of: “For God so loved the world that he gave his one and only Son” (John 3:16), nor to “sacrifice” in the sense of: “While we were still sinners, Christ died for us” (Rom 5:8).  In fact, there can’t be any parallel, because it would be considered blasphemous to say that God has a Son, or that anything which God does, can be compared to being a crucifixion victim.  (As discussed previously, Islam does not even seem comfortable with the idea of purely human prophet experiencing such a fate.)

And as for the human response to God’s grace… suppose we consider the most law-oriented book of the New Testament: the epistle by Jesus’ brother James.  This letter considers its most essential task, to be convincing Christians to obey Christ’s “perfect law of freedom” (1:25), and it says that “faith without works is dead” (2:26).  If a Muslim scholar wanted to identify the stratum of early Christian teaching which is most compatible with Islam, they would probably pick this letter.  And yet, even in this book, St. James strikes a note totally incompatible with Islamic (or Pelagian) theology:

Every good and perfect gift is from above, coming down from the Father of the lights, with whom there is no variation or shadow of change.  By his own choice, he gave us birth by the word of truth” (1:17-18).

Or as Jesus said to a Jewish religious leader, “You must be born again” (John 3:7).  This refers not to our natural birth, but to a spiritual birth into a new life which comes from God!  Receiving this new life from God, makes us truly children of God.

While obviously this does not refer to literal procreation in an earthly sense, Jesus’ use of a biological metaphor here still communicates something deeply important.  When Christians call God “Father”, we do so not as a mere title of respect (though he is worthy of all respect, nor do we call him “Father” simply because he looks after our needs as a parent does (though he certainly does that as well).  Neither of these would require any notion of “new birth”.  Rather, we call God Father because he has enabled us to participate in his own spiritual life, which we receive from Christ.  This divine life cannot be replicated simply by human effort.  (This would be just as impossible, as for a woman to get pregnant by looking at pictures of babies.)  This is why, throughout the Gospels, Jesus continually talks about receiving the word of God using agricultural metaphors: seeds growing into plants, vines nourishing branches, etc.

We come to Christ because we have had the experience of being unable to live up to even our own moral standards; and we find forgiveness and hope there, and a grace that seems to touch our point of need.  To say: “the problem is you were trying to follow moral rules that were too hard, just do these other rituals instead, and remember that God is merciful” seems like it is missing the point.  My own spiritual needs cry out for something deeper than that.

And then Christianity offers something far greater than we had any right to expect.  We believe that those who are in Christ, become spiritual sons and daughters of God, living by the power of God’s own life.  Even though we are human and not divine—and however inadequate our current strivings may be—the purpose and goal of our sainthood is nevertheless to become, in some inconceivable manner, spiritually united to divinity.  As closely as a husband is united to a wife, or as a mother to her unborn child, or the soul to the body.  This is a relation to God that Islam does not offer, and cannot offer, given its other theological commitments.

Hence, from the perspective of someone who believes this central Christian gospel (the good news about Jesus), the Islamic religion simply doesn’t come across as a mere extension or addition of new material.  Rather, it is a denial of what Christians consider to be the good news: that God did for us, and will do in us, a work of righteousness which goes beyond human capabilities.  In the moral realm, we need somebody who can say to us, what Jesus said to the crippled man: “Pick up your mat and walk!” (John 5:8).

VI.  Hinduism

To find a religion which competes with Christianity in its desire for mystical union with the divine, we now turn to the East, to the religions of India.  In this section we will look “Hinduism”, although in fact this is a pretty broad target, containing a very eclectic group of different philosophical traditions, which are really only regarded as “one thing” as a result of being grouped together by British Imperialists.  As these traditions are practiced by different groups of people, there is no obligation for these ideas to all be compatible with each other, so it is very difficult to discuss Hinduism in any sort of unified way.  There is a lot going on here.  Some of it good, and some of it bad.

Traditional Hinduism is fairly closely bound up with a system of racial subordination, which it grew up around.  It’s hard for me to get too worked up about this at the personal level, not being Indian, and I don’t want to overstep when judging a culture different from my own.  But if there were a hypothetical American religion which taught that black people shouldn’t necessary aspire to the same religious goals as white people, but should follow the duties of their own traditional station in life, in hopes of being reincarnated as a white person… then I think that religion would strike me as being pretty evil!

By contrast, the popular Bhakti (devotion) movement in Hinduism teaches that one can gain salvation through devotion to a particular deity (or set of deities), and that this devotion transcends caste divisions.  These reform movements became very popular in India, starting in the 15th century.  Perhaps this was in part due to influence from Western religious concepts.  Different religions do not actually exist in watertight compartments; they influence each other in various ways.

The mythology associated with Hinduism, like other pagan mythologies, often does not portray its deities as holy and righteous, but rather as petty, selfish and sensual.  This shows that these gods are only idols, made in the image of our own flaws in order to tell a good story.  Even if they were real, they would have no moral authority, because they behave no better than the powerful and rich rulers of our own species.

My friend Sudipta is an agnostic from India; he doesn’t consider himself Hindu, but he is from a Hindu cultural background.  Although not a Christian, he says “I have no problem calling Christ divine, because he forgave those who crucified him.”  We’ve had several conversations in which he minimized the differences between religions, saying they’re all equally good, no way to know who is really right, etc.  On one occasion, after I invited him to my church in Maryland, we were walking back to the Metro station, and he was telling me about a religious festival (I think Diwali) involving one of the Hindu goddesses.  Suddenly he started coughing and sputtering as if he had something in his throat (we looked for a drinking fountain but none was available).  “Maybe I said something about the goddess she didn’t like,” he said. “They aren’t merciful, like your god is!”

As St. E. Stanley Jones (a Christian missionary to India who was close friends with Gandhi) wrote:

Moreover, in Hinduism the moral law is not rooted in God, God is not the basis of morals.  It is to be found in the law of Karma which operates independently of God.  God is lifted above the law of Karma, and has nothing to do with it.  If God is lifted above morals, the devotee gets to the place where he, too, transcends morals.  He is not affected by good or evil.  Both for God and man morality has no eternal significance.

In the Gospel the moral life is founded in the very nature of God.  Both God and man are bound by the same moral attitudes.  “Follow me as I follow God,” Paul could say, and when he said this he was saying the highest thing he could say.

By all that God requires of me
I know that He Himself must be.

This makes the moral universe a universe and not a multiverse.  Morality has permanent meaning and does not vary from age to age and from circumstance to circumstance.  What we have seen of God in Christ becomes the standard for God or man.  To be Christlike is the highest attainable or even imaginable goodness.  Our morality then is firm—fixed in the nature of God and in historic fact the nature of Christ.

But this is not true of Hinduism.  You are not supposed to follow the Incarnations in their moral actions.  I asked a priest at a temple on which was depicted the escapades of Krishna, “Can you follow this as your own example?”  “No,” he said very thoughtfully, “unless you are very strong when you come here you will go off and do the same things.”  The devotee’s safety must lie in the fact that he is strong enough not to do what his Incarnation did.

Of course, the more philosophical side of Hinduism does not concentrate on these mythological indiscretions; it tries to get to a more transcendent concept of the Divine which is beyond both gods and men.  But here again, its morality continually founders on the rock of Pantheism, the idea that God is in everything, and is therefore indifferent to good and evil.  How can it be considered “good” to try to conform your own life to a reality which is indifferent to goodness?

(Here I am speaking to the majority Hindu position of “Non-Dualism”; however you can find Hindu schools of thought which have almost any set of views on the divine, including that God and the world are totally distinct e.g. the Dvaita school founded by Madhvacharya, who claimed to be an avatar of the wind god, but did not identify himself with the ultimate reality, Brahman.)

For example, the Bhagavad Gita was clearly written by a poet with a strong intuition concerning the grandeur and majesty of the One who is above all, and in that respect it is a spiritually insightful work.  But it continually waffles on this important issue, of whether God really is benevolent and loving, and whether creation is to be regarded with joy or suspicion.  Krishna sometimes speaks as if he were to be identified with the best and most noblest of things, but in other parts he claims to be identical with everything, both high and low.

The book certainly makes a distinction between those who cultivate good desires and rise in their next life, and those who act ignorantly and fall in their next life.  But the best and noblest thing is to be indifferent to any such rewards, and so to transcend the system altogether, going straight to love of Krishna alone.  At one point, the text gets within striking distance of Christian morality:

A person is said to be still further advanced when he regards all—the honest well-wisher, friends and enemies, the envious, the pious, the sinner and those who are indifferent and impartial—with an equal mind.  (Gita 6:9)

But reading the context makes it clear that this is more about indifference than benevolence:

For such persons heat and cold, happiness and distress and honor and dishonor are all the same.  (Gita 6:7)

Yes, one is to regard enemies as equal to friends, but only as one is to regard pain as equal to pleasure—the point is not to regard them at all!

Thus, at the end of the day, Arjuna still ends up killing his friends and family in battle.  He is to do so without any concern for them, because it is really God who is swallowing them up with his many mouths; Arjuna is merely fulfilling his duty in life.

VII. Buddhism

I suppose that Buddhism has the most noble type of ethical system (the Stoic type) that could possibly be expected from a wise philosopher without the benefit of divine revelation.  Like Christianity, it is concerned primarily with the heart, not with external regulations.  (In theory, if not always in practice.)  As Buddha said to an inquirer:

“What do you think, Kalamas?  When non-greed, non-hatred, non-delusion arise in a person, is it for his welfare or for his harm?” — “For his welfare, venerable sir.”  “Kalamas, a person without greed, hatred, delusion not overcome by them, his mind not obsessed by them, does not destroy life, take what is not given, transgress with another’s wife, or speak falsehood; nor does he encourage others to do likewise.  Will that lead to his welfare and happiness for a long time?” — “Yes, venerable sir.”  (Discourse with Kalamas)

The structure of this idea is very similar to the Christian doctrine of the unity of ethics:

The commandments, “You shall not commit adultery,” “You shall not murder,” “You shall not steal,” “You shall not covet,” and whatever other command there may be, are summed up in this one command: “Love your neighbor as yourself.”  Love does no harm to a neighbor.  Therefore love is the fulfillment of the law.  (Romans 13:9-10),

yet in another respect it is the exact opposite since Buddha posited dispassion (negative) rather than love (positive) as the root of moral conduct.

These quotations illustrate the fact that religions do not differ very much in their account of the most basic ethical obligations to other humans—the behaviors prohibited by Buddha are basically identical to the second half of the Ten Commandments—but they do differ essentially in their account of how and why we are to be ethical, and indeed what a supremely ethical person would look like.  They differ at the heart, but more or less agree on the basic outward observances.

Having said that, it is noteworthy that most sects of Buddhism (like many Hindus) take the rule against killing much further, by requiring vegetarianism; which Christianity generally regards as an optional practice.  There is certainly an obvious ethical case to be made for vegetarianism, given that most animals raised as livestock seem to be capable of experiencing affection and suffering, and are therefore appropriate objects of empathy.  On the other hand, many animals in Nature are naturally carnivorous, and our own human teeth imply that we evolved to be an omnivorous species, so that is some evidence we are “meant” to eat meat.  It seems to me this ethical difference may come down partly to different beliefs about facts—if you happen to believe that people can reincarnate as animals, then the case for not eating meat is a lot stronger.

(Please note, that I am talking about vegetarianism in the abstract, as the issue would have been presented in the ancient world.  We are not currently discussing modern industrial “factory farms”, which were created only about 100 years ago.  These seem like an obvious moral abomination, which I assume would have horrified most ancient religious leaders in the West as well as the East.  Anyway, I am not denying that the suffering of factory farmed animals is a grave evil, despite the fact that I have only made the most pathetically minimal attempts to modify my own diet in response—mostly I only try to reduce the amount of chicken I eat.)

Buddha also rejected the caste system of Hinduism, observing wryly that:

Whoever from a noble, priestly or royal family, bringing an upper piece of fire-stick of teak or sāl or of a sweet-scented tree or of sandal or lotus, lights a fire and gets it to give out heat — this fire has flame and hue and brightness and is able to serve the purposes of a fire.

And too, whoever from a despised family, a trapper family, a bamboo-plaiter family, a cartwright family, a scavenger family, bringing an upper piece of fire-stick from a dog’s trough or a pig’s trough or a trough for dyeing or dry sticks from a castor-oil shrub, lights a fire and gets it to give out heat — this fire too has flame and hue and brightness and is able to serve the purposes of a fire.  (Discourse with Asalayana)

And yet, Buddhist texts do not contain the same denunciations of social injustice that you find in Abrahamic religious scriptures.  (Indeed they could not, given their views about avoiding attachment to worldly goals.)  Indeed, I may be giving a false impression by selecting out a few Scriptures that touch on what Westerners would recognize as ethical themes.  In general, ethics are discussed much less frequently than questions about how to organize monastic communities, and the techniques for attaining enlightenment.

This brings us to the key point.  Buddhism correctly recognizes—from observation—that there is a serious flaw or mistake in human nature which needs to be rectified by extreme measures.  People cannot be happy because, regardless of what we have already attained or experienced, we are left unsatisfied and desire more.

From the Christian point of view, its main fault is that it proposes a type of despair; it assumes that the human condition is essentially bad, and that we need to escape from our desires, cravings, attachments, and illusions, into something more closely akin to apathy.  Benevolence is a virtue, but all forms of emotional attachment (including love for family and friends) are to be rejected.

Please understand that I am here talking about real Buddhism, not the vaguely exotic Eastern ambiance which Westerners use as a foil to project their ideas of what a non-Christian wisdom tradition ought to look like.  According to David Chapman (himself a rather eccentric modernizing Tantric Buddhist), much of what passes for Buddhist ethics was simply reimported from the West.  Chapman writes:

By the Victorian era, Christianity’s beliefs had become obviously false…

Rationally-inclined liberal Victorians developed secular moral philosophy, trying to find new, rational foundations for more-or-less the same morals.  (Current secular morality, both left and right, derives primarily from Christian morality.)

Romantically-inclined Victorians hoped for analternative spiritual foundation for ethics.  Rejecting rationality, they were sure Truth lay in the mystical connection of the True Self with the Absolute Principle of the Universe.  Some great civilization, in a land less barbarous than the ancient Middle East, must have discovered a correct system of ethics, and must have based it on this mystical unity.  Surveying the world’s religions, Buddhism looked most promising. (Buddhist morality is surprisingly un-bad compared with pre-modern alternatives.)  Ah, the ancient wisdom of the exotic East!

Unfortunately, traditional Buddhist morality is plainly inferior to liberal Victorian morality.  And, Buddhism does not use mysticism to justify its morals.  But, these are mere details! Buddhism must have the correct ethics—so we need to look harder to find it.

In fact, since it is not there, the Victorians wrote the ethics they wanted onto Buddhism, creatively hallucinating the object of their desire.

But this was not just a European project.  Asian Buddhist modernizers had their own reasons for inventing “Buddhist ethics,” and they collaborated vigorously in the project.

First, educated Asians recognized that European morality was, in fact, superior.  It was at minimum a stage 4 ethical system: a rational structure of justifications that eliminates arbitrary rules and assigns sensible weights to different moral considerations.  Traditional Buddhist morality goes no further than stage 3, which aims only at communal harmony, not justice.  Although Asian intellectuals disagreed with some specifics, they could see the value of a justifiable structure; so the idea of a Buddhist version was compelling.

Second, Asian rulers constructed modern Buddhism as a defense against colonialism.  Europe’s moral justification for colonialism was “bringing the benefits of civilization to the benighted savages.”  Demonstrating that an Asian country was fully civilized successfully prevented the colonization of Thailand and Japan.  One of the greatest benefits of civilization was a just system of ethics, for which Christianity was the standard.  Christianity was an instrument of colonialism, so it was urgent for Asians to invent an alternative system of ethics that would compare favorably with Christianity on Europe’s own terms

(How Asian Buddhism Imported Western Ethics, some formatting changes)

At a later state of the same process, we get the wishy-washy American Buddhism, which is really just therapeutic moralism with a side of meditation.  It is easy enough to find some hippie teacher who says that Buddhism is just about getting rid of unhealthy attachments while living the life you always wanted, but this is completely foreign to the complete renunciation of all pleasures demanded by most of the historical forms of Buddhism.

In particular, Buddha’s “Middle Way” does not refer to a comfortable middle class existence; rather it refers to Buddha’s conclusion that severe ascetic practices intended to torment the body are just as distracting and unhelpful as pleasure-seeking.

If you are looking for a sex-positive religion, Buddhism isn’t it!  When an early disciple named Sudinna had intercourse with his wife, solely because his family wanted an heir, the Buddha rebuked him severely:

Worthless man, haven’t I taught the Dhamma in many ways for the fading of passion, the sobering of intoxication, the subduing of thirst, the destruction of attachment, the severing of the round, the ending of craving, dispassion, cessation, unbinding?  Haven’t I in many ways advocated abandoning sensual pleasures, comprehending sensual perceptions, subduing sensual thirst, destroying sensual thoughts, calming sensual fevers?

Worthless man, it would be better that your penis be stuck into the mouth of a poisonous snake than into a woman’s vagina.  It would be better that your penis be stuck into the mouth of a black viper than into a woman’s vagina.  It would be better that your penis be stuck into a pit of burning embers, blazing and glowing, than into a woman’s vagina.  Why is that? For that reason you would undergo death or death-like suffering, but you would not on that account, at the break-up of the body, after death, fall into deprivation, the bad destination, the abyss, hell.  But for this reason you would, at the break-up of the body, after death, fall into deprivation, the bad destination, the abyss, hell.  (from the Vinaya Pitaka, quoted here)

[Note that as discussed previously, my quotations are from the Theravadan Pali canon, to keep them as close as possible to the historical Buddha’s teaching.]

To a monk who questioned whether it is really necessary to give up all sensual acts (perhaps thinking he would do them without becoming attached to them) the Buddha replied:

For a person to indulge in sensual pleasures without sensual passion, without sensual perception, without sensual thinking: That isn’t possible.  (Discourse on the Water Snake Simile)

Of course this is extremely difficult to do if you aren’t a monk; so it was understood (even in the Theravada traditions) that most laypeople would still eat nice food, and have sex with their spouses, and love their kids—but that just means they are currently failing to become enlightened in this life.  Hopefully, by being decent and moral people (ideally by taking vows to abstain from killing, sexual immorality, stealing, lying, and drinking alcohol), they can improve their chances to succeed in the next reincarnation!  (Hence Buddhist texts like the Advice to Sigala, encouraging householders to adhere to a sort of conventional-bourgeoisie work ethic.)  But it was generally understood that actual enlightenment was not really compatible with fulfilling such social roles.  In this respect, Buddhist monasticism is not like ordination in other religions, where you can be e.g. a fully practicing Jew without becoming a rabbi, or a fully practicing Catholic without becoming a priest, monk, or nun.

(A lot of later schools of thought in Buddhism can be understood as reacting to the difficulty of this Theravada teaching by adding mitigating features—for example Mahayana adds to Buddhism the idea that bodhisattvas (Buddhist saints) can intercede on behalf of ordinary people to make Enlightenment easier for them; while Tantric Buddhism allows for the indulgence of sensuality and for breaking traditional Buddhist vows as an alternative path towards enlightenment.  But as far as I can tell, both of these are departures from Buddha’s original teaching.)

Seeing that the human condition is full of suffering, Buddhism looks around for the door marked Exit.  (In a system with reincarnation, you can’t just top yourself.)  The goal is to permanently escape from the cycle of births into cessation of suffering, returning (if at all) only to help other people also escape from life.

I take it that Nirvana (literally “blowing out” or “quenching”) is not necessarily regarded as quite the same thing as nonexistence, but it would at least seem to involve the ceasing of all that makes us uniquely human.  No Christian would ever use the word “extinguished” to refer to the state of heavenly glory, let alone the state of the resurrected saints reigning with Christ in the New Heaven and Earth.  By contrast, Buddha himself refused to say whether the enlightened person persisted after death, holding that any possible viewpoint on the issue would keep one entangled in suffering:

[Note: the repetitiveness of many Buddhist sutras was designed to make them easier to recite by memory.  In the following quote I retain this feature, despite its awkwardness in written text.]

Vaccha, the position that “after death a Tathagata exists” is a thicket of views, a wilderness of views, a contortion of views, a writhing of views, a fetter of views.  It is accompanied by suffering, distress, despair, & fever, and it does not lead to disenchantment, dispassion, cessation; to calm, direct knowledge, full Awakening, Unbinding.

Vaccha, the position that ”after death a Tathagata does not exist” is a thicket of views, a wilderness of views, a contortion of views, a writhing of views, a fetter of views.  It is accompanied by suffering, distress, despair, & fever, and it does not lead to disenchantment, dispassion, cessation; to calm, direct knowledge, full Awakening, Unbinding.

Vaccha, the position that ”after death a Tathagata both exists & does not exist” is a thicket of views, a wilderness of views, a contortion of views, a writhing of views, a fetter of views.  It is accompanied by suffering, distress, despair, & fever, and it does not lead to disenchantment, dispassion, cessation; to calm, direct knowledge, full Awakening, Unbinding.

Vaccha, the position that ”after death a Tathagata neither exists nor does not exist” is a thicket of views, a wilderness of views, a contortion of views, a writhing of views, a fetter of views.  It is accompanied by suffering, distress, despair, & fever, and it does not lead to disenchantment, dispassion, cessation; to calm, direct knowledge, full Awakening, Unbinding.

(To Vacchagotta on Fire)

Thus, while Buddhism encourages many noble virtues, its core goal is what some Christians might refer to as a “mortal sin”, which (unless it is repented of) is inconsistent with salvation.  By this I do not mean that it is a vice for which God arbitrarily withholds salvation.  Rather, I mean that, if any Buddhist in fact succeeded in their quest to unmake themselves, it would be a logical contradiction for them to also receive the Kingdom of God, as Christians understand it.  (The sins of the flesh, like sexual immorality, are quite trivial in comparison to the existential despair that causes a person to seek spiritual suicide.)

But I don’t want to be misunderstood as making a judgment about the final state of salvation of Buddhists, since not all of them will succeed in damning themselves.  I would not be very surprised to find out that a great many Buddhists (perhaps even Buddha himself) were sincerely trying to follow the best they knew, and will be rewarded with a fuller knowledge of the truth in the age to come.  But this will necessarily require them to stop chasing after annihilation, and instead go through the gate of life.

The Goodness of Creation, and Suffering

Christianity believes that physical existence is good; because it was created by a God who is good.  Redemption is not about escaping from physicality, instead it is about God assuming human nature in Christ and healing it from within.  It is true that we are called to die to our selfishness, and to be willing to sacrifice anything else if it conflicts with our relationship to Christ, but only so that we may become the holy people who God truly created us to be, more human than ever before!  Unlike Buddhism—and most sects of Hinduism—it does not preach the destruction of our essential individuality.  We are not to be merely absorbed into something impersonal.  The Christian message is called the gospel (good news) for a reason.  Our good news is better than their “good news”!

To be fair, I should probably note that in the past, many Christian monastics came very close to a “Buddhist” interpretation of Christianity, where the ideal monk is supposed to renounce every sort of earthly pleasure or desire, for the sake of seeking Christ alone.  Many early church fathers spoke out against “passions” in general.  And there are passages in Roman Catholic spiritual classics such as  The Imitation of Christ (by St. Thomas à Kempis) or the Ascent of Mount Carmel (by St. John of the Cross) which seem to advocate a total renunciation of everything that is not God.  It must be remembered that Christianity developed in a world which was—partly due to cultural influence from the East—far more sympathetic to asceticism than most moderns are comfortable with.

But this was only one strand of Christian tradition.  At least in theory, Christianity has always affirmed the goodness of the physical creation, including marriage and procreation.  The emotions expressed by St. David in the Psalms, crying out to be delivered from earthly troubles, are representative of a much older view: that you can put God first without having stoic indifference towards the world.

(On the other hand, modern Christians, especially Protestants, are far more likely to fall into the opposite mistake, thinking that the point of worshipping God is to live a fulfilling earthly life; while ignoring all the scriptural passages cautioning us not to set our hopes on this world, but to store up treasures in heaven.)

Zooming out more broadly, it is actually kind of surprising to me how many religions teach that suffering is, in one way or another, basically our own fault.  Pagans look to propitiate the gods whenever something goes wrong; Buddhists say it is our own desires that cause suffering; the doctrine of karma implies that we deserve whatever we get.  Even the medieval Rabbis, somehow overlooking or misreading the Book of Job, taught that all misfortune is a punishment for sin (although I gather that the Holocaust has led most modern Jews to reconsider this idea).

But Christianity has always allowed for the existence of unjust suffering.  It follows a Messiah who was not ashamed to be seen weeping, who felt the full range of human experiences, who went to the Cross in order to suffer on behalf of others.  Instead of karma, it offers grace, undeserved favor.  We get something unimaginably better than what we deserve, including the privilege of suffering with Christ, alongside the needy and oppressed.  And if we share in his sufferings, we will also share in his joy.

Next: Spiritual Experience

Followup on the Moral Argument for Theism

A commenter named Nikki argued against my post Fundamental Reality XII: The Good, and the Not.

Nikki writes:

I don’t think the post’s argument works – I’d argue that non-theistic morality can be objective and well-grounded, or at least be no worse off in those regards than theistic morality is.

So the first part of this post that really jumped out at me is the claim that if morality is objective, it must be like a mind. Frankly, to me this seems not only false, but a category error. Morality is things like systems, principles, rules, etc. – I’m not sure what the exact best word choice is. The point, though, is it is a thing that minds use, but not in and of itself a mind. You describe morality as approving or disapproving certain things, but this seems to be conflating things like “this abstract system contains claims that X is good/bad,” which could validly be said about morality, and “this abstract system itself consciously judges that X is good/bad,” which could not. It is us who use morality to consciously make those judgements.

As an analogy, personality traits are part of minds, but not minds themselves – to speak of them, by themselves, being conscious, thinking, willing, etc. would be a fundamental mistake. (Though Inside Out was a pretty fun movie). I’ll admit though, I don’t actually think that’s the best analogy. I’d argue the set of laws of logic or mathematics are an even better example of something that is a feature of minds – but is not, and could not possibly be, a mind in itself. However, you’ve said in an above comment that logic is also a description of God’s character.

(Perhaps a bit of a sidetrack here, but I don’t think this could be true either. I believe that you’ve stated elsewhere that while you believe God is metaphysically necessary, he is not logically necessary – but of course, it is logically necessary that the laws of logic or mathematics are true. I don’t think the dependence you’re arguing for could work, even if God exists in some sense. That said, as one might guess, I don’t think God is metaphysically necessary in the first place.

In fact, I have doubts that there is even a “metaphysical necessity” distinct from logical necessity at all. I find Chalmers’ arguments in his paper “Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?” fairly convincing in this regard. I do think there are some weak points, but it seems to me that at least it shows that even if there is a metaphysical modality separate from logical modality, we don’t currently have a good reason to believe in it. I know there are several relevant arguments on this blog, but well, I can’t discuss every single reason for and against the existence of God in this post, so here I’m trying to stick with things related to the original topic/what’s been mentioned in previous comments on it. I might debate the other arguments later.

As a note, Chalmers’ arguments there are important for the case he makes that consciousness is not physical, because they counter the reply of some materialists that consciousness is metaphysically the same as a physical property, even if it cannot logically be derived from other physical facts. Others have argued that this causes problems for theists who both defend the metaphysical necessity of God and the non-physicality of consciousness. I suppose this may not apply to you because you’ve said you can’t rule out that consciousness is physical in some sense, as in what Chalmers calls “Type-B Materialism,” but I did think it was interesting).

Alright, back to the main topic. Does an objective morality depend on God? The whole field of moral philosophy is certainly not something I can fully describe in one post, but I’ll start with something interesting you said in your own previous post in this series:
“Even people who say there’s no such thing as ethical truth suddenly sound quite different when somebody treats them unfairly.”

I suspect that in that statement is at least a hint at what the basis for a nontheistic objective morality might be like. If there is an objective morality, I think it has something to do with the symmetry between you and others – if you don’t treat others well, what’s to prevent them from doing things to you that you don’t want? Even if evil may sometimes have short-term rewards, people committing acts like theft or murder or terrorism ultimately make things worse for everyone, including themselves. Note that these statements do not depend on God to make them true. And I think several strands of thought, such the Golden Rule, Kantian morality, Rawls’ veil of ignorance, and even some game-theoretic analyses, among others, all point towards something like this in a sense.

Now, this may not be very compelling – I’m being vague and have not spelled out a fully detailed nontheistic system. Furthermore, many of the systems I’ve cited actually contradict each other. Nevertheless, I think that there are important shared elements that don’t depend on a belief in God to be convincing (well, Kant’s morality was theistic and the Golden Rule is a part of many religions, but I don’t think everything along the lines that I’ve mentioned is). So it seems that the claim that no secular account of morality can possibly succeed isn’t very certain. I’ll note that you linked in your previous article to the SEP’s article on Moral Naturalism, but merely said those systems were “problematic” without really discussing the individual ideas presented there, although there are many important nonreligious thinkers whose ideas on morality are much more detailed than mine. (I won’t complain about that too much though – after all, I’m not discussing every form of theistic morality in this post myself).

Some more notes: 1. Speaking of moral naturalism, even on atheism, that isn’t the only option available for an objective morality. While I agree naturalism and atheism are often found together in practice, it is still possible for an atheist to be a non-naturalist, including about morality. So even if morality cannot be justified on naturalism, you would have to show that God specifically is the only one who can ground morality, not some other non-natural element.

2. Above, Scott Church argues that on naturalism, the universe does not care about us and we are fundamentally unimportant, so it cannot ground objective morality. But the universe itself does not have to care about us/be a moral agent for morality to be objective! I’d argue that if morality, say, applies to all rational beings, it is objective, and the universe not obeying it does not matter because the universe is not a rational agent. The laws of rationality themselves are a good analogy for this – the universe, itself, does not reason, and it requires minds to use reason, yet the standards of rationality are fully objective (and not derivable from physical equations, by the way). And even on theism, it is agreed that some things, like inanimate objects, are not and cannot be moral, yet again, that does not prevent morality from being objective. Related, while pure pleasure-maximization/pain-minimization has several well-known problems, so I doubt that’s the full objective morality, I do think there are non-arbitrary reasons why those are at least important. They are necessarily important to us by their very nature – no one can truly be indifferent to them even if they claim to be. And even if the universe does not care about them, I take the anti-nihilistic view that it is precisely the fact we care that matters – it’s not as if the universe has any rule against that!

3. I’ve seen this part stated before in some other comments on the blog, but I think it’s important enough that I’ll state it again (especially since unless I’m missing it, I don’t think I’ve seen a response). Escaping the Euthyphro dilemma by saying that God is identical to goodness can only work if we have good reasons to believe that the two could possibly be identical. I don’t think we have those (unlike for the triangle case, in which we do have reasons to believe that “having three sides” and “having three angles” are the same, even though those are logically necessary), but we do, in fact, have reasons to believe the opposite. As I wrote at the beginning of my post, if God is to be viewed as even like a mind, he cannot possibly be identical to morality even if he is an (ultimately) moral agent. For instance, one of the important reasons to consider God like a mind is that he is supposed to be able to take actions, but morality cannot, by itself, take actions. (Also, I’ll admit I don’t know whether your analysis of Plato is accurate, but even if it is, it’s generally fine to take inspiration from an argument and adapt it to your own views. After all, in the original article, you said you used “Hume’s Is-Ought dictum in a manner which he would have thoroughly disapproved of!”)

As a final statement, I don’t think theism is actually better at convincing people of being moral than secularism. There’s some evidence that nonreligious people are even more moral than very religious people, but interpretations are controversial and I’m focusing more on purely philosophical points here. (I do suspect nonreligious people being more moral than the religious, if true, would be a particularly big problem for theism and theistic morality. I think the evidence at least shows that the nonreligious are generally not less moral than the religious, but you’ve agreed in another article that for some senses of “good,” religion is not strictly necessary for it, so that may not be a big problem for you). But anyway, you’ve agreed that not all rational people might be convinced by theistic arguments, and it’s been pointed out above that you can always ask questions like “Why should you follow God’s commands?” so that seems to be an issue. Of course, you might very well always be able to ask similar questions about any nontheistic system, and rational people might not find it convincing. But my point was that secular morality is at least equal to theistic morality in this regard, and while this is a bit speculative, perhaps some of the reasons above might make the former even more convincing than the latter.

My reply got pretty long, so I’m turning it into a blog post.

Dear Nikki,
Welcome to my blog, and thanks for your interesting comment. However, I am not sure that your arguments are actually directed against the specific argument I am making. Here are some replies (not in the order of your points):

I. Objective Morality is a Premise in the Moral Argument

You make a good case defending this proposition: It is possible for a non-theist to rationally come to believe in the existence of an objective ethical system, without thereby coming to believe in God. However, I also believe that this is the case!

In fact, if this were not true, there would be little rhetorical point in presenting a Moral Argument for God’s existence.  In order for an argument for God’s existence to be capable of being convincing, there have to be some people out there who agree with the premises of the argument, but have not yet realized that the conclusion follows (or at least, is made more probable) by the premises.  I obviously do not deny the existence of non-theistic moral realists, because they are the target audience for my post!  (That is why I presented an argument for ethical realism in part XI before describing how  I think Theism grounds ethics in part XII.)

Now obviously, if the a nontheistic argument for objective ethics happened to take the form of an entirely satisfactory reduction of concepts like ethical obligation into naturalistically acceptable terms—e.g. in terms of physical facts of the sort that even Sean Carroll would accept—then the Moral Arguments for Theism would fail, since there would be no additional work for God to do in terms of grounding ethics.  (There might still be a need to ground the laws of physics in some way, but no additional and separate need to ground ethical truths.)  But of course, if you could show that this were true, you would have just solved a very famous and important problem in philosophy!  So I sort of doubt you really think that we can know this to be the case.  And if we cannot know it to be the case, then there is room for discussing non-naturalistic groundings of ethics, in a probabilistic argument for Theism.

You sketch some ways in which you think an non-theistic grounding for objective ethics might work (which fall into the rough family category of what I called “Kantian approaches” to ethics in part X).  As I explicitly stated in that post, Kantianism is not as friendly to the Moral Argument, as Platonism or Aristotelianism is; although I don’t think it is utterly hopeless on that front.  (Kant himself made a sort of pragmatic argument for Theism from Morality, but he didn’t agree with metaphysical arguments of the sort I’m discussing.)   The only conclusion I explicitly drew from Kantianism was:

If Ethics can be deduced rationally as in the Kantian system, then one can at least deduce that if the Universe originates from something like a mind, that mind should also be able to appreciate ethical truths.

So the point you are making was to some extent already acknowledged in this series.  (Of course, on classical forms of Theism, where God is something like the ultimate Reason or Logos behind the Universe, this would still end up identifying God with moral goodness in some deep sense; but such classical views are necessarily bordering on Platonism anyways…)

B. Moral Naturalism and Non-Naturalism

By the way, I revisited the SEP article, and found to my dismay that it had been edited in a way that removed (without refutation) some of the critiques of Moral Naturalist positions. Here is the original version of the article.  If you look, for example, at the original article’s section 4.3, you can see what appears to me to be a pretty desperate attempt by Jackson to make naturalistic ethics work, together with (what appears to me to be) a pretty strong refutation in terms of the permutation problem.  But the main point is not the refutation of that particular idea, but that I don’t see any way forward mentioned in the article which doesn’t seem to have serious problems.

You write:

Speaking of moral naturalism, even on atheism, that isn’t the only option available for an objective morality. While I agree naturalism and atheism are often found together in practice, it is still possible for an atheist to be a non-naturalist, including about morality.

Yes, obviously.  Such views exist (which is why I mentioned them in part X of this series). In fact, individuals with such views (e.g. Moral Platonists) are closer to being the target audience of this post, then perhaps you are.

So even if morality cannot be justified on naturalism, you would have to show that God specifically is the only one who can ground morality, not some other non-natural element.

No, because as I tried to make it clear at the beginning of this series that I wasn’t trying to present a deductive, logically watertight argument for Theism.  As I said in Part I:

Even if there are no strictly deductive arguments (from indisputable premises), there are still going to be plausibility arguments pointing in various directions.  It’s irrational to put too much faith in plausibility arguments, but it’s also irrational to be completely insensible to them.

So the mere existence of logically possible positions, besides the one I argue for, doesn’t bother me.  The question is which positions are most credible.

On the plausibility front, it seems to me that once you start modifying your metaphysics in order to accommodate objective ethics, it would be irrational not to take that into account when assessing the probability of other metaphysical hypotheses.  Ethical Monotheism is, among other things, the belief that a fundamentally good being exists.  The plausibility of this statement depends in part on what we think moral goodness is.  For example, on the view that:

1. “Morality is a emergent and subjective set of feelings found in some of the higher apes, conducive to their evolutionary survival, but having no basis in any metaphysical reality”

then the idea that there exists a fundamentally good being outside the physical universe—which did not evolve—is totally absurd.  On the other hand, if:

2. “moral facts are necessary truths, which tell us something substantive about the structure of non-physical realities”,

then the idea of a fundamentally good being is, though not logically compulsory, at the very least far more plausible than on viewpoint (1) than (2).  Do you agree with that?  If so, then you are necessarily agreeing with me that the Moral Argument for Theism has significant probabilistic force.

[Notes: I am not saying these are the only possible views.  Also, hypothesis (2) does not necessarily deny biological evolution, as it is possible for evolved systems to recognize necessary truths such as mathematical theorems.]

C. The Role of Analogies

Let me remind you a bit of the context of my argument in the Fundamental Reality series.  In parts II-VI, I argued that it is plausible that there exists some fundamental reality which explains everything else, I discussed some properties this entity should have, and after reviewing various candidates I suggested that (based on the mathematical character of the laws of physics) the two most plausible metaphors for understanding this fundamental reality are:

* something like an equation
* something like a mathematician

Now it is important to remember that both of these ideas involve metaphors!  Obviously, if a Naturalist says that some equation provides the deepest truth about the Universe, that doesn’t mean this assertion is being made about a set of chalk lines on a blackboard.

Similarly, if a Theist says that God is like a mind, that doesn’t mean that this Mind is like our mind in every respect.  In particular, Classical Theism proposes a mind for whom there is no distinction between its subjective beliefs and objective reality, and also no distinction between its subjective preferences and objective morality.  This is obviously very different from evolved primate minds like our own!

You wrote:

So the first part of this post that really jumped out at me is the claim that if morality is objective, it must be like a mind. Frankly, to me this seems not only false, but a category error. Morality is things like systems, principles, rules, etc. – I’m not sure what the exact best word choice is. The point, though, is it is a thing that minds use, but not in and of itself a mind. You describe morality as approving or disapproving certain things, but this seems to be conflating things like “this abstract system contains claims that X is good/bad,” which could validly be said about morality, and “this abstract system itself consciously judges that X is good/bad,” which could not. It is us who use morality to consciously make those judgements.

and

As I wrote at the beginning of my post, if God is to be viewed as even like a mind, he cannot possibly be identical to morality even if he is an (ultimately) moral agent. For instance, one of the important reasons to consider God like a mind is that he is supposed to be able to take actions, but morality cannot, by itself, take actions.

I think perhaps you missed the amount of qualifying words I put into my reasoning.  What I wrote was (emphasis added):

But now observe that morality is at least a little bit like a mind, insofar as it approves or favors certain things, and disapproves or disfavors other things. So a fundamental morality would have something analogous to will or desire, and in that respect it would be more like a mind than like an equation, as in Theism.

The point here is not that an objective morality is exactly like a mind, but that it in certain respects more similar to a mind than (say) the equations of the Standard Model are, namely that the Standard Model does not encode any judgements that certain states of affairs are desirable or undesirable (as opposed to probable vs. improbable).

Now, obviously, when we say that God is personal, and can do things like forgive or create, we are adding more to our concept of God then is implied by the mere abstract notion of a metaphysical objective morality.  In my understanding of God, we are adding more to our idea of divinity than the idea of a Platonic form of the Good, but we are not necessarily taking anything away.

In other words, in my conception of God, God is such that he is good, not in an accidental (happenstance) way, but in an essential way, because all goodness in the universe in some sense participates in his goodness, just as all existence participates in his existence.  (The latter claim, of course, obtains for any fundamental reality which is taken to explain all other things.)

D. God Transcends the Abstract/Concrete Divide

Another commenter, St. David Madison, replied to your comment by saying (in part):

“You draw an analogy between morality and personality traits and then point out that personality traits are not conscious and do not themselves think. However, personality traits cannot exist without a personality that possesses those traits.”

This is certainly a reasonable distinction to draw in general; and we could indeed escape from the supposed category error by simply replacing the words “objective ethics” with “that which grounds objective ethics, whatever it is.”  But I think I am instead going to double down on this idea, and say that this supposed category distinction between abstractions and concrete objects breaks down when one is speaking about divinity, just as the distinction between particles and waves breaks down at the subatomic scale.  If God is the source of all else that exists, he must unify within himself the perfections of both abstractions (necessary, eternal, unchanging) and concrete realities (which are causally active, definite, individual etc).

This is indeed, already implied by certain sorts of religious language, in which God is portrayed not as some good or beautiful thing, but as the Supreme Goodness or Truth or Beauty or Life etc.  For example, in the Gospel of John, Jesus asserts his divinity by saying that he is the Way, the Truth, and the Life, which is not the sort of thing that a Positivist philosopher would consider a well-formed statement (a person cannot be an abstract quality).  But I am not convinced we can restrict our language in the way the Positivists wanted to do (I don’t think Positivism even satisfies its own criteria of meaningfulness).  What this religious language points to, is an insight into the nature of divinity as a necessary being, in which all other realities are grounded.  A proposition about a created being can be true, but only the ultimate reality can be the Truth.  In other words, denying the applicability of the concrete/abstract distinction is not something I am doing merely to avoid a logical puzzle, but is already implied by standard religious language about God.

This sort of language about God makes Classical Theism radically different from traditional forms of polytheism, in which the gods are simply regarded as more powerful individuals than us, who still can be born/killed, have conflicts with each other, make mistakes etc.  Yeah, obviously the preferences of finite beings like ourselves can’t possibly ground objective ethics, which was the whole reason why Plato went in a platonic direction instead.

Furthermore, I don’t think we can avoid postulating this sort of concrete/abstract unification, simply by rejecting Classical Theism, as Naturalism seems to me to imply exactly the same thing.  For example, if the fundamental reality is something like a mathematical equation, then we are asserting that it is both an abstract piece of mathematics—which can in principle be understood by humans—AND ALSO the governing principle controlling the universe.  In other words, when a Naturalist does physics, they are still are postulating that the fundamental reality is a λογος, i.e. a rational principle.

Of course, I’m not saying that the equations we write on the blackboard, or in our minds, are strictly identical to the actual laws of physics, which obviously exist whether or not we ever discover them.  But if we asked, “what are the fundamental laws of physics like” we can’t point to anything other than to our abstract human formulation of the equations, and then lamely add “except that it also exists as an actual concrete reality, in a way which transcends our human abstractions”.

In the same way, objective morality exists even apart from human processes to reason about what is or is not moral—So I’m not saying, that this latter, social process of reasoning is equal to God.  Rather it is goodness as it actually exists (which our human reasoning is a mere approximation of) that is rooted in God’s nature, as the ultimate Goodness that other things participate in.

E. Implications for Euthyphro

Escaping the Euthyphro dilemma by saying that God is identical to goodness can only work if we have good reasons to believe that the two could possibly be identical.

This is a strange way to discuss this subject, given that the (modern) Euthyphro dilemma is typically phrased, not in the form of a deductive argument, but in the form of a challenge to Theists to explain their beliefs more clearly.  It’s phrased in the form: “Do you believe A, or B?” (both of which have unpalatable consequences).  But if A and B are not, in fact, exhaustive possibilities, because some other option C is conceivable—and if in fact C was the belief of most ethical monotheists historically, as well as myself—then merely pointing this out is sufficient to defuse the dilemma.

That being said, there is a good reason to think that, if God exists at all, he can ground morality.  Recall that God is, by definition, the explanation for all entities other than himself.  (That’s the whole point of Mono-theism, to have only one ultimate entity.)  So if God exists at all, he either grounds or creates all other realities.  Now if there is objective ethics, then ethics counts as one of these realities.  Since it doesn’t make sense to create ethics (since at least some ethical principles are non-arbitrary, necessary truths) then he must ground it.  (The same argument would hold for logic or mathematics.)

Now, to be clear, this is an argument that God grounds ethics.  It is not an argument which explains how God grounds ethics.  To understand how God grounds ethics we would have to first have direct perception of the divine essence, which we don’t possess.  Instead, we only know the things which proceed from the divine essence, and we have to learn about what God is like, as best we can, from that.

If you like, you can take “a concrete reality which grounds ethics” as a defining property of God, and then ask questions like i) what other properties would such a being need to have, and ii) is there good reason to believe that such a being exists?

If you will allow me to make a more meta-level argument.  It seems to me that giving the Euthyphro dilemma as an objection to Classical Theism is historically obtuse.  It’s like proposing the Equivalence Principle as an objection to General Relativity, when the Equivalence Principle was in fact the motivating thought experiment that led to GR in the first place.  In the same way, the question of what the gods (or really God) has to be like in order to justify treating piety as a virtue, was the underlying question motivating the Euthyphro dilemma.  But somehow atheists never say to themselves, “Geez, the fact that this famous philosophical argument was introduced in a Platonic dialogue, by a theist whose ideas laid the groundwork for the most mainstream philosophical formulation of Monotheism, maybe is a reason to think I’ve missed something and the argument isn’t actually a knock-down in favor of Atheism.”

(To be sure, arguments aren’t “owned” by philosophers and there is no reason in principle why an argument by a philosopher P can’t sometimes be turned against P’s own worldview.  So sure, maybe there is some very subtle reason why GR is still inconsistent with the best formulation of the Equivalence Principle.  But if somebody sends me and email about why they think GR is inconsistent with the EP, and it shows no awareness of why some people have historically thought that GR satisfies the EP, then it’s unlikely that their “gotcha” question about how the EP refutes GR has much merit.  Ditto for Classical Theism and Euthyprho.)

F. Metaphysical vs Logical Necessity

Now to be fair, you did explain why you don’t believe in scenario C.  In addition to your “category error” assertion, you add this:

In fact, I have doubts that there is even a “metaphysical necessity” distinct from logical necessity at all. I find Chalmers’ arguments in his paper “Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?” fairly convincing in this regard.

So on your recommendation, I read through this Chalmers article and I found it pretty unconvincing.  Why should reality be fundamentally scrutable to us?  Or said another way, why can’t there be propositions P which are necessary, but only a mind fundamentally more powerful than the human mind could see why they are necessary?  It seems hubristic to think that human reasoning has access to every possible necessary truth.

Ironically, the reason I don’t believe in Chalmers’ thesis here, is actually very similar to the reasons why I side with Chalmers over Dennett when it comes to Consciousness.  While Dennett makes an interesting philosophical case for the reducibility of conscious experience to neurological facts, ultimately I concluded that Dennettism can only work if Dennettism is true by logical necessity.  In other words, that once you’ve specified all the physical facts then Dennett’s views on consciousness follow automatically.  And it seems to me that this is simply not the case.

Similarly, Chalmers’ idea that if we specify all the physical nonmodal facts, then a single set of views about modal necessity must logically follow (to idealized human reasoners) seems plainly false to me.

(Assuming it even makes sense to distinguish between “modal” and “nonmodal” facts in this way.  This is an important distinction between analytic philosophy and traditional medieval philosophy.  Analytic philosophy sees modality as primarily a feature of certain propositions, and only secondarily as a property of things.  While Aristotelian/scholastic philosophy sees modality as primarily as a property of things, while only secondarily as an attribute of propositions.  A scholastic might argue that the analytic habit of immediately jump to always reasoning about maximal “possible worlds” obscures the role that modal concepts play in causal reasoning, which involves specific concrete entities.)

Anyway, since you hold to something like Chalmers’ view, here’s a dilemma for you: Is the proposition expressing this view itself a logically necessary truth?

(P) There are no metaphysically necessary truths, other than logically necessary truths.

If you say that P is logically necessary, then there must be a proof that it is true which follows deductively from the definitions of the words.  What is that proof?  As far as I can tell, none exists.  Certainly Chalmers doesn’t give a logically conclusive proof in that article, he just gives some reasons why he considers belief in P to be plausible, which is not the same thing.

On the other hand, if is not logically necessary, then either it is contingent (which is inconsistent with the usual S5 rules for modal logic) or else it is an example of a metaphysically necessary (but not logically necessary) truth, in which case it refutes itself.

One could make a similar, superficially less “meta” argument for the same conclusion by considering the proposition:

(N) A necessary being exists.

A standard analytic argument from S5 modal logic implies that either: i) N is necessarily true, or ii) N is necessarily false.  So which of these is logically necessary?  I say neither, but if you disagree then what do you think the proof of N or its negation would look like?

G. Can God be the grounds of Logic?

I believe that you’ve stated elsewhere that while you believe God is metaphysically necessary, he is not logically necessary – but of course, it is logically necessary that the laws of logic or mathematics are true. I don’t think the dependence you’re arguing for could work, even if God exists in some sense.

This is a little compact, but I’m guessing your argument is something like the following:

1. A contingent truth cannot ground a necessary truth.*
2. God’s existence is logically contingent.
3. But logic itself is logically necessary,
4. Therefore, God cannot ground logic.

[*I suppose there is some sense in which, if a Cat walks onto a Mat, this arguably grounds the necessary proposition: “Either the Cat is on the Mat or the Cat is Not on the Mat” by virtue of being a truthmaker for one of its disjunctives.  But I won’t pursue this possible counterexample further, since I don’t think it is relevant to the sense in which God grounds logic.]

But this argument is fallacious, because when I say that God grounds logic, I am making a metaphysical statement rather than a logical one.  From the perspective of metaphysics, both logic and God are (in my view) metaphysically necessary, and it is not at all impossible for a necessary statement to ground another necessary statement.  In other words, we have to distinguish between:

1a: A logically contingent truth cannot logically ground a logically necessary truth.

which is true, and:

1b: A logically contingent truth cannot metaphysically ground a logically necessary truth.

which does not in any way follow from 1a, and I would say it is false.

H. What Metaphysical Necessity Means

Actually, there is a better way to put this which makes the concept of “metaphysical necessity” somewhat less mysterious.  The right way to talk about this is to make Aristotle’s distinction between that which is necessary to us (axioms of human thought) and that which is necessary in itself (propositions which could not have been otherwise).

When we say that a proposition is metaphysically necessary, we merely mean it falls into the latter category.  The adjective is misleading since, unlike the cases of “logical necessity” or “nomic necessity” (which mean necessary given certain specific principles), the phrase “metaphysically necessary” simply means whatever is necessary simpliciter, i.e. that which (without adding any qualifications) could not have been otherwise (whether or not the reason for its necessity is known to human beings.)

On the other hand, logical necessity is an example of what is necessary to human beings, i.e. an axiom of human reasoning, or a particular technique L used to prove the impossibility of certain propositions.

So, the proposition P from earlier boils down to:

(Equivalent to P): If a proposition cannot be proven to be impossible by technique L, then it really is possible.

while I see no reason to believe that technique L is sufficient to uncover all possible cases of necessity.  Especially since technique L does not even seem to be powerful enough to refute the statement that no concrete entity whatsoever exists.

This relates of course to cosmological considerations as well.  As is well-known, if P is true, then the basic principles of existence are just contingent “brute facts” which means they are not true for any reason at all.  So there is an obvious reason to postulate a necessary concrete entity, which is that it serves as a starting point to explain why anything else exists at all.

This reason to want a necessary being, does not seem to depend on us being able to know why the being is necessary.  This is the Thomistic viewpoint on the Cosmological Argument, and it seems to me to be the only possible middle ground between Anslemian positions (there is a valid Ontological Argument for a necessary being from pure logic) and explanatory nihilism (there is no good reason why the universe exists, it just does).

(Now you could just double down and say, I have no idea what you mean by the phrase: “could not be otherwise”, please explain it to me; and then refuse to accept any answer I give other than one which reduces it to logical implication.  But the same technique could be done to motivate skepticism towards practically any other concept, including the other concepts in this discussion like “mind” or “good” or “abstract” or “grounds”.   (It is not even clear that logical necessity can be fully explained without an infinite regress, as  St. Lewis Carroll pointed out in his Achilles and the Tortoise dialogue.)  I don’t claim to have a definition of metaphysical necessity that would satisfy Socrates, but if we make that the standard, there aren’t going to be very many philosophical terms left!)

I. An Irrelevant Topic

As a final statement, I don’t think theism is actually better at convincing people of being moral than secularism.

This is just so totally irrelevant to the metaphysical questions behind the Moral Argument for Theism, that perhaps I should simply refuse to respond to this entirely.  It’s really just a complete change of topic.

God could be the metaphysical grounds for morality, even if every single human being on Earth were an atheist, or even if every single theist were morally worse than every single atheist.  These motivational questions really have nothing whatsoever to do with the question about what metaphysical theses are made more plausible, if we subscribe to moral realism.  I wrote my blog post Is it Possible to be Good without God? precisely because I was annoyed by how regularly people seem to conflate these totally unrelated questions.

(I’m not saying that the degree of goodness of religious people can’t potentially be used as an evidential argument for or against the existence of God.  What I am saying is that it is a mistake to allow such sociological questions to contaminate our interpretation of the thesis that God grounds ethics.)

That being said, I”ll take the bait and say I do think there is some pretty serious question begging required for a non-circular argument that atheism is fully compatible with moral behavior.  For one thing, if a being such as is described by Classical Theism in fact exists (a perfectly wise and holy and good being, who created us and is the source of all our goodness), then we have the moral obligation to worship and obey that being, and to reflect God’s holiness through a life of prayer and repentance, dedicating our earthly activities to the glory of God.  It is difficult to see how an atheist can satisfy that obligation, because for the atheist these activities are just distractions from a different, more secular understanding of what the good life consists of.

(To be sure, if the atheist has some intellectually honest reasons why they think God does not exist, then this may well be a mitigating circumstance that reduces—or even eliminates entirely—their culpability for this omission.  But if we are discussing the question of which beliefs make it easier to be moral, then usually mitigating circumstances are considered mitigating precisely because they make it harder to be moral.  Furthermore, a lack of culpability does not remove all of the causal consequences of trying to place our ultimate happiness in things other than God—what Christians call idolatry.)

I do suspect nonreligious people being more moral than the religious, if true, would be a particularly big problem for theism and theistic morality.

From the standpoint of Christian doctrine, it is not actually clear why this should be.  Merely having knowledge of God’s existence does not necessarily translate into obedience, and in some cases knowledge can make people morally worse since they ought to behave better but don’t.  As Jesus’ brother St. James said:

You believe that there is one God. You do well. Even the demons believe—and tremble!  (James 2:19)

and as Jesus himself said:

“Not everyone who says to me, ‘Lord, Lord!’ will enter the kingdom of heaven, but only the one who does the will of my Father in heaven.  On that day many will say to me, ‘Lord, Lord, didn’t we prophesy in Your name, drive out demons in Your name, and do many miracles in your name?’  Then I will announce to them, ‘I never knew you! Depart from me, you lawbreakers!’ ”  (Matthew 7:21-23)

The Pharisees were among the most “religious” people in Jesus’ day, and many of their leaders handed Jesus over to Pilate to be crucified.  See also St. Paul’s observations of religious people in Romans 2.

According to Christianity, what people need to be transformed morally, is not so much knowledge as grace.  Knowledge is good if it helps us acknowledge our need for grace, but not so much if it makes us look down on other people.

I think the evidence at least shows that the nonreligious are generally not less moral than the religious…

I’m not sure what evidence you are referring to here, or how you could actually know this to be the case.  If your claim is just that religious people can be morally weak and inadequate, well I already knew that from my own life, without looking at anybody else’s.

If it refers to survey data, you have the problem that what many polls of religious affiliation captures a lot of individuals who only identify as religious in a nominal sense.  Polling nominally religious people, and asking about their rates of divorce, adultery etc. is sort of like asking whether watching the Olympics on TV makes people more physically fit!  It’s the wrong question to study.

If you are referring to personal experience, I can only say that while I know good and bad seeming people (emphasis on “seeming”, it’s not my place to judge them) who are both religious and non-religious, the most loving and self-sacrificial people I know seem to be religious.  And religion also often plays a significant role when very bad seeming people repent and turn their lives around.  Furthermore I have very often heard people refer explicitly to God when they explain why they did something morally difficult, while I cannot ever recall in my personal experience ever hearing somebody say that they did something morally difficult because atheism is true.  (I mean, I could imagine such a motivation: e.g. God isn’t going to save this person, so I have to.  But I don’t think I’ve ever heard anyone explicitly say this “in the wild” so to speak.)

By comparison, studying secular ethics seems to itself have little observable consequences in terms of making people better.  This could be taken as a critique of secular ethics, but it might be better taken as a critique specifically of what modern analytic philosophers mean by ethics as a discipline (as opposed to ancient philosophies, which were typically viewed as a way of life that had to be put into practice, in order to be understood).  I mean, why should studying little numbered arguments about whether ethics is objective, or arguing about what to do in some controversial edge case involving trolleys, actually help one to build habits of life that make one treat your fellow human beings better, and a community which helps support you in doing so?  Religion is one of the few ways of getting such support in the modern era.  (There are some others, but they are getting sparser in an increasingly disconnected age.)  While this isn’t necessarily an argument for God’s existence, it does make your thesis that serious religious practice is totally orthogonal to ethical accomplishment seem pretty implausible.

I called this an “irrelevant topic” because it isn’t terribly relevant to the validity of the Moral Argument.  But of course, from the perspective of what ultimately matters, it is this section that is most important, and the rest which are of lesser relevance.  If Christianity is true, then what will matter the most in the end is not whether you are persuaded by this or that specific argument for Theism, but more whether your heart is open or closed to God at a deeper level than that.  Jesus has promised that those who truly seek God will find him.

If you take it as a goal to be as moral of a person as you can possibly be, then that is at least a start along that road—even if the final destination is going to be, in some ways, quite different than what you expected when starting out on that journey.  But somewhere along the way comes the recognition that you can’t actually be good, and need help to do better, and that is where concepts like grace and salvation start to make more sense…

Blessings,
Aron