Category Archives: Ethics

The Unity of Virtue

In order to act righteously, it is necessary that you:

1. have given the matter sufficient thought* to reasonably conclude (Prudence):
____A. the act will benefit (on the whole) whatever person(s)/society the act concerns (Justice),
____B. that it is neither excessive nor deficient in light of the circumstances (Temperance),
_and furthermore:
2. you must overcome whatever resistance there is to actually performing the act (Fortitude).

[*Sufficient thought need not—and in many cases should not—take a significant amount of time, but as one can never act voluntarily without making some judgement about the situation, prudence is a feature of all moral action.  Wisely judging the amount of deliberation that is required, is itself an act of virtue.  In the case of habitual action, the deliberative thought might have been performed sometime in the past. Human acts, and hence human virtues, are extended in time.]

If an act is unwise, then it is necessarily also unjust, intemperate, and rash, and vice versa.

For example, if eating a 3rd slice of chocolate cake in one day is wrong, this can only be because careful thought (Prudence) would reveal that it is too much (Temperance) to be healthy for your body (Justice) and hence that one should resist the temptation to do so (Fortitude).

Eating 3 slices cannot both be “too many all things considered”, yet still “wise to choose”; nor can it be “bad for you”, yet also “admirable to continue upon encountering resistance and pain”.  (Except perhaps in the sense that the willpower required, could later be turned to better purposes.)  And the same relation holds between every other pair of cardinal virtues.

Similarly, if an act is, of its nature, good for society (Justice), but is done at an inopportune time or in excess (lack of Temperance), this presumably implies that it would have been even better for society if it had been done in a better way.  Thus, the failure of Temperance is itself also a failure of Justice, and of Prudence as well.

It is even more obvious that if you are contemplating an act which is Prudent, Just, and Temperate, but you chicken out of actually doing it, that none of the sweetness you were aiming for will actually occur.

When we state that an act involves a failure of one specific virtue, this should be understood as being advice for improvement.  Since a human being cannot attend to all features of their act simultaneously, we point them to whichever feature of the act they need to be thinking about in order to act better. (Picking the wrong feature, e.g. telling a smoker about the health benefits of quitting when they are already fully aware of this, is a failure of moral rhetoric).

In some cases our best judgement turns out to be in error, yet following our best judgement is still virtue, since virtue belongs to the genus of skill, not the genus of luck. One cannot choose to be lucky, except insofar as cultivating opportunities for luck is itself a matter of skill (as e.g. the skillful card player will cultivate hands, such that a greater number of possible card draws would result in winning the game).

All four of these virtues are therefore necessary, to some degree, in every virtuous act.  Just as the human body cannot survive for even an hour without any one of the 1) brain, 2) heart, or 3) lungs functioning.  (Apart from artificial medical substitutes.)  You need ALL of them to be working.  The total failure of any one of these 3 organs, will almost immediately cause catastrophic failure of all other organs.  Of course if you value survival on the order of weeks, we could add several more vital organs to this list!

Not every virtue with a name, thus contains the whole of Virtue.  Some virtues (e.g. Chastity, Sobriety, Studiousness) are instead virtue as restricted to a particular subject matter.  In such cases, it is of course possible to fail in one area of life, while not failing in other areas of life.  So far, I have argued only that the 4 traditional cardinal virtues implicitly contain all of Virtue within them.

Are there other such virtues?  If virtue can also be understood as our duty to the gods, then Piety is also the form of every virtue. But what must the gods be for this unity to make sense?  (Euthyphro).  First, the gods must have a unity of will among themselves; and second, the union of their will with goodness must be necessary rather than accidental. The dilemma points us towards Ethical Monotheism, not Atheism.

Paradoxes of Theodicy

Part I. The Problem of Evil.

A typical form of the Argument from Evil claims that it is unreasonable to think that a God exists who would permit evil, if he is assumed to have the following properties:

• Omnipotent (all-powerful)
• Omniscience (all-knowing, all-wise)
• Perfectly good

(Actually, it would be even more typical if the presentation used the term “Omnibenevolent” for the moral property.  But I can’t help but notice that this term is only ever used by skeptics presenting this particular argument.  It is not a term traditionally used by theologians, and I’m not entirely certain what its meaning is.  What does the “omni” part extend over?  Different persons?  Different acts?  Does it mean that God is obligated to create every possible being?  Does it mean that God is obligated to give every possible good to every possible being?  Traditional theology tends to deny the existence of such obligations.  I have accordingly replaced the “moral” attribute with what I consider to be a better term.)

The argument goes, that if God is perfectly good, he will want to prevent us from experiencing any evil.  If God is all-wise, he will be aware of the best method for eliminating evil.  And if God is all-powerful, then he will be able to implement this method without encountering any obstacle to his power.  So then what is the explanation of evil?

The term “theodicy” refers to attempts to explain why God permits evil.  This post will not, quite, propose any specific theodicy.  Although there are various theodicy-like proposals that I will make in various places in this essay, most of them fairly tentatively.  Instead, my points will be more on the meta level.  I will argue for some reasons to be skeptical about the cogency of the Argument from Evil in this form.  I will argue for the following theses:

1. It is not highly implausible that God has reasons for permitting evil that we don’t know about.

2. If there is a logically satisfactory explanation for suffering, it is not unlikely that the explanation—to the extent that we can understand it—would not emotionally satisfy us.  Arguably, it could not do so, without undermining whatever purposes God has for allowing suffering in the first place.

3. There are some deeply paradoxical aspects of the human relationship to “good” and “evil”, that make it impossible for us to conceive of a perfectly good state of affairs, involving (a) human beings recognizably like us, who (b) experience no evils, and in particular (c) are content with this state of affairs.

(Strictly speaking, the discontent in (c) is a subcase of (b), but I have given it a separate letter anyway, because you can’t stop me from doing so!)

While I maintain that thesis 1 follows from entirely straightforward and reasonable probabilistic considerations, the other two thesis may seem stranger.  How can there be an explanation for suffering that doesn’t satisfy us?  How can it be not good for things to be perfectly good?

But I doubt that we can avoid all such paradoxes by denying Theism.  Especially the paradox in my 3rd thesis, which has to do with the nature of human preferences, and which would be a quite serious problem, even—in fact, especially—in a hypothetical transhumanist utopia designed by atheists.

The Order of Limits

Let me start by making one point, which I have said before, and which I consider to be utterly obvious.  It is stupid to think that Omniscience makes the Argument from Evil stronger.  It obviously makes it weaker.  The argument I mentioned above:

If God is all-wise, he will be aware of the best method for eliminating evil,

presupposes that God’s infinitely greater wisdom only matters for purposes of selecting the most intelligent means, to accomplish those goals that we in our finite human wisdom have identified as good.  But it is equally possible that God’s greater wisdom will involve him pursuing higher goals that humans are unaware of.  God could well be aware of forms of goodness we have no clue about.  (As well as seeing various ways in which our own goals might be better served, by first putting us through a sequence of events that doesn’t seem to us like a good way to accomplish those goals.)

It is pure hubris to think that God’s infinitely greater intelligence would only be like a higher technology in service of human ends.  Rather than also giving him a higher perspective on what are the goods most worth acquiring.

In other words, the Argument from Evil would be most convincing, if it were about a being who has human-level wisdom, but universally benevolent, and infinitely* powerful.  I certainly agree that such a being would be unlikely to construct a world that looks like our own.  But that is not the Judaeo-Christian doctrine about God, is it?

[*Footnote: except, to make the hypothetical work, the infinitely powerful being would have to be somehow prohibited from using one of their wishes to wish for greater wisdom?  The thought experiment doesn’t really make sense, but that isn’t the point of the thought experiment, so let’s ignore its internal contradictions.]

On the other hand, if we imagine an infinitely wise being with finite power (but still universally benevolent) it is quite hard for me to imagine that I know what such a being might think are the most important priorities.  It could very easily be something quite different from my own top priorities.

Remember, infinite wisdom is a lot of wisdom. Now wisdom is not quite the same thing as intelligence, but if we consider intelligence then one of the smartest people who have ever lived is St. John von Neumann.  Suppose we imagine a being who is as much smarter than John von Neumann, in the same ratio that von Neumann is smarter than an average 4-year old child (let’s call this being HvN for hyper-Von Neumann).  Then HvN is presumably able to have an enormous number of qualitatively important insights, that would be impossible for HvN to explain even to Von Neumann.  And this is a being who still has a finite amount of wisdom.  The same is true of hyper-hyper-Von Neumann (HHvN), hyper-hyper-hyper-Von Neumann (HHHvN) etc.  But God would be smarter than all of these.  (And, if you accept, as most modern mathematicians do, St. Georg Cantor’s theory of transfinite cardinals of different size, then we probably aren’t even done yet.  God’s wisdom would not be exhausted just by saying it is infinite—it is bigger than the hierarchy of all possible infinities!)  So who knows what an infinitely wise being would do?

And note, that, at less than one iteration of this process, there are already plenty of evils (like needing to brush one’s teeth and go to the dentist) that the average 4-year old is not likely to be able to understand the reasons for, but an average adult can understand.  (Of course, the 4-year old could simply trust their parents that there is a good reason to brush teeth, but this would involve faith in a higher authority, not the 4-year old’s own reason.)

I’ve been using a bit of rhetoric here to drive home my point, by harping on how alien an infinitely wise being is likely to be, compared to us.  To be sure, it is equally valuable to meditate on the other prongs of the argument—just how much compassion a perfectly good God would have towards a child who gets cruelly murdered etc.  But proponents of the Argument from Evil have doubtless already rhetorically hammered on these points enough for almost everyone to know what that would look like.  I am inviting such proponents to meditate on a different prong of their argument, for a change.

So, the Argument from Evil seems likely to be solvable if God is (infinitely wise, reasonably finite power level).  And it seems likely to be unsolvable if God is (reasonably finite wisdom, infinitely powerful).  What if (as Classical Theism holds) God is infinite in both respects?  Well then, I maintain that it is at least not obvious which of these 2 cases gives a better analogy to the (infinitely wise, infinitely powerful) case.  It’s a bit like one of those functions F(x,y) in calculus where you get one answer if you take the x → ∞ limit first, and a different answer if you take the y → ∞ limit first.  So the value of F(∞,∞) is ambiguous.

Except that, the whole point of my argument is that we don’t really know what happens when the “wisdom” parameter is taken to be enormously large values, even if those values are finite.  Maybe, insight into goodness tops out some wisdom level W, and all beings wiser than W would basically all agree about what goods are worth pursuing (and what means should be used to attain them, whenever said means are possible).  Then, any being wiser than W would either be able to “justify God’s ways to”—well maybe not “man”, but to somebody sufficiently far up in the sequence (vN, HvN, HHvN, HHHvN…).  Or, alternatively, maybe a being wiser than W would be able to tell that the Argument from Evil was perfectly sound.  But I see no particular reason why this should happen at a human level of intelligence.

On the other hand, it is also possible that infinite wisdom leads to some qualitatively new insights about goodness that aren’t accessible to anyone in that sequence.

Which of these is more important, God knowing more about goodness than I do, or God being so powerful that he has ways of avoiding having to ever make a tradeoff?  Beats me!  But if agnosticism is justified concerning this critical question, then the Argument from Evil seems to rest on some pretty shaky foundations.

Maximizing Functions

Without assuming it is accurate in every respect, let us consider a crassly consequentialist model of the “God knows about more kinds of goods than we do” scenario.  Let’s write a function \(f(w)\) that sums up all the kinds of goodness which we humans are aware of.  Here let \(w \in W\) where \(W\) is the set of all the (logically consistent) possible ways the world might be.  Now let us suppose that God is aware of the existence of other important kinds of goodness besides the ones we are aware of.  Call these additional goods \(g(w)\).  So the total goodness is the sum:

$$\mathrm{Total} \, \mathrm{Goodness}(w) \,=\, f(w) + g(w)$$

Let us suppose this function has a maximum possible value, and that God selects whichever world \(w\) maximizes total goodness.  (Or if there is a tie, he picks one of the maxima arbitrarily.)

What are the odds that the world \(w\) which God selects, maximizes not only \(f + g\), but also \(f\)?  Well it is impossible to say for sure, without knowing what the function \(g(w)\) is.  But intuitively the answer seems to be, vanishingly unlikely (approaching probability 0), unless there is some reason why the function \(g(w)\) happens to be 0, or directly proportional to \(f(w)\), or some other weird thing happens.

This deviation will, almost by definition, appear to us to take the form of a gratuitous evil, since \(f(w)\) is smaller than it might have been and we are unaware of \(g(w)\).  So, on this hypothesis, we should be highly confident that God will create a world with at least one form of gratuitous evil.  It seems like this is even more likely to be true in a more realistic model where worlds \(w\) differ in a very high dimensional space.

How different will the optimum world be, from the apparent optimum?  They could be quite “close” if \(g(w)\) is small compared to \(f(w)\).  But we have no particular reason to think this is true.  If \(g(w)\) is comparable in size to \(f(w)\) or bigger, then maybe the maxima lie in quite different directions.

Aside: Some Goods May Be Incomparable

Now actually, my moral and theological beliefs are quite a bit different from the setup above.  I don’t think goodness is really a number.  I think sometimes things can be compared, and sometimes they can’t be.

In my view, there are many (radically incomparable) different forms of goodness, and (like an artist writing a novel) nobody has any right to complain if God creates one form of good over another, as long as the world is actually good, and there’s no way he could have done a better job at making that particular good thing he was aiming at.

God is already supremely good before he makes anything at all, and in that sense all of creation is gratuitous.  But, once we specify what specific type(s) of goodness God is aiming for, it seems inevitable that there are better and worse ways of going about it, and therefore in some specific aspects, the consequentialist model above probably captures a fair amount of truth.

However, if these beliefs are right, none of the corrections I have made in this section seem to make the Problem of Evil harder to solve.  If anything, they make it easier to solve.  (There might be a question of why a God who is already supremely good made anything at all, but this is a different theological problem.)

If you are an AI-Doomer, you should reject the Argument from Evil

Let me put the argument another way.  Perhaps some of my readers belong to the Singularity school of thought (people who are hopeful/worried about AI bootstrapping itself into an enormously superhuman level of power in a short amount of time).  To such readers, I would note that the following beliefs seem to have incompatible justifications:

1. High risk of Yudkowsky-style AI doom (conditional on a powerful AI being built)
2. The Argument from Evil is devastating evidence against standard Theism.

As I understand it, the argument for (1) partly proceeds through the claim that an agentic AI can be modeled as a utility maximizer.  While the AI’s utility function is likely to overlap in some ways with ours (since we built it to accomplish some tasks), relatively small mistakes in the AI’s utility function, are (in this view) likely to lead to consequences which most humans will regard as grievously evil (e.g. human extinction or perpetual slavery).  Basically, the idea is that utility maximization is a harsh mistress.  Since whatever maximizes one set of goals perfectly, will often be a very bad fit to any other set of goals.  And if the utility maximizer has enormous power, so that the maximization is done over a very wide space of possibilities, we aren’t in a good position to predict whether such a universe will be human-friendly.

But now consider the view Theism + Moral Realism.  On this view, God is an agent who seeks objective goodness.  For purposes of this argument, let us model goodness as maximizing some utility function, which partially overlaps with human preferences.  But as pointed out above, if there are any additional terms in the function (e.g. types of good which God knows about and we don’t) then (if you buy the argument in the previous paragraph) it seems almost certain that the world will contain certain things that humans see as grievous evils, upon extreme optimization over God’s “utility function”, as it were.

In fact, if you are a dystopian about AI, that means you must regard our current world (prior to the predicted AI apocalypse, anyway) as rather surprisingly human-friendly, among the space of worlds optimized by utility functions slightly different from our own.  A world where, if the AI had produced it, the AI-doomers would all breathe a big sigh of relief that alignment had gone better than expected, even if we didn’t get the Transhumanist Utopia.  But that means that the existence of apparently grievous evil is actually expected on the hypothesis of a benevolent God!  (That is, if you buy the AI-doom argument.)

In other words, if you think:

1. High probability of great evil, given a powerful AI whose preferences are slightly “incorrect” relative to human preferences,

you should also think:

2. High probability of (apparent) great evil, given that human preferences are slightly “incorrect” relative to divine preferences.

Of course, the God of Classical Theism is vastly more powerful than any AI could be, but it is not clear that this helps, since (in the case of the AI) people think that the more powerful it is, the more concerned they should be.

Does this mean that humans should hate and fear God, the way AI-doomers hate and fear unaligned AI?  Well, I would agree that a certain type of “fear” is appropriate, towards a powerful being with somewhat inscrutable goals.  There is a reason why the Bible talks about the “fear of the Lord” as a characteristic trait of pious people.  But if moral realism is true, I don’t think that hatred can be appropriate towards a being that maximizes true goodness.  (Imagine, if it makes it easier, that you would come around to God’s point of view after a million years of what Yudkowsky calls “coherent extrapolated volition”.)  Note also that this view does not imply moral skepticism, as the things we care about can still be really morally good, and the things we dislike can still be really morally bad.  It’s just that God just cares about some additional things, that we don’t know about.

Degree of Inexplicability Not Proportional to Magnitude

It is tempting to say, well maybe this sort of theodicy explains stubbed toes or a lack of parking spaces, but surely it does not justify allowing mass starvation, rape, children dying of cancer etc.  But really it all depends on what is contained in the mystery box \(g(w)\), and how important it is.

Intuitively, there is a pretty big difference between a stubbed toe and childhood cancer.  It feels like explaining away the latter is almost offensive to the child or parents.  And indeed, in the presence of those who are suffering grave evils, one should be cautious about speaking in a glib way about God’s plans.  But this social rule of politeness also applies when speaking to people who are convinced that their suffering is part of God’s plan.  So this rule of politeness is hardly substantive evidence that there is no divine plan.

That said, it seems like a conceptual mistake to identify how apparently “gratuitous” an evil is with how large it is.  It is just as mysterious to me what good is gained when we stub our toes, as it is why some children get leukemia.  Indeed, the more severe an evil is, the more likely it is to build character or something else (infuriatingly) edifying, rather than just cause irritation without personal growth.

Part II. The Problem of Moral Action

Let us now consider a potentially serious paradox if we accept the above framework.  Suppose that there really are greater goods that justify all the evils in the world, it might seem to have the unpalatable consequence that it would be bad to try to improve the world.  For suppose we truly believe the world maximizes the goodness function \(f(w) + g(w)\).  If we try to change the world in a way that increases \(f\), presumably we decrease \(g\) by a greater amount and end up in a worse place.

So seemingly we shouldn’t try to cure cancer, or help little old ladies cross the street, or prevent rape, or anything like that, since any defects we see are part of God’s purpose.  But that is morally absurd (and also contrary to the teachings of most Theistic religions, where God commands us to do good deeds).

Of course, since God also made us, we can’t really think about God’s goals in isolation from what we do.  As a result, it is not clear that this unpalatable conclusion actually holds.  But, to speak more carefully, not every possible bundle of hidden goods \(g\) will have the property that it still justifies our attempts to improve things.  Only some possible \(g\)’s will have this property.  So, this does place a serious constraint on the kinds of justification that are possible.  It has to be a justification that is compatible with the continual struggle to morally improve the world.

But this fact, once we acknowledge it, has pretty significant implications for the whole problem.  And not all of these implications are bad for Theism.  Some of them help to explain certain aspects of why God might allow the existence of apparently gratuitous evils.

The Correct Explanation Might Not Be Satisfying or Helpful

It is tempting to say, “Why doesn’t God at least explain why evil exists, so that we can be satisfied that our suffering is for a good reason?”  This might not eliminate the evils, but it would at least make them no longer appear to be gratuitous.

But there is no reason to think that, even if the answer is comprehensible to us (it might not be) that we would find it emotionally satisfying to learn the answer.  One thing that I have learned in life is to be suspicious whenever anyone says “I could bear my suffering if only I had [specific unobtainable consolation C]”.  Sometimes when the C is finally obtained, it  doesn’t help as much as we think it would.  The only way to be confident that this sort of thing is true, is if we actually had C and found that it helped us.  Obviously, we are not in this position when it comes to the Problem of Evil.

So it is quite possible that God doesn’t explain the reason for allowing evil, because he knows that if we did, we wouldn’t like it.  (Even though it actually is explanatory.)

The odds are good that the true explanation has some steps like “Let me first sit you through several courses in microbiology so that you see how inevitable it is that copying errors will appear in DNA of life forms like you.  Now let me say why I appreciate biology enough that I don’t just do random miracles to stop it.”*  Are you any happier now that your kid got cancer?  What if there are footnotes answering all the obvious objections?

[*Footnote: I don’t mean that this is an actually correct theodicy that should convince you.  Just that the actual one could be something which is similarly unsatisfying.]

No?  Then you didn’t want that reason.  You wanted something else: a compelling life narrative in which suffering (even if you don’t know the specifics of why it happens) contributes in a meaningful way to your own personal beatitude (and that of your child in this hypothetical).  What you really need is inspiring stories about how historical people just like you have overcome the suffering and become heroes and saints.  In other words, to meet your emotional needs, what will really help is precisely the kind of consolation that a religion like Christianity actually offers, most especially through its view that suffering unites us to God if we offer it back to him, through the crucified Christ.  Even if it doesn’t feel like solving the Problem of Evil in the abstract sense originally posed.

Or let’s put this another way.  What would satisfy us as “Solving the Problem of Evil”?  What most of us want, if God exists, is for him to tell us some specific fact A that makes it so we don’t have to struggle anymore with the seeming futility of life.  But if the moral struggle is part of the point (of our current stage of existence), then it necessarily follows that God had better not to tell us fact A.  Because if he does, we will stop struggling with it!  Perhaps he can tell us other things, but not that.  (Not yet.)

Or, suppose no such fact exists, but there is some other good reason B for our struggle, but it has the property that learning would not cause us to stop struggling.  Well then, in that case, learning will not feel emotionally like a good explanation for evil.  And this is precisely because it doesn’t cause us to stop struggling with the fact of evil.  So if God specifically wants us to mature through a process of struggle, we can’t expect to be fully emotionally satisfied by any presently available explanation as to why we struggle.

To summarize, if there is a good reason for God to have us suffer, then it follows God won’t not tell us the reason for that suffering, unless knowing that reason doesn’t cause us to stop suffering, and is therefore emotionally unsatisfactory.

Of course, having discovered this reasoning, I already feel a bit better about God not telling me why I suffer!  So perhaps I am undermining my own argument a bit here.  But, it could also be true that there is an important difference between my having a theory about suffering exists, versus a hypothetical situation where we know the answer because God tells us explicitly.

Why Do Pandas Exist?

The Argument from Evil has the greatest force if, conditional on both God and evil existing, we would expect to know the reasons for the evil to exist.  (Then we can appeal to the fact that in the real world, there are seemingly gratuitous evils, where “gratuitous” means there isn’t a  good reason, contrary to our expectations on Theism.)

But do we have the right to expect this, even conditional on Theism?  I think it is important to put the problem of evil in perspective, by noting that almost everything we observe in the universe seems similarly gratuitous, in the sense that we don’t know its purpose for existing.

To be sure, people don’t complain very much about gratuitous non-evils.  But that doesn’t make them any easier to understand from an intellectual point of view.

For example, why do pandas exist?  Is it to be cute and fuzzy?  Is it because they give humans joy?  A plausible theodicy, but we don’t really know that this is why God made pandas.  (Or snakes, or beetles, or…)  If we don’t know the function and role that even seemingly good things play, in the ultimate purpose of creation, then why would we expect to know the function and role of seemingly bad things?

(One cannot simply appeal to their goodness, as there is a huge variety of good things God might have made.  Why are there pandas instead of dragons?  Who knows!)

This may be part of the meaning of the Answer to Job in the Bible.  It’s not as if we were in a position to say to God, “OK, I know why you did everything else, it’s totally obvious why there had to be elliptical galaxies and all those beetles, but what about evil?”  Most people can’t even give a good explanation why humans exist, let alone all these other things in creation.

Evolutionary Theodicy

Or maybe we do know why pandas exist?

There’s another way to interpret what God says to Job.  “I can’t explain why evil exists in your current state of development.  But I’ll give you a big hint, for the benefit of future generations.  It has something to do with why there are so many different kinds of animal species that behave in lots of crazy ways!”

Many generations later, Darwin comes along.  We now know something people didn’t know in the past, which is that the brutal competition to avoid death and find love, is actually powerful enough to create new animal species and in fact, this is the reason why there are so many amazingly cool animals and plants out there.  Wild!

But, that means we do now know at least part of the reason for all the death and striving in the animal kingdom.  It was needed to produce humans.  (Not just us, of course, but also cats and dogs and horses etc.)  If God had decided that all creatures get to flourish equally, there wouldn’t have been any creatures like us in the first place.  The reason you have all these unfulfilled strivings (to avoid pain, seek arduous goods, acquire a mate etc.) is precisely that it was only those who struggled in this way, who were able to pass on their genetic heritage to future generations.

You have pain because it was useful for the survival of your ancestors.  Thus, the evils that appear in evolutionary history clearly play a causal role in the creation of human beings. And human beings are good.  Therefore the evils in past evolutionary history were, at least in broad strokes, justified by the final outcome.  You, in turn, have that same capacity to suffer, precisely because it is the biological legacy passed on to you by your ancestors.

I already told you that you wouldn’t like the explanation for evil, and that it wouldn’t resolve your suffering, or make much difference to how you live your life.  But you didn’t believe me then, did you?  Do you believe me now?

Some readers might have the following objection: God could have created life forms by some completely different method.  For example, like Young Earth Creationism (YEC) or something.  But precisely because Darwinian evolution is so—well explanatory—there is something about this view that strikes me as being fundamentally silly, like the YEC trees being created with rings already in them, or the YEC Adam and Eve having belly buttons, despite not having been born in the usual way.  But the point is far more profound than this.  The fact is, our evolutionary history is partly constitutive of who we are.  If God created life forms ab initio, without evolution or pain or striving, surely they wouldn’t look anything like humans, with our bundles of animal drives.  They wouldn’t even look like ideally happy humans.  They would have to look like something completely different.  Like angels or something.

But in that case, we wouldn’t exist.  So is it good for human beings to exist?  If so, why shouldn’t God create them?

You could bite the bullet and say that God should have simply created intelligent beings very different from us.  It’s plausible.  But it also reduces my confidence that such a world would really be better, since it would be quite radically different from our own.  Our confidence in our ability to assess the goodness of a world, should surely diminish as we get farther away from the domains in which our common sense applies.

(Of course, traditional Christian theology says God did create angels; he just didn’t stop there.  God went on to also create humans.  So the answer might be that it is indeed better to create angels than humans, but having created the angels, God decided the world would be even better if it also contained evolved animals such as us.)

I don’t actually know if this amounts to a complete theodicy.  It may only be one piece of the puzzle.  But it is rather interesting that there is a nontrivial theodicy buried within Darwinian Evolution, even though this is widely regarded by many people as the scientific theory most supportive of Atheism.

Of course, that is because of its implications against (certain forms of) the Argument from Design (as well as the fundamentalist interpretation of Genesis) leading to many religious folks having an immune reaction against Evolution.  But in this post we are now considering the Argument from Evil, not the Argument from Design.  There is nothing contradictory about Darwinism partially undermining both of these classic arguments, for and against Theism.

The Ubermensch

Our current struggles put you in continuity and sympathy with past life forms, whose struggles absolutely were necessarily in order to create you.  What about the future course of evolution?  Here’s another idea that might make Nietzsche happy: your current struggles might well create an evolutionary gradient that will result in the emergence some superhuman life form.

It is true that some (mostly not-very-Christian people) around the start of the 20th century got rather too excited by the possibilities of humans evolving into the ubermensch, and a bunch of silly and horrible things happened as a result.

While evolution might indeed occur in the future, I reject the idea that we should make this into a religion.  We shouldn’t worship our descendants, any more than we should worship our ancestors.  As St. Lewis wrote:

There is no sense in talking of `becoming better’ if better means simply `what we are becoming’ — it is like congratulating yourself on reaching your destination and defining destination as `the place you have reached’.  Mellontolatry, the worship of the future, is a fuddled religion.
(“Evil and God”)

At least in the case of our ancestors, if we choose to worship them, we have some notions what they were actually like.  But in the case of our distant descendants, it would just be a blank canvas to project our fancies.  For all we know they will be completely different from what we think they are going to be.

It is true that, if the world lasts long enough, future evolution may well create more evolved forms of the human race, and all this might in turn morally justify some amount of whatever “survival of the fittest” is taking place in the present.  But this is speculative, since none of us knows what is going to happen in the future. If you put all of your eggs in this basket, you’ll look pretty silly if Jesus comes back sometime in the next few thousand years, and ends history before this hypothetical new evolutionary stage emerges.

The Christian worldview is bigger than the cosmos, not smaller.  So we should be willing to acknowledge whatever truth there is in other worldviews, even if those other views aren’t seeing the entire picture.  As a Christian, I can accept that there are elements of truth to the Nietzschean philosophy, that struggle is a valuable thing and shouldn’t be eliminated.  But there are lots of other moral truths that need to be held in balance with this one.

If learning about evolutionary struggle makes some people think it is OK to go around starting fistfights, collecting harems, and pissing in other people’s swimming pools, then maybe there’s a reason God didn’t spell all of this out in the Book of Genesis.  Maybe instead of asking God why he allows evil, we should instead ask ourselves whether we humans are sufficiently trustworthy for God to explicitly tell us the explanation for evil.

Instead of trying to breed a new human race, maybe we should focus on trying to be good people.  Of course, you are allowed to have (some) opinions about what you think people should be like, when you choose a spouse and raise your kids.  But maybe we should leave the long-term management of the human gene pool to God.

We Christians have very good reasons to believe that God’s ideal for human behavior is closer to St. Francis of Assisi, than to Genghis Khan—the most evolutionarily “successful” man of his generation!  But without evolutionary history, you don’t get Francis any more than you get Genghis.  Francis had the same animal impulses, to retaliate and lust, that you or I have.  His meekness was like the gentleness of a tamed lion.  Not that of a mouse too small to do much harm.

Part III: The Problem of Humanity

Suppose we accept that it a good thing for human beings to exist—then on that supposition, the Argument from Evil amounts to this.  We are saying to God: “I’m okay with being a primate with a big brain, dedicated not just to seeking food and sex and affection, but also solving complex, difficult problems.  But, I also want to be placed in a world where there are actually no important problems that need solving, or at least none that I care about enough to affect my happiness.  Just give me the food and love, without me having to do anything to get them.  And please don’t let me get bored either.”

That comes across to me as a bit lazy and spoiled.

Perhaps it is even true, that the more moral virtue we have—in the sense of routinely accepting difficult or painful tasks for the sake of achieving greater goods—the less plausible we will find the Argument from Evil.  Because virtue gives us the lived experience of bringing goods out of evils (apparent or actual).  So the more we are able to do that, the more we will see the goods that can only exist when we overcome badness.  Conversely, a cynical and selfish person, is almost bound to see the world as more deeply bad than it actually is, whenever it contradicts their most superficial desires.  (Note that I am not implying that people who raise the Argument from Evil are acting on bad moral motivations, at the moment they raise the question.  What I am talking about is something happening at a deeper and prior level, before the argument is ever raised.)  Admittedly there are other ways in which being a good person makes our hatred of evil sharper, so the balance here is not entirely straightforward.

Somebody could say, well maybe virtue is only good because (unfortunately) it is necessary to do hard things in this world, and that’s why we admire it.  But in a hypothetical perfect world where nothing bad happened, virtue would also be unnecessary.  We could be cowardly and selfish, and it just wouldn’t matter because there would be neither danger nor competition.   On such a utilitarian view, virtue doesn’t really matter for its own sake.  It only matters to the extent that it leads to more pleasure or less pain.

But I don’t share this view.  I think it is good to be a good person, not just that it is instrumentally useful for gaining hedonic pleasures.  Indeed the so-called “happiness” of a hedonist is trivial, in comparison with the meaningfulness of a typical life of virtue.

What is the Optimal History?

In fact, the existence of large problem-solving brains, itself problematizes the entire concept of maximizing goodness, at least if this is considered in a static sense.  Suppose the world were already optimal, i.e. the best world possible, at the time that human beings first came into existence.  Then, there would seemingly be not much point in God creating intelligent animals like us.  Because animal intelligence involves the ability to imagine the world as different from how it is, and then to act to bring about that change.  But if the world is already optimal, than any change we make will make it worse, and that seems to make the use of intelligence a bad thing, rather than a good one.

But this is a paradox.  Because from another perspective, intelligent life is the highest, best, and most valuable good thing, among all the things we experience.  If intelligence were purely instrumental, that would imply you should be willing to sacrifice almost all of your intelligence to achieve your other goals, like pleasure.  But this is an absurd wireheading scenario.  (In this thought experiment, I am assuming it is possible to have large amounts of consciousness/pleasure, without much intelligence.)

So what is the best possible way to have intelligent beings like humans that meaningfully use their intelligence?

One possible way out, is for God to try to optimize for the best history, rather than the best static world-state.  That is, the world could be one that starts out imperfect, but eventually (at least in part as a result of human struggle, without ruling out a possible need for divine intervention) achieves a state of complete perfection.  (Of course, you could worry that once we reach perfection, the same problems will recur, but I will postpone that discussion to the end of this essay.)

Suppose this scenario is true.  Then at a sufficiently early state of our development, we should expect to find ourselves in a situation where the world is imperfect and requires fixing.  Well guess what?  Look around, and that’s just what we see!  Suspicious, huh.

Nothing I have said in this section necessarily requires libertarian free will.  But if it turns out that we do have such free will, then it is of course possible that some of our free actions will make things worse, rather than better.  This basic observation is different from trying to attribute all evils to free will, which is not at all the idea that I am proposing here.  (Though, there may be more attributable to this than we think.  For example, if nobody ever made the kinds of evil choices that cause or require wars, and if all that time and energy had gone to medicine instead, presumably there would now be far more cures for diseases.  Thus, many current events that we frame as natural evils, could be reframed as consequences of past moral evils.)

It should be noted that this moral action theodicy, like the free will defense, obviously overcomes the objection that it de-motivates moral action.  If a major part of the reason why the world contains imperfections is so we can remove those imperfections, then obviously this will motivate, rather than de-motivate, moral action.

The Garden of Eden

Someone might object by mentioning the story of the Garden of Eden in Genesis.  I’ve already mentioned Adam and Eve, so this is fair game.  Doesn’t Christianity claim that human beings did start in a perfect state, and only lost it because they sinned, by eating the forbidden fruit (that is, the Fruit of the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil)?

To be sure, multiple aspects of this story would need to be interpreted non-literally in order to be compatible with Darwinian Evolution, a fact which any scientific worldview needs to incorporate.  But if we relax a bit, and just read the story as a story, it seems to describe a world without sin and death.  So isn’t that the perfect world we are looking for?

I would deny this claim.  A world without sin is not the same as a world where nothing bad ever happens.  Even if we go by the literal text, Genesis indicates that there was pain before the Fall (Gen 3:16), and also things that were not good (Gen 2:18).  Even before the Fall, there was a mission to name the animals and to tend the garden.  And there was already a conflict brewing with the crafty serpent, implying that (to remain sinless) Adam and Eve were required to resist some of their own desires, an experience which is not usually 100% pleasant for the persons concerned.

Following a more Eastern Orthodox approach to the story, I would see Adam and Eve not as being perfect in the sense of maximally mature, but rather as being at the very beginning of their story, rather than at the end of their story.  We don’t know how what the middle of the story would have looked like, if they hadn’t sinned.  It could even be, that if Adam and Eve had resisted temptation for long enough, God would have eventually permitted them to sinlessly eat from the Tree of Knowledge.  (Knowledge is an inherently good thing, not a bad thing.  The problem was trying to acquire this particular knowledge by disobeying God, and also at a time when they were insufficiently mature to deal with the consequences of this knowledge.)  In any case, the story doesn’t tell us what would have happened next if they hadn’t succumbed to the first temptation, since they did succumb.  And as they say, the rest is history.

Haggling over the Price

Anyway, I certainly admit that there could well be lots of ways of introducing removable imperfections into the universe, that don’t involve anything near as great a degree of suffering as we see in the real world.  Or, where we have enormous bliss at the same time as we solve a bunch of intellectually stimulating puzzles.  Or at the very least where there isn’t death at the end of every road.  (Though most Theists think we survive death in one way or another.)

But at some level, this is just haggling over the price.  All of us can point to significant changes we would like to see in the world.  At the same time, that is exactly what this theodicy would predict—that there will be features of the world we find unsatisfactory and want to remove if possible, and also that it should not always be obvious how to remove them (since otherwise intelligent thought would not be needed).  And we can’t expect to solve all the problems either, not if there is to be anything left for future generations to do.

There are lots of possible quantities of evil in the world that could be imagined.  But wherever on that spectrum God places the human race, it’s always going to seem to us like he should have included a bit less evil.  And this is presumably going to be true all the way up to the point where, from the standpoint of our current world and its evolved preferences, we would see that there would then be not very much point in having intelligent creatures at all.  (Perhaps there really is an objectively optimum amount of evil to overcome, in which case God would presumably have created the human race right at that optimum point.  But I have very little idea how to assess how much or how little evil that is, relative to what we currently experience.)

Trying to solve the Problem of Evil here and now, is a bit like expecting to have, in the middle of an adventure story, the same sense of satisfying closure that you have at the end of the story, after the main character is rescued from the trials and tribulations which prevented them from getting what they wanted.  Maybe you can have this the second time you read the book, but not the first time (assuming you don’t like spoilers).

Again, it’s okay if you hate it.  Nothing about this explanation implies you will feel satisfied with this explanation.  At some level, you shouldn’t!  Bad stuff is bad and you aren’t supposed to like it.  You are supposed to fix and/or endure it.  You aren’t required to like it.

We Prefer Stories where Bad Things Happen

But maybe we don’t hate it as much as we think?  I just mentioned stories.  Consider our revealed preferences about that.  When all of our basic physical needs are met (or when we don’t want to face our problems) our favorite pastime as humans is to tell each other stories.  Campside stories, bedtime stories, TV, books, movies, video games etc.

And one thing we absolutely insist on, almost always, is that these stories should have some bad things happen in them!  Problems to overcome.  Villains to fight, victims to rescue.  Or conflicts of value, hard choices that reveal character.  Trials that test characters, or break them.  Finding revenge, or redemption.  If there is nothing bad to overcome, the story is (usually) considered boring.  (Maybe this isn’t true of strictly all stories, there might be some stories without much bad stuff, but it takes a very good writer to keep that interesting!  And certainly nobody would want all stories to be like that.)  It’s okay for the story to have a good ending, but only if there was something to overcome in the middle.  (But there are also people who prefer tragedies and sad endings!)

Isn’t that strange!  We want to remove bad stuff from our actual lives, but that makes us bored, so we insist on bringing bad stuff back in by the back door, as long as it is fictional evil.  Since this is something we all take for granted, being accustomed to it from our youths, I suggest that you stop, and really contemplate for 120 consecutive seconds, just how weird this (almost) universal human desire is.

Secretly, in the spirit deep within our hearts, we already know that some evils are necessary, in order for certain great goods to exist.  Let me be clear, I am not claiming that you should believe this based on the above arguments.  Rather, I am claiming that you already believe this, whether you recognize it or not.

To answer an obvious objection, I agree of course that a fictional bad event is quite different morally from a real bad even, i.e. it isn’t necessarily actually bad.  For example, fictional people don’t really suffer, we only pretend that they do.  If fictional evil were really evil, then it would be morally problematic to write fiction in which terrible events occur, and nobody thinks that this is the case.  (Perhaps it is sometimes immoral to write dreary nihilistic fiction, but if so this is only true because it demoralizes actual human beings.)

Nevertheless, our love for the fictional story represents a real desire in us.  So it is striking that this love not only allows, but often requires bad things to exist, in the story.  And this love suggests, in turn, that there is something good about worlds that include evil, that simply cannot be found in worlds without it.

And of course, many people enjoy confronting potential evils in the real world—it’s called a sense of adventure.  We certainly like hearing about stories of adventure that really happened too.  In fact, as long as the story is equally good, it is more interesting to us if it really happened.  Though for most of us, we would prefer for it to happen to somebody else!  But if bad things never happened to anyone, presumably we wouldn’t know how to tell or enjoy stories about it happening.  So even fictional badness requires some real badness (even if only a limited amount of it).

Somebody could say, well maybe we only like stories which include bad stuff because we are evolved to face bad stuff in the real world.   So in a world where nothing bad happened, we would also not have a taste for adventure stories, and we wouldn’t get bored not having them.  But doesn’t that seem… at least a little bit bad?  There is a genuine good in these adventure stories, and it seems like in some ways the perfect people would be missing out, not being able to appreciate them like we do.  But then, if these stories capture some sort of goodness that requires evil to exist, then surely this implies the existence of a partial justification for evil?

If some amount of fictional evil is needed to maximize fictional good, then plausibly some amount of actual evil is needed to maximize actual good.  And perhaps, the actual goods concerned, are not completely unrelated to the goods that we appreciate in stories: adventure, interestingness, a dramatic plot etc.  Perhaps, one of the differences between God’s notion of goodness and are own, is not that so much that he values some things we think are evil, but rather that he sees that some of things we genuinely like (in certain contexts), are in reality far more valuable even then we think they are, when viewed from an eternal perspective.

At any rate, our taste in stories implies that, if we were just judging God’s creation as if it were a fictional narrative, from an aesthetic viewpoint rather than a moral one, we would certainly judge that it had better contain evil.  At any rate, in order to not feel that way about life, human beings would need to relate to the concepts of good/bad in a rather different way than we do so now.  (Perhaps, we would need to be a species without “the knowledge of good and evil”?)

From this purely aesthetic perspective, one could even argue that maybe our modern world doesn’t have nearly enough evil! Since most people’s lives are rather dull from a day-to-day basis, with most of our daily needs met, and no dramatic actions needed.  Most people need to seek out adventure, by reading about other people’s problems (people whose lives are usually much less pleasant than average).  On the other hand, from a moral perspective, since real people aren’t fictional characters, we also have good moral reasons to want them to suffer less, out of mercy.  So maybe this world is actually a compromise between the two perspectives, the aesthetic one and the moral one.  With enough drama to be interesting, but not enough to ruin the majority of day-to-day pleasures.

(Admittedly this doesn’t do much to explain evils that are also boring and tedious, like factory work and so on.  Though a lot of these evils come from our choice to organize society in a particular way.)

Again, I don’t know if this is the correct theodicy.  Perhaps it is mostly off-base.  But there is at least one insight from this discussion which I am quite confident about.  Which is this lesson:

I can’t think of any conceivable scenario in which human beings as we know them are totally happy, without some badness to overcome somewhere.

In other words, it’s not that I can identify some specific way to run the world, in which everything is perfectly hunky-dory, but our human-level intelligence is also meaningfully exploited, and I am wondering why God doesn’t do that.  Rather, I can’t see any way to avoid some evil existing (even if these might be different evils than the ones we actually see in the real world.)  Maybe Omniscience would see another solution, but I can’t.  To me, any such solution is, and I mean this word advisedly, inconceivable.  By this, I mean, not that it is logically impossible, but rather that if there is a solution, I don’t think any human being on Earth has succeeded in conceiving it.

To be sure, there are plenty of specific bad things about the world, that I would change if I could.  I never denied that, and in fact it is part of my argument.  What I find impossible to imagine, is a world in which everything is perfect, by human standards.  I claim that a world like that is literally impossible to imagine.  Or put another way, any utopia which you can imagine will always have some aspects which are unsatisfactory, and will thus not be fully compatible with our present human conceptions of what a good life should look like.

Transhumanism and the New Jerusalem 

This is why, in transhumanist utopian fiction, once technology reaches the point where almost all problems are overcome, there is often a somewhat bittersweet tone, once you realize the characters living in that society have little to strive for.  Or in a long fantasy series, after the main character becomes a wizard-god so powerful that they can just do whatever they want, and then the character—or at least the reader—has to grapple with the resulting lack of meaning.  (Of course, most good storytellers are smart enough to never put their protagonists into this situation, since it usually ruins the story.)  These scenarios illustrate the sort of ennui which any actual paradise would have to somehow overcome, in order to truly be paradise.  (Here is a book review by Scott Alexander, discussing this problem.)

Of course, these scenarios are a pretty long way—and perhaps we should say, thank God—from what a typical human life looks like.  Although there is a little bit of an earthly parallel, in the archetype of the bored aristocratic hedonist:

There are things you need not know of,
though you live and die in vain,
There are souls more sick of pleasure
than you are sick of pain.

(The Aristocrat, St. Chesterton)

Perhaps some readers are tempted to say, well I certainly would never get bored with a life of prolonged pleasures and no other suffering.  But it is not clear why anyone should believe you, if you haven’t yet been put to that particular test.  Others among my readers might think that for precisely this reason, they wouldn’t want to live forever in Heaven, because surely (after a gazillion googleplex years, or if that isn’t enough, try Graham’s number) it would eventually become tedious.

Fortunately, the Christian concept of Heaven—or to use more accurate biblical language, “The New Heaven and New Earth”—isn’t vulnerable to this objection, that any conceivable infinitely prolonged utopia would end up being boring and shallow in the end.  The reason for this is simple: we can’t yet conceive it.  Not until after the Resurrection, when our bodies are made new, and when we see God face-to-face.  As St. Paul writes:

“What no eye has seen,
what no ear has heard,
and what no human mind has conceived”—
the things God has prepared for those who love him.
(1 Cor 2:9)

Since the New Heaven and New Earth isn’t conceivable by us, arguments about “all conceivable utopias” don’t apply to it.

Once again, I am using the word conceivability quite literally, to mean “capable of being conceived by our minds”, not as a cheap synonym for “logically possible”.   If I thought that the New Heaven and New Earth weren’t logically possible, then I obviously I couldn’t also believe that it will come to exist.  But there is no reason why every possible state of affairs must be imaginable by us, especially if that state of affairs is created by a God who exceeds our understanding, and in some way involves union with that God.  It might not even be measured by time, at least not in the exact same way that our current earthly existence is.  It might instead participate somehow in the timeless and eternal life of God, in which case we definitely can’t imagine it.

This is why the Christian hope is not subject to ennui.  Ennui arises when you get what you thought you wanted, but you still aren’t satisfied, and say “Is this all there is to life?”  But since the state of the redeemed is beyond our understanding, and requires going through a radical transformation as a preliminary, nothing in our current life experience contradicts the idea that those who love God can be perfectly happy and fulfilled, once we get there.  Without ever getting bored, or pining for an impossible state of affairs.

If we are eternally happy in God’s kingdom, then in turn justifies all the suffering we had to go through, in order to get into it.  At least, so long as having gone through suffering in some way improves our eternal experience once we get there.  And it’s hard to prove that this can’t be the case, if we don’t know what it is like to see God face-to-face in the first place.

It is easy enough to make the case that our current life is not fully satisfactory.  But if our current life is just a preliminary to another, greater life, then the things that make an earthly life good or bad might well be very different from what we now judge to be the case.  In other words, on the assumption of an afterlife which is radically different from our current one, it is virtually certain that the original idea I defended—that God will know a lot of stuff about goodness that we don’t—is going to be true.

As an analogy, our unborn existence in the womb was a preliminary to a greater life, that mostly couldn’t be imagined by an unborn child, who has no real concept of sight, taste, or open space.  Of course, the unborn child can still hear sounds and music from outside the womb.  Perhaps it is not a coincidence that music is one of the most common ways that religious literature describes the activity of the saints in heaven?

And don’t give me that stale line about “I don’t want to play a harp on a cloud”.  I’ve already said that we can’t imagine it, and cartoon imagery is definitely out of the question.  But even if we take the accusation on its own terms, who says it has to be a harp, if you prefer some other musical instrument?  As musically inclined people know, jamming with some friends on earth can be a transcendental experience, in which we somehow go out of ourselves, and feel as if we are participating in a higher harmony of existence.  A deeper rhythm, which reconciles us to all the sorrow and longing we’ve felt, by making it seem part of a greater and more significant wholeness.

On a religious outlook, this feeling gives us a real insight into the nature of reality.  The New Heaven and the New Earth will be something like that.  Only better.

The Argument From Confusion is Weak

One of the mainstays of atheist rhetoric is the Argument from Evil (AfE), that there exist evils in the world, of such a quality or quantity, that it is irrational to believe in a good Creator.

This post is not directly about the Argument from Evil.  Instead, I want to address the Argument from Confusion (AfC).  This is the argument that no good God—especially one that wants everybody to believe in some specific religion such as Christianity—would allow the extent of human religious confusion that exists in the world.  (Including a plurality of contradictory religions, but also atheism/agnosticism.)  True, Christianity is the largest religion in the world, with over 2 billion people claiming to be Christians of some sort or another, but this is still a minority.  Why doesn’t God reveal himself more clearly?  The AfC claims that this is by itself good reason not to believe in God, or at least a specific religion such as Christianity, etc.

The AfC must of course be distinguished from the general AfE.  The world includes lots of unpleasant stuff (like cancer etc.), and it might be possible to view religious confusion as just a subset of such evil.  It isn’t totally obvious—except on some highly specific religious views about the necessary conditions for salvation—that religious confusion is the worst evil in the world.  So we could treat the AfC as just a special case of the AfE.  Here, I want to instead treat it as a separate argument, and see how it fares when detached from the rest of the AfE.  If you think it is overwhelmingly likely that if God exists there would be no evils whatsoever, then you probably don’t need an AfC.  The AfE suffices.  But let’s suppose that God might have some reason to permit some evil, and allow human life to be difficult in various ways.  Then, let’s ask whether the AfC specifically, changes the situation.

It cannot be denied that the AfC has emotional appeal.  What I want to argue in this post is that the argument actually has very little rational force.  Specifically, it depends crucially on equivocating between different scenarios.  Once we specify the scenario more clearly, we find that there is not much reasonable work for the AfC to do.

Specifically, I want to break the AfC into subcases based on the following:

  1. Is the argument supposed to be about (a) myself and my own confusion?  [By the first person pronouns here, I mean whichever individual is considering the AfC as a possible objection to Christianity.]  Or, is the argument supposed to be about (b) the confusion of other people besides me?
  2. Apart from the AfC (let’s abbreviate this important concept as AFTAFC) would such persons be (i) rationally justified in believing in Christianity, or (ii) not rationally justified?

To be a little more technical about 2, we could adopt a Bayesian framework where people have credences in various propositions such as Christianity (which are subjective probabilities between 0 and 1, based on the evidence available to that person, and their prior sensibilities).

By contrast, let us consider belief in a religion to be a binary (yes/no) decision.  After all, from the point of view of making a decision, I need to either live my life as if God exists (going to Church, praying, asking for forgiveness of sins, taking sacraments etc.) or else not bother to do this stuff.  And the simplest way that credences could be related to beliefs, is that that there exists some threshold probability t, with 0 < t < 1, such that if my credence p satisfies p > t, then rationally I should believe, whereas if p < t, then rationally I should not believe.  I won’t discuss in this post where the threshold t should be set, and why; all that matters is that it exists somewhere.

[We could consider more complicated decision theories, e.g. a range of probability for which either stance is permissible, or belief for-purpose-X but withholding judgment for-purpose-Y.  I think that making things more complicated is unlikely to change the final conclusion much, so let’s keep things simple.]

(a)(i) Let us start by considering the case (a)(i), when the argument is about me and my own confusion, but I nevertheless think I am AFTAFC-justified in believing in Christianity.  By ATAFC-justified, I mean that I would be rationally required to believe when taking into account all arguments except the AfC itself.

(This of course, includes on the one hand the positive arguments for Christianity; on the other hand, all other arguments against Christianity, including that portion of the AfE that doesn’t intersect with the AfC).

Now, what should I conclude in this case?  Unless perhaps I am very close to the threshold credence t—it seems to me that the AfC shouldn’t make much difference at all in this case.  After all, the premise, that God has left me in confusion, isn’t really true if I admit that I otherwise have enough evidence to rationally compel me to believe in Christianity.  In that case, the premise, that I am religiously confused, isn’t sufficiently true to make a convincing argument.

Surely, the AfC isn’t allowed to just exist as a circular self-fulfilling prophecy!  As in: “The AfC is sound because the AfC is sound because the AfC is sound…”  It can only be valid if it is based, non-circularly, on some other reason to disbelieve, other than the AfC itself.  But by stipulation, this is not true in case (a)(i).

The only way I can see that the AfC would still work in this scenario, is if I believe something much stronger about God’s actions, than simply that God should give me enough evidence to rationally warrant belief.  I would need to believe that God is obligated to make me even more certain than this.  In other words, I would need to believe something like the following objection:

Obj 1. God is not allowed to place me in a situation where I have to exercise the virtue of faith.

That is of trusting in God, even in the face of whatever psychological uncertainty remains.  And in this case, everyone should concede that such faith would be a virtue, since we are stipulating that AFTAFC there is sufficient evidence to require me to rationally believe in God.  (In particular, not believing would be morally wrong, again AFTAFC itself.)  But this assumption is quite implausible.  Especially if we are considering a religion like Christianity, which claims that faith is one of the most important theological virtues and something that brings us closer to God.

It follows that we can drop the assumption AFTAFC.  In this scenario, faith is simply rationally justified, and the premise of the AfC is simply invalid.

(a)(ii) Now let us consider the scenario where I think I am not AFTAFC-justified in believing in Christianity.  In this case, the premise of the AfC now appears to be correct, but now it doesn’t seem to be doing any useful work.  That is, by stipulation I already have a good reason not to believe.  Adding the AfC doesn’t change this, so it doesn’t change my decision to disbelieve.

You might think, well it at least gives me an additional reason to disbelieve, so as a result I can be more fully confident in my disbelief.  But a moment’s reflection shows that this isn’t really true in any sense that matters for decision making.  Suppose that on some grounds g, I disbelieve in Christianity, and then I try to take comfort in that fact that even if g ends up being incorrect, the AfC still works.  Well, but if I ever lose my confidence in g, that again will retrospectively invalidate the AfC, putting me back in situation (a)(i)!  After all, I would be discovering that I was wrong, and that I do in fact have sufficient rational evidence to believe.

OK, but could I make an argument about how God should have revealed himself to me at an earlier time in my life, while I still thought that the reasons g were good?  But that won’t fly, unless I believe that:

Obj 2God is not allowed to wait for the most opportune time to reveal himself to a person.

But this objection also seems highly implausible.  Human life is a chronological thing, in which we develop our capacities progressively over time, starting off as a baby who can hardly do anything.  And anyone who eventually comes into a relationship with God, has by definition resolved their confusion sufficiently to obtain this relationship.  See the discussion here on Just Thomism (especially the 1st comment by St. Brandon).

Furthermore, if salvation implies that we get to live forever with God in the next life, then we get this benefit even if we have a deathbed conversion.  Furthermore, the period of time when we were living apart from God, might well have served some sort of educational or other purpose—and by stipulation, it has culminated in coming to see that (AFTAFC) it is rational to believe in God.  So in this case again, the AfC should have very little force.

Because of this chronological consideration, I cannot even take the AfC as an additional reason to think it is unlikely that my grounds g for disbelieving in God will later be removed by divine action!  Because, if they are removed, that would retrospectively invalidate the AfC, making the scenario no less plausible than it would have been otherwise.

Now when we turn to case (b), a new problem presents itself.  Specifically, it is very hard for us to know the spiritual state of another human being.  For me to look at another person and judge them by saying Deep down, this person secretly knows that God exists but he is intellectually dishonest, and thus suppresses the truth in his heart vs. This other person is totally honest and not resistant to God’s grace, is something very difficult for human beings to know (except perhaps in a few, very rare cases, where the behavior of the other person makes it totally obvious).   And Christianity itself, at the very least strongly discourages us from judging other people in this way.  As if we ourselves could look into their hearts the way that God can.

Furthermore, Christianity also says that we are all sinners, making it clear that no human but Jesus was completely non-resistant to God’s grace.  So, the category of human adults who are totally non-resistant to God’s grace is presumably the empty set.

Nevertheless, we can still abstractly consider the 2 possible cases:

(b)(i) The argument involves other people, and they are rationally obliged to believe in God—they just irrationally (and perhaps culpably) don’t do so.  This case is thus resolved the same way as (a)(i).  By definition these people aren’t sufficiently confused here, they are making a willful decision not to believe in God even though they have enough evidence.  Only if you buy something like Obj 1, is the AfC convincing in this case.

To be sure, this isn’t the end of the story for people in this class.  “All have sinned and fall short of the glory of God” (Rom 3:23), and resisting grace is indeed one of the ways that this sin manifests, both in the lives of non-Christians and Christians.  But, “Christ came into the world to save sinners” (1 Tim 1:15).  Most Christians have stories about how once they were once running away from God, but God came and saved them anyway.

So, I am not saying that all such individuals will be condemned in the end.  My point is only that, by the definition of class (b)(i), their present disbelief is their own fault and choice.  So it has an adequate moral explanation, in terms of human freedom.

It is certainly true that God could have appeared with such dramatic and undeniable miracles so as to force everyone to believe.  But apparently he doesn’t (yet) want to do that.  St. Pascal wrote somewhere that God,

…wishing to appear openly to those who seek him with all their heart, and hidden from those who shun him with all their heart, he has qualified our knowledge of him by giving signs which can be seen by those who seek him and not by those who do not. There is enough light for those who desire only to see, and enough darkness for those of a contrary disposition.

Pascal thought that God hid himself in order to condemn those who were unworthy of his mercy.  But in my view, on the contrary, God hiding himself from those who don’t want to believe in him is itself an act of mercy and compassion.

If God revealed his holiness to us with total clarity, our only choices would be to accept him as he is, or rebel like Satan and become utterly wicked.  But instead God gives us enough space that we don’t have to believe, in this life.  (The same applies, of course, to the various ways in which Christians are still faithless—the point here isn’t just about atheists.)  This allows even atheists to still seek out a good life in earthly terms, one that still allows for the pursuit of ideals like truth and justice and benevolence.  Perhaps eventually, some day, they will come to realize how these qualities point to God.  But in the meantime, they don’t have to think of themselves as rebels defying God.  Instead they can live what they think of as a normal human life, in friendship with other people, trying to follow whatever they perceive as good.

So, if God gives to people who really don’t want to believe in him, sufficient space to live their lives without such belief, I don’t feel that such people are in a position to complain.  They are getting what they wanted!  And—conditional on them not wanting to believe—it is quite plausibly spiritually better for them than the alternative (being forced to believe by overwhelming evidence) would be, as I don’t think this is the sort of belief that God is looking for.

(b)(ii) The argument involves other people, and they do not in fact have sufficient evidence to rationally believe in God.

Except in some cases involving young children, and/or people-groups who have never heard the gospel, it is difficult to know for sure who belongs to this category.  But I don’t doubt that there are some people in it.

A person might then without logical absurdity say, well I myself have AFTAFC-justified belief, but I see that other people do not have enough evidence to believe.  And all things considered, I think that tells against Christianity enough that—by taking into consideration the AfC—in the end, I don’t believe.  Thus, here at last we have a case where the AfC could logically have some force.

But I don’t think it is a lot of force.  The reason is simple: how are we in a position know that God will not form a saving relationship with such persons at some time in the future?  If we have good reason to think a benevolent God would always do so, why then that is a good argument that he will.  We simply aren’t in a position to know that he won’t.  If the main obstruction to a person’s relationship with God, is simply a lack of evidence, then we have every reason to believe that (when Christ eventually makes his reign obvious, through his Second Coming in glory) this lack will eventually be remedied.

So again, this is only a problem if we think that 1) there are intellectually honest people who sincerely would want to seek God, but 2) they do not have enough evidence to rationally believe, and yet 3) God will never reach out to them in the future.  I can see how we might come to believe (1) or even (2) about someone specific, but how could we ever come to be confident in (3), which involves a blanket statement about all future time?

We might be in such a position to know (3) with high probability, if we additionally subscribe to the following doctrines about salvation, commonly held by many Evangelicals:

Doct I. It  is impossible for any adult to be saved, without an explicit and conscious faith in Christ, of a sort that (apart from rare cases, like e.g. last-minute deathbed conversions) is usually clearly observable from the outside.

Doct II. This faith must come before death; there is no possible chance to be saved after death.  All those who die without such faith necessarily go to Hell.

I do, in fact, concede that doctrines (I) and (II) would together make the AfC very concerning, as it does seem to be an empirical fact that the majority of people on Earth are not saved if (I) and (II) are the criteria.  But I don’t believe that the Bible in fact teaches these doctrines, when it is properly understood.

In particular, (I) implies that we are often in a position to negatively judge the spiritual state of (those who are not in any obvious way) Christians.  But the Bible specifically says we aren’t in a good position to judge other people’s hearts: “Who are you to judge another man’s servant?  By his own master he will stand or fall.” (Romans 14:4).  In some cases I think we can be reasonably confident in a positive view of another Christian’s salvation, but in this life I don’t think we can ever look at a non-Christian and say, God has given up on this person.

Secondly, there is surprisingly little support for (II) in the Bible, and some passages (such as 1 Peter 3:18-4:6) appear to say the opposite.

My view is that, while salvation does come through faith in Christ, we should reject (I) and (II) in the specific forms that they are stated above.  Then it seems like the AfC is only a major concern if we have something like the following objection:

Obj 3.  God has to reveal himself to everyone (of a given generation, I suppose) at the same time.  He isn’t allowed to reveal himself to humans in some particular order, so that some persons have sufficient reason to believe before other persons do.

But I also don’t see a good reason to subscribe to this.  Why should it be true?  Revealing himself to some people before others, would be fully compatible even with a Universalist scenario where all are eventually saved!  (Indeed, the very notion of “generations” already implies that some people come to God before others are even born.)

It will be noted that all three of Obj 1-3 involve thinking we know better than God how to construct a world, and that he is obligated to conform to our expectations.  But a God who has to conform to our expectations isn’t a God at all.   In fact, the notion of a crucified Messiah, the central paradox of Christianity, would not even be possible in a world with no religious confusion!  If there were no such thing as religious confusion, there could be no Christianity!

Furthermore, by revealing himself first to the prophets and apostles, who in turn evangelize others, God makes Christians into a community (the Church).  This is a great good, that would not so obviously occur if we all received our understanding from God in a direct way from heaven, that was totally disconnected with the witness of others.

Speaking of witnessing, if it is our Christian responsibility to share the good news, and make it credible by our lives, then it seems inevitable that our (many) failures to do so will result there being some people who don’t yet have good reasons to believe.  You could imagine God making a world where our actions couldn’t affect anyone else spiritually, but I don’t think such a world would be better than the one we live in.  (Indeed it would be less of a “world”, in the sense of a system of interacting persons and things…)

Again, this is not the end of the story.  But it is a reason for things not to be 100% clear right here and now.

To summarize: If there is enough evidence for me to rationally believe, the Argument from Confusion is unsound and thus should be rejected.  But if there isn’t enough evidence for me to rationally believe, the argument is redundant with my other reasons to disbelieve, and thus serves no purpose.

Or suppose I think there is enough evidence for me, but not enough evidence for other people.  In this case, the Argument from Confusion only speaks against Christianity if I put myself in a role of a judge and say that I know who is intellectually honest, and I also put myself in the role of a prophet and say that I know that God will nevertheless reject such people.  But in fact, I am not in a good position to know that God does indeed ultimately reject such people!  Instead, I should pay attention to the insight that I do have, and follow it as best I can.  Without getting sidetracked by saying to God: “What about this other person?”  Why should God reveal to me his plans about somebody else?  What matters is if I myself have enough light to come to Christ.

Therefore, in none of these configurations is the AfC particularly convincing.  And of course, if the subcases (a) and (b) are unconvincing when considered separately, they will also be unconvincing when combined together into a single argument.

Comparing Religions X: Moral Depth

[It’s hard to believe it’s been nearly 3 years since the last post in this series; maybe writing about a “long delay” jinxed me.  Anyway I got pretty busy with academic stuff, but now I’m on sabbatical.  Like the rest of this series, the core of this post was written about 7-8 years ago, but I kept feeling like I needed to tinker around with it.  But it’s past time to release it into the wild, so here it is.—AW]

10. What is the general moral character of the religious teaching?

This is relevant for two reasons.  First, a good person is more honest, and therefore less likely to try to deliberately trick other people into believing something false (see my previous section on fraud.) People who make up religions are hardly likely to be paragons of moral virtue in other respects.  As Jesus said:

Watch out for false prophets.  They come to you in sheep’s clothing, but inwardly they are ferocious wolves.  By their fruit you will recognize them.  Do people pick grapes from thornbushes, or figs from thistles?  Likewise, every good tree bears good fruit, but a bad tree bears bad fruit.  (Matt. 7:15-17)

By “fruit” Jesus means, not simply conversions or quantity of pious devotions (which any fanatical cult can produce), but rather the moral character of those who claim to be prophets of a true religion, which serve as a test of their claims to be supernaturally inspired.

Second, if God is good and holy—which is a core article of faith for all Abrahamic religions, and also Platonism—then presumably any religion he reveals must also be good and holy.  In fact, one might well expect it to be supernaturally good, since if the religion merely taught ordinary human ethics, we could just as easily come to it by natural reason alone.  This does not, of course, imply that the people God reveals his laws to will be morally perfect (if they had no flaws, they wouldn’t need instruction) but the teaching itself should be morally good.

I. Making Moral Judgements

In comparing different religions for their degree of moral goodness, I am presupposing that moral virtue is not merely a matter of conformity to the arbitrary social conventions that one is brought up with, but rather that an open-minded person can recognize and appreciate goodness, even when it is embedded in a culture very different from their own.

In other words, I am assuming in this blog post that we will not allow ourselves to be bogged down by “Meno’s paradox”.  In a conversation with Socrates, Meno tried to argue that it was impossible for a person who didn’t already know what virtue is, to ever find out about it:

How will you search for it, Socrates, when you have no idea what it is?  What kind of thing from among those you are ignorant of will you set before yourself to look for?  And even if you happened exactly upon it, how would you recognize that this is what you didn’t know?  (Meno, 80d)

But as Socrates pointed out in reply, this argument is fallacious because (as he illustrates with an example from Geometry) we are sometimes capable of “recognizing” a truth, even when we are encountering it for the first time.  Put another way, we already have some sort of “germ of truth” inside of us, which helps us to recognize greater truth when we stumble across it.

Plato called this human ability ἀνάμνησις (recollection), and proposed that it was due to having known the truth in a previous existence.  But we don’t need to take this Platonic myth too literally to recognize the essential point about learning.  As Socrates says in this same dialogue:

I wouldn’t strongly insist on the other aspects of the argument [the stuff about reincarnation], but that we would become better men and braver and less lazy if we believe it is necessary to search for what one doesn’t know, rather than if we think that we can’t discover what we don’t know and should not look for it, for this I will fight strongly, if I am able, in both word and deed.  (86d)

Thus, if we want to search for the true religion in a reasonable and open-minded way (rather than take religious disagreements as an excuse not to think for ourselves) then we need to avoid two opposite extremes:

  1. The first extreme would be if we make a list of all our opinions about highly controversial ethical topics (e.g. abortion, vegetarianism, alcohol, specific sexual taboos…) and demand that a religion can be true only if it agrees with us about each one of these particular issues.  But this approach would absolutely preclude ever using religion to progress in our understanding of morality.                                                                                                                                           .
    It would, after all, be a very limited deity who didn’t know anything more about the conditions for human flourishing than we do.  And since people’s views about morality evolve with time, it would be quite a coincidence if God’s views happened to agree with e.g. early 21st century postmodern liberal mores in every single detail—even on points where we disagree with other places and times!  (And even, with many other people who live in the same country as us.)   Such an approach would only make sense, if I arrogantly assumed that I have nothing to learn from any being wiser than myself.                                                                                                                                           .                                                                                    .
  2. The opposite extreme—which is equally petrifying—would be to adopt a position of total moral helplessness, and take the attitude that we have no inherent knowledge of morality except for what we can learn through the dictates of some specific religion.  But such total deference would make it impossible to use morality as a measuring-rod to help us determine which religion is true.  After all, each religion will claim that its own moral system is right.  So this sort of helplessness, is no better than moral relativism!                                                                                                                                           .
    Even if we start out in a religion which was truly revealed by God, this particular type of fundamentalism would actually prevent us from ever truly internalizing a moral system—as this requires, not just blind obedience, but also learning to appreciate how a particular way of life is healthy and good, at least for human beings like ourselves.                                                                                                                                           . 
    A final and decisive objection is that it is simply incorrect!—in fact, human beings do have the ability to instinctively understand moral truths, in ways that are broadly similar; even if the details of how it expresses itself are modulated by our particular cultures and religious frameworks.

In summary, we should not expect our preconceptions to line up with every single teaching of a religion.  But taken as a whole, it should come across as something clearly better than what we would have on our own.

We can rationally take our agreement/disagreement on a particular moral topic to be evidence for/against a particular religion.  But, if we discover a religion which seems to have gotten many deep and important truths about humanity right, then we also need to take it seriously even when it makes claims that seem counterintuitive to us.  (A rational person can take such claims “on the credit of the system”, as St. John Newman memorably put it.)

Who is the Judge?

A closely related question is this: Do we come to religion with some degree of humility, and in the posture of someone willing to learn something new?  Suppose we imagine assembling all of the `holy books’ in the world, and looking through each one.  How will we pick the morally best one?

If we come in the posture of a cynic, then we will be looking for something in the book which morally offends us.  Once that happens, we will reject the book (unless somebody can convince us we were mistaken in doing so).  In other words, we are coming to the book with the intention of judging God.  Well, I cannot imagine any such person deciding to rank the Bible as the most moral of all religious books.  Yes, there is some good stuff in there, but there is a considerable amount of weird and violent stuff.  There are some inscrutable divine decrees, and several things which are foreign to modern sensibilities.

It is doubtful that such a person could be happy with any religion; but if they had to pick one, they’d probably be happier with some modernized religious community without much in the way of distinctive beliefs (like Unitarian Universalism, Reconstructionist Judaism, etc.)

On the other hand, we could also imagine somebody coming to a holy book as a penitent who needs spiritual healing, or as a confused person who wants wisdom.  If I take this attitude, then I (as a morally imperfect person) am looking for the holy book that is most able to judge me, to show the ways in which I fall short and can do better.  I want a book which can inspire me morally to a higher standard, and which illuminates the paradoxes and complexities which arise trying to live a spiritual life in the real world.  If you are looking to be judged in this way, then I am not aware of any book which is better for this purpose then the Bible.

(Note that this approach is quite different from “total moral helplessness”, since it still requires us to engage our minds!  We still need to decide whether the holy book speaks to our condition; whether its moral critique is incisive or superficial; whether it is calling us to a higher stage of moral development, or a lower one which we have already superceded.)

In other words, your assessment of the Bible’s ethics is going to depend in large part on what you are hoping to get out of it.  As the Bible itself says in multiple places, “God opposes the proud, but gives grace to the humble.”

A Product of Its Time

What a true revealed religion should definitely not be, is simply a reflection of the prevailing ethics of the time and place in which the claimed prophet lived.  There are lots of examples of ancient religious leaders prescribing barbaric acts, that were common in their era of history.  But in some ways, this phenomenon is more hilariously obvious when the ethical system being hawked has only quite recently gone out of vogue.

As an example of this, consider the early 20th century internationalist modernism endorsed by Shoghi Effendi (the grandson and first successor to the main prophet of the Bahái religion):

The unity of the human race, as envisaged by Bahá’u’lláh, implies the establishment of a world commonwealth in which all nations, races, creeds and classes are closely and permanently united, and in which the autonomy of its state members and the personal freedom and initiative of the individuals that compose them are definitely and completely safeguarded.

This commonwealth must, as far as we can visualize it, consist of a world legislature, whose members will, as the trustees of the whole of mankind, ultimately control the entire resources of all the component nations, and will enact such laws as shall be required to regulate the life, satisfy the needs and adjust the relationships of all races and peoples.  A world executive, backed by an international Force, will carry out the decisions arrived at, and apply the laws enacted by, this world legislature, and will safeguard the organic unity of the whole commonwealth.  A world tribunal will adjudicate and deliver its compulsory and final verdict in all and any disputes that may arise between the various elements constituting this universal system.

A mechanism of world inter-communication will be devised, embracing the whole planet, freed from national hindrances and restrictions, and functioning with marvellous swiftness and perfect regularity.  A world metropolis will act as the nerve center of a world civilization, the focus towards which the unifying forces of life will converge and from which its energizing influences will radiate.  A world language will either be invented or chosen from among the existing languages and will be taught in the schools of all the federated nations as an auxiliary to their mother tongue.  A world script, a world literature, a uniform and universal system of currency, of weights and measures, will simplify and facilitate intercourse and understanding among the nations and races of mankind.

In such a world society, science and religion, the two most potent forces in human life, will be reconciled, will cöoperate, and will harmoniously develop.  The press will, under such a system, while giving full scope to the expression of the diversified views and convictions of mankind, cease to be mischievously manipulated by vested interests, whether private or public, and will be liberated from the influence of contending governments and peoples.  The economic resources of the world will be organized, its sources of raw materials will be tapped and fully utilized, its markets will be cöordinated and developed, and the distribution of its products will be equitably regulated.

(“World Unity the Goal”, The World Order of Bahá’u’lláh [paragraph breaks added by me])

These words were written in 1936, and they are quite obviously a product of the time and place in which they were written.  For anyone who has seen the rest of the 20th century, the idea of placing our spiritual hopes for the future in the hands of a more powerful version of the United Nations—which in turn imposes a monoculture on the rest of the world—is too absurd to contemplate as a potential divine revelation.

Obviously, no real divine revelation was needed to come up with this idea.  Effendi (and to a lesser extent Bahá’u’lláh) were simply taking up the “spirit of the age”—what the internationalists and socialists of that time were already striving for—and recasting it as a principle of their own religion.  But a universally valid moral system ought to transcend the prejudices of the particular time and place in which it was originally developed.

(The one somewhat prescient aspect of this passage is that humanity did indeed come up with a global “mechanism of world inter-communication”: a.k.a. the Internet.  Kudos for that.  But the Internet is a highly de-centralized system, which allows for cultural diversity, and which certainly does not require a omnicompetent world-state in order to function.  And as we are all now acutely aware, the Internet doesn’t actually solve our moral coordination problems, it just transfers them to a new sphere.)

If what you care about most is maximizing ethical niceness, but you also want a religion which is a few centuries old (and thus not simply a repackaged version of contemporary morals) you could always try Sikhism—about which I know relatively little, but it seems to be one of the ethically nicer religions out there (notwithstanding being the religion of a warrior caste).  However, I haven’t been able to get much out of reading its holy book (the Guru Granth Sahib) at an intellectual level, as it mainly seems to repeat the same basic ideas over and over again.  Probably the point is not so much to be intellectually stimulated but to absorb the main idea by singing it over and over again.  But, I suppose that is the sort of benefit that one would only get by actually joining a religion…

II. Christianity

So is there a system of religious ethics which does transcend its particular time and place, sufficiently to be credible as having a transcendental origin?

Surprisingly, Jesus’ moral teaching, as recorded in the Gospels, e.g. the Sermon on the Mount, actually passes this test.  [If you’ve never read it before, stop and read the whole thing right now, starting with “Blessed are the poor in spirit” in chapter 5 and ending at the statement of the crowds being astonished by his teaching at the end of chapter 7.]  It is still an impressive spiritual standard, still relevant even after 2,000 years of humanity’s moral development, and it has inspired even non-Christian activists such as Gandhi to greater moral heights.

(The Sermon does contain a few minor cultural references to religious institutions of the time; for example Jesus mentions the practice of offering gifts to the Temple at Jerusalem, and also the Sanhedrin which was the supreme court for religious practice in Israel.  But it seems clear that all these references are inessential to the basic principles Jesus was preaching.)

Jesus cuts away the legalism common to many religious traditions, and puts the focus on integrity in the heart:

You have heard that it was said to the people long ago, `You shall not murder, and anyone who murders will be subject to judgment.’  But I tell you that anyone who is angry with a brother will be subject to judgment.  Again, anyone who calls his brother ‘Raqa’ [Empty-headed] is answerable to the Sanhedrin, but anyone who says, ‘fool!’ will be in danger of the fire of hell.

Therefore, if you are offering your gift at the altar and there remember that your brother or sister has something against you, leave your gift there in front of the altar. First go and be reconciled to them; then come and offer your gift.  (5:21-24)

In other words, if you want to be righteous, it’s not sufficient to just not kill people.  Even somebody who doesn’t express their hatred in words, may be murdering their brother in their hearts (many times over), and that contempt comes out in the words we use to speak about other people.  So if you want to cut to the root of the matter, you have to begin with the way you regard others in your mind.

The same sort of deepening applies to the other commandments as well:

You have heard that it was said, `You shall not commit adultery.’  But I tell you that anyone who looks at a woman lustfully has already committed adultery with her in his heart!…

It has been said, ‘Anyone who divorces his wife must give her a certificate of divorce.’  But I tell you that anyone who divorces his wife, except for sexual immorality, makes her the victim of adultery, and anyone who marries a divorced woman commits adultery.

Again you have heard that it was said to those of old, `You shall not swear falsely, but shall perform your oaths to the Lord.’  But I say to you, do not swear at all…  Let your ‘Yes’ be ‘Yes,’ and your ‘No,’ ‘No.’  For whatever is more than these is from the evil one.

(5:27-37, excerpts)

Jesus’ radical new interpretation of the Torah shows us the real source of misdeeds—our own desire to get what we want, even at the price of manipulating others.  They show that no amount of following of technical justifications—”it’s okay that I left my wife for another woman because I filled out the proper legal paperwork”; or “I don’t have to keep this promise because I didn’t swear I would do it”—can prevent us from doing wrong.  Instead, we need for our own internal motivations to be right.

Beyond Legalism: Children, not Slaves

Most religions tend to focus on regulating externals of behavior.  They are obsessed with figuring out the answer to the question “What is the minimum acceptable standard of behavior?”  This process tends to produce an elaborate law-code, often (as in the case of rabbinic Judaism) becoming more and more complex with time.

But Christianity says that God doesn’t want slaves, who obey mindlessly out of fear, without knowing the reasons why.  It is true that his awe-inspiring glory deserves our worship and submission.  Yet the New Testament says he wants to treat us as his adult children (who can be trusted with freedom after learning what is good) and as his close friends (who know his plans and thoughts).  As far as I know, this attitude is unique among theistic religions.  It would be quite presumptuous, if God had not taken the initiative by drawing near to us, in order to share the mind of his Spirit with us.  Yet now that I have been granted these privileges, giving them up again in order to serve a more distant deity would be disappointing.  To draw back from this intimacy, from the thoughtful responsibility he has entrusted me with, seems more like immaturity than humility.

Love your Enemies

When Jesus goes on to say:

But I tell you, do not resist an evil person.  If anyone slaps you on the right cheek, turn to them the other cheek also.  And if anyone wants to sue you and take your shirt, hand over your coat as well.  If anyone forces you to go one mile, go with them two miles.  Give to the one who asks you, and do not turn away from the one who wants to borrow from you.

You have heard that it was said, ‘Love your neighbor and hate your enemy.’ But I tell you, love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you, that you may be children of your Father in heaven.  He causes his sun to rise on the evil and the good, and sends rain on the righteous and the unrighteous.  (Matthew 5:39-45),

these sayings are far from trivial to implement, yet actually this is the only practical suggestion—the one that actually works in practice, e.g. in the Civil Rights movement in America—for creating peace between those who hate each other, other than wiping one of the groups out.

Christians have differed as to whether Jesus’ words imply total Pacifism (I don’t think so myself), but I do think that these words introduce us to a nonviolent form of power which, when applied intelligently, is far greater than the power of violence; because it has the power to move people to freely become better, in a way that no amount of external coercion can ever do.

America’s greatest 20th century political activist, St. Martin Luther King Jr., explained the meaning of this passage as follows:

The ultimate weakness of violence is that it is a descending spiral begetting the very thing it seeks to destroy, instead of diminishing evil, it multiplies it. Through violence you may murder the liar, but you cannot murder the lie, nor establish the truth. Through violence you may murder the hater, but you do not murder hate. In fact, violence merely increases hate. Returning violence for violence multiplies violence, adding deeper darkness to a night already devoid of stars. Darkness cannot drive out darkness; only light can do that. Hate cannot drive out hate; only love can do that.

(Where do we go from here: Chaos or Community)

These words are not mere idealism, as in: wouldn’t it be nice if people behaved this way, but we know they never will.  For King, these words described a highly practical strategy for social change.  He had hands-on experience using Jesus’ method to reform the segregationist South.   Of course, King also paid the price for it.  It can be seen from this example that nonviolence does not imply submissively accepting the status quo; rather it is a creative way of seeking justice by appealing to people’s better nature.

As far as I can see, Jesus’ radical ethic of love, forgiveness and acceptance is morally better than anything else on offer.

I do not of course mean to imply that the ethical duty to love one’s enemies was absolutely original in all respects when stated by Jesus.  It was anticipated by Plato, and certain parts of the Hebrew Bible, although Christ emphasized it more forcefully.   The point is not so much that it was utterly new, but that it was right, even though it was not a truth generally appreciated in Jesus’ culture, nor indeed in any culture not influenced by Christianity.  (Sometimes I’m not too sure about Christians either!)

Two Potential Stumbling Blocks

Although it should be indisputable from the above that Jesus’ ethical teaching calls his followers to an extremely high ethical standard, there are still a couple of ways in which his morality might still seem alienating or “bad” to many nonreligious readers.  It is worth highlighting these issues briefly, although each would really justify a long post of its own:

Road Bump #1: God the Father

The first point is that Christianity is unavoidably and distinctively theistic, through and through.  Without denying that there are some aspects of Jesus’ teaching which could be applied with profit by non-religious people, much of what he says simply makes no sense, when separated from the idea of a God whose character we can count on.  Even when Jesus announces a moral rule that atheists might be able to get behind, he nearly always appeals to theological reasons—for example, imitating the character of God—to explain why the rule should be followed.

I have seen pastors who tried to put forward Jesus’ teachings as a sort of “worldly wisdom” that can be appreciated and put into practice even by those who aren’t yet religious.   But, apart from a few tidbits, I’m not sure this approach is a very coherent way of introducing seekers to Christianity.

The fact is, it makes no sense to give up your earthly life and goals for the sake of eternal happiness, if in fact there is no God to take care of us, and to keep his promises, and to be blessed by being in communion with him.  Anyone who wants to “try it out”, will quickly see that Jesus’ commands cannot be separated from Jesus’ teaching about our generous and kind Father, whom we are urged to trust to provide for our needs:

“Ask and it will be given to you; seek and you will find; knock and the door will be opened to you.  For everyone who asks receives; the one who seeks finds; and to the one who knocks, the door will be opened.

Which of you, if your son asks for bread, will give him a stone?  Or if he asks for a fish, will give him a snake?  If you, then, though you are evil, know how to give good gifts to your children, how much more will your Father in heaven give good gifts to those who ask him!”  (Matthew 7:7-11)

This does not necessarily mean that an agnostic cannot begin to try to obey some of Jesus’ teachings—but I do not see how they could possibly do so, without at least hoping or wishing that a God like this exists, and that following Jesus’ teaching might put them in some kind of relationship with something like this deeper reality that Jesus called Father.

Given that we are currently evaluating different forms of religious ethics, this is only to be expected.  If you do not yet currently believe in a God, then understanding Jesus’ teaching will require you to imaginatively “suspend your disbelief” on this point.  There is no point in taste-testing a religion for its ethical truth, if you aren’t prepared to grant, at least hypothetically, its most essential premise.

Having granted this premise, what is most distinctive in Christianity is not just whether we believe in God, but rather than nature and character of the God being described, and the way in which his goodness can be taken as a model to transform our own lives.

The second potential road-block is this:

Road Bump #2: Final Judgement

A second, more sensitive issue, is the fact that Jesus repeatedly warns people about the fact that there is a final judgment coming at the end of history, and that even though God loves us, it is quite possible—in fact easy, if a person takes no care to avoid it—for that person to be condemned to Hell.  This is a feature which is bound to seem unpalatable to anyone who doesn’t feel that their degree of guilt (or perhaps, anyone’s guilt) would warrant such a stiff sentence.  And of course, the higher the moral standard we are expected to uphold, the scarier these threats are.

As Bertrand Russell argued:

There is one very serious defect to my mind in Christ’s moral character, and that is that He believed in hell. I do not myself feel that any person who is really profoundly humane can believe in everlasting punishment. Christ certainly as depicted in the Gospels did believe in everlasting punishment, and one does find repeatedly a vindictive fury against those people who would not listen to His preaching—an attitude which is not uncommon with preachers, but which does somewhat detract from superlative excellence. You do not, for instance, find that attitude in Socrates. You find him quite bland and urbane towards the people who would not listen to him; and it is, to my mind, far more worthy of a sage to take that line than to take the line of indignation.   (Why I am not a Christian)

Of course, belief in post-mortem punishment is far from unique to Christianity.  Any religion which believes in both human freedom and life after death, necessarily has to grapple with the question of what happens to people who sink into a self-chosen state of moral corruption.  Even most Buddhist sects believe in various hells (generally regarded as finite, but astronomically long, in duration).

A complete discussion of the topics of Heaven and Hell goes well beyond the subject of this blog post, the purpose of which is not to share my own personal ideas about how this theology could be justified.  One could note however that the possibility of damnation would seem to be logically inherent in any theological system which satisfies the following criteria:

  1. All humans will live forever;
  2. It is impossible for humans to be happy forever without loving God;
  3. God does not force humans to love him, if they choose not to.

On these premises, if anyone would prefer to be immoral (and thus unhappy) rather than to love God, then there does not seem to be any obvious alternative to a system of indefinite incarceration, for those who reject Heaven.

The Offer of Grace

What is unique to Jesus’ teaching, is the extent to which these warnings are side-by-side with the most forceful declarations of God’s mercy and grace towards sinners:

What do you think?  If a man owns a hundred sheep, and one of them wanders away, will he not leave the ninety-nine on the hills and go to look for the one that wandered off?  And if he finds it, truly I tell you, he is happier about that one sheep than about the ninety-nine that did not wander off.  In the same way your Father in heaven is not willing that any of these little ones should perish.  (Matthew 18:10-24)

We do not have to be saved by our own efforts; instead the Good Shepherd comes looking for his lost sheep in order to save it.  Jesus welcomed the prostitutes and the dishonest tax collectors, because God is a loving Father whose heart goes out to all his children, no matter what they have done.  God doesn’t want anyone to perish, but for everyone to come to him and be saved.

If anyone is outside the scope of God’s forgiveness, it is not because God runs out of patience and kindness, but rather because that person is trapped in their own hatred and failure to forgive others.  In other words, the only unforgivable sin is to reject the Holy Spirit, even when he makes his goodness clear to you.  All who repent and turn to Christ can be saved, no matter what they have done.

Not “Meek and Mild”

Jesus’ own ways of reaching out to people were highly controverisial.  Shockingly for the time, he took women on as close disciples.  He was criticized for going to parties with notorious sinners, for healing people on the Sabbath, and for telling religious people that their hypocrisy was an abomination in God’s eyes.  As he himself noted, a life of real virtue leads to persecution.

They also accused him of blasphemy, for saying things which sounded as if he was claiming some sort of equality or association with God himself.  (This is also something which we have to come to terms with in deciding what Jesus really was, since as many people have pointed out, if he was wrong that would make him a delusional megalomaniac.)

I remember reading the Gospel of Matthew for the first time as a child and being surprised by the continual extremeness of Christ’s teachings.  My parents are devoted Christians and I was very pious, so you would think I would already have known what to expect, but still—the words of Jesus were shocking.  It seemed appropriate that Christ’s words were typed in red ink in my mother’s Bible, as if they were going to burn through the page like acid.  As St. Chesterton wrote in The Everlasting Man (a rethinking of comparative religion from a Christian perspective):

A man reading the Gospel sayings would not find platitudes.  If he had read even in the most respectful spirit the majority of ancient philosophers and of modern moralists, he would appreciate the unique importance of saying that he did not find platitudes.  It is more than can be said even of Plato.  It is much more than can be said of Epictetus or Seneca or Marcus Aurelius or Apollonius of Tyana.  And it is immeasurably more than can be said of most of the agnostic moralists and the preachers of the ethical societies; with their songs of service and their religion of brotherhood.  The morality of most moralists ancient and modern, has been one solid and polished cataract of platitudes flowing for ever and ever.  That would certainly not be the impression of the imaginary independent outsider studying the New Testament.  He would be conscious of nothing so commonplace and in a sense of nothing so continuous as that stream.

He would find a number of strange claims that might sound like the claim to be the brother of the sun and moon; a number of very startling pieces of advice; a number of stunning rebukes; a number of strangely beautiful stories.  He would see some very gigantesque figures of speech about the impossibility of threading a needle with a camel or the possibility of throwing a mountain into the sea.  He would see a number of very daring simplifications of the difficulties of life; like the advice to shine upon everybody indifferently as does the sunshine or not to worry about the future any more than the birds.  He would find on the other hand some passages of almost impenetrable darkness, so far as he is concerned, such as the moral of the parable of the Unjust Steward.  Some of these things might strike him as fables and some as truths; but none as truisms.  For instance, he would not find the ordinary platitudes in favour of peace.  He would find several paradoxes in favour of peace. He would find several ideals of non-resistance, which taken as they stand would be rather too pacific for any pacifist.  He would be told in one passage to treat a robber not with passive resistance, but rather with positive and enthusiastic encouragement, if the terms be taken literally; heaping up gifts upon the man who had stolen goods….

The statement that the meek shall inherit the earth is very far from being a meek statement.  I mean it is not meek in the ordinary sense of mild and moderate and inoffensive.  To justify it, it would be necessary to go very deep into history and anticipate things undreamed of then and by many unrealised even now; such as the way in which the mystical monks reclaimed the lands which the practical kings had lost.  If it was a truth at all, it was because it was a prophecy.  But certainly it was not a truth in the sense of a truism.  The blessing upon the meek would seem to be a very violent statement; in the sense of doing violence to reason and probability….

Something of the same thing may be said about the incident of Martha and Mary; which has been interpreted in retrospect and from the inside by the mystics of the Christian contemplative life.  But it was not at all an obvious view of it; and most moralists, ancient and modern, could be trusted to make a rush for the obvious.  What torrents of effortless eloquence would have flowed from them to swell any slight superiority on the part of Martha; what splendid sermons about the Joy of Service and the Gospel of Work and the World Left Better Than We Found It, and generally all the ten thousand platitudes that can be uttered in favour of taking trouble—by people who need take no trouble to utter them.

(“The Riddles of the Gospel”, in The Everlasting Man)

But if Christ really came down from Heaven, you might expect him to teach a morality which is of a different nature than any Earthly cultural code.  Just as if you were sent back in time thousands of years to the ancient world, you would inevitably react with dismay at many atrocities which the ancients took for granted; so too Jesus preached just as if he came from another world, where life operates on completely different lines than what we Earthlings are used to.

Humble Service

Another of these paradoxes was Jesus’ idea about the nature of leadership.  To the first leaders of his Church, he says:

“You know that the rulers of the Gentiles lord it over them, and their high officials exercise authority over them.  Not so with you!  Instead, whoever wants to become great among you must be your servant, and whoever wants to be first must be your slave—just as the Son of Man did not come to be served, but to serve, and to give his life as a ransom for many.”  (Matthew 20:20-28)

And here the Theology of Christianity—that God sent his Son to forgive his enemies and save us from destruction—is in perfect consonance with the Ethics.  Jesus’ actions were not hypocritical; he lived a life (and died a death) of self-sacrifice and forgiveness.  Healing the sick and crazy, welcoming social outcasts and telling them their sins were forgiven, feeding the hungry, raising the dead, preaching the good news to the poor.  Jesus’ character makes the commonplace seem miraculous and the miraculous commonplace.

It is certainly true that the doctrine of the Atonement—that Jesus’ innocent victimization on the Cross is the method by which God forgives our sins—can be perplexing and disconcerting, when considered from the point of view of ordinary human justice, especially if it is explained using inapt metaphors.

If your notion of the divine does not allow for elements of mysterious depth, if you insist that nothing can transcend your own understanding, then I have no way of getting you past this third potential stumbling block.  All I can say is that a supposed divine revelation would be quite impoverished indeed if it contained nothing strange or difficult.  When we study subatomic matter, out of which we ourselves are made, we find the bizarre mind-bending paradoxes of Quantum Mechanics, which can be described mathematically but nobody can agree on what’s going on metaphysically.  It would be strange indeed if our interactions with God—a being coming in from outside our physical world entirely—did not have a comparable degree of weirdness!

A Spiritual Kingdom

Finally, Christianity says that Jesus conquered death itself at his Resurrection from the grave.  He did not meet the Jewish expectations of a world revolution, but he did something greater, triumphing over all the strong things in the world with his tender weakness.  That is why he proclaimed that the kingdom of heaven was very near, and would be a revolution in the hearts and minds of anyone willing to be born anew, in order to enter it with humility, like a small child.

If this did not happen and—as some believe—the Messiah is yet to come, can he possibly be greater than this?  After Jesus, anyone else would be an anticlimax.  Even if you were to write a fictional story to try to imagine a superior Messiah, the only way you could make your fictional Messiah morally satisfying is by including enough elements of Jesus’ character, that the story would really owe its emotional and moral depth to him.  (Or one could simply accept the moral retrogression back to the military leader trope, as is largely the case in e.g. the Dune mythos.  This leads to a satisfying story for a novel, but if it happened in reality, it would not answer the deepest spiritual needs of the human race.)

Christians believe that Jesus’ teaching is the Way (the Tao) which comes down from Heaven.  Unlike the Torah or the Quran, the New Testament contains no instructions for setting up an earthly theocratic government; instead it is a spiritual kingdom:

Jesus said, “My kingdom is not of this world.  If it were, my servants would fight to prevent my arrest by the Jewish leaders.  But now my kingdom is from another place.”  (John 18:36)

Therefore, his followers have no excuse for engaging in religious persecution on Earth.

Jesus and Hypocrisy

Although many have tried.  Let me say right away that I do not consider any religion to be refuted merely by the hypocrisy of those who come in later generations.  I am asking how glorious the original teachings are, not how well they have been followed.  Christians, like others, are frequently hypocrites.  In fact, one might well expect the religion with the highest ethical standards to provide the greatest temptation to hypocrisy, since those are the standards which are hardest to live up to.  So when people complain about how the Church is full of hypocrites, they thereby testify that they know that the Christian standards are (at least in certain respects) good and right.  We don’t usually complain when people fall short of a religious standard which we don’t approve of!

And if you hate hypocrisy, bear in mind that you probably owe this very insight to Jesus’ teaching.  Just as the weekend comes from the Judaeo-Christian practice of Sabbath keeping, so the modern Westerner’s sensitive conscience on this point comes, directly or indirectly, from the New Testament.  There is no religious text which speaks more forcefully against hypocrisy.  Jesus’ denunciations of this sin were spectacularly harsh.  And yet his severity was clearly needed, given the later conduct of many of his own followers.

Because these warnings are in the DNA of the Christian Church, it can never remain permanently fossilized in legalism and spiritual decay.  There will always be a revival.  If you are sincerely worried about becoming a hypocrite yourself, and if you want to pick the religious teacher most likely to prevent you, if you follow him sincerely—surely, Jesus is the one.

(Although, I can’t help but notice that the people who complain about religious people being hypocrites, seldom seem all that worried that they might be hypocritical in other respects.  Shall we coin a term and call that “meta-hypocrisy”?)

Of course, hypocrisy is not at all the same as simply not living up to one’s own moral standards.  Otherwise there would be no difference between the self-righteous Pharisee and the repentant tax-collector!  We all fail to live up to what morality requires, but some people sincerely repent of it, while others don’t care or try to pretend everything is okay.  If you ever find a religious group which succeeds in keeping their own moral standard, you should run away from them as fast as you can!  Because if they can meet it, it must be abysmally low.  At least if people fall short of the standard they set by their preaching, they leave open the possibility of repenting and doing better in the future.

Other Religions

The moral teachings of other religions, might indeed have been improvements on what went before, but are limited and defective in comparison with Christianity.  I don’t mean of course to imply that there’s nothing ethically good in other religions.  But they don’t impress and amaze me, to the same degree that Christianity does.

III.  Judaism

Although Christians believe the Torah to be genuinely revealed by God, even this must be regarded as “limited”, since according to Christianity it is  incomplete in nature, and its ceremonies pointed the way to something better, to come later.  Since Christianity came from Judaism, a Christian cannot consistently say that the core ideas of Jewish ethics were mistaken.  But, we can point to the place where Jewish ethics has reached its highest point of fulfilment, which is in the teachings of Jesus.

But first, what is the most distinctive feature of Jewish ethics?  One of the main innovations of Judaism was the unification of religion and morality.  God is believed to be both righteous himself, and the one who demands righteousness on Earth.

In paganism, the concepts of sin (that which offends God) and moral wrongdoing (injustice) can come apart; an act may please one god and yet offend another.  But in Jewish theology, sin and wrongdoing are coextensive: one can never offend God by a righteous act nor please him by a wicked one.  To be sure, the implication goes in both directions, meaning that a Jew might sometimes need to submit to a difficult divine command, the reasons for which are obscure.  But it is always implied that when this is so, the moral limitation lies with us humans, rather than with God.  Hence, obedience is itself a righteous act, and is never merely a craven submission to a more powerful being, as in much of paganism.

Before anyone marches in with a Dawkins-esque caricature of the “God of the Old Testament”, let me say right away that there is simply no comparison here to the moral universe of pagan mythology.  Not even the most hardened blasphemer would deny that the God of the Bible is at least moralistic in his character.  He is always portrayed as actively defending moral norms, with acts of justice or mercy.  When a reader objects to one of the Old Testament God’s verdicts, they usually do so for one of three reasons [not all of which are applicable to each case]: (1) because the punishment seems too harsh, or (2) involves collective justice on groups, or (3) involves offenses against archaic codes of conduct which we no longer accept.  In a certain Nietzschean sense, one might say that the biblical God is more frequently accused of an excess of morality (at least in the sense of punishing sins), rather than a deficit of morality.  But the God of the Old Testament does not ever simply disregard morality to gain personal advantage; nor does he, like Zeus, commit adultery with his neighbor’s wife and then turn her into a animal to cover up his hijinks.  In this sense the Hebrew tradition, even at its most distressing, can be objectively seen to reside on a higher moral and metaphysical plane than pagan polytheism.

And it should be noted that the Israelites themselves, comparing their beliefs to others, did not view their own God as being especially implacable in wrath.  Rather, they characterized him as a “gracious and merciful God, slow to anger and abounding in love, a God who relents from sending calamity” (Jonah 4:2).

A critic might say that, simply by asking the question which religion is morally good, we are already begging the question massively in favor of Judaism and its offshoots, since it was Judaism that popularized this idea in the first place.

And yet none of us can completely transcend our roots.  When Western skeptics critique the moral sensibilities of Jewish scriptures, they are usually doing so on the basis of moral assumptions which they learned, indirectly, from Christianity.  Since Christianity is deeply rooted in Judaism, this really means that their ammunition against Judaism comes indirectly from sources within Judaism itself.  Had Judaism and Christianity never existed, it is quite probable that most modern “civilized” people would have no concept of universal human rights.  Hence: less emphasis on protection of the weak and victimized, more tolerance for barbaric practices like slavery, torture, and gladiator fights, etc.  There have been plenty of civilized pagan cultures (Greeks, Romans, Chinese, Japanese) in which these concepts have not played a major role.

(This does not mean that there were no ways that e.g. Greco-Roman pagan religion intersected with morality.  There were a few specific moral violations that were viewed as likely to be punished by the gods, such as violations of hospitality or oaths, or violence against parents.  And of course, Egyptian polytheism eventually developed some very precise notions of divine judgement in the afterlife.  But for the most part, appeasing the gods was regarded more as a practical necessity, than a moral one.  For a good overview of the way that most pagans in the Roman Empire viewed their religious rituals—which had very little in common with what most modern people would regard as “spiritual”—see this excellent blog series by a very entertaining historian.)

Proceeding to more specific observances, there are indeed many parts of the Torah which are still very morally inspirational today, such as the Ten Commandments, or the laws about ensuring justice and mercy for widows, orphans, and strangers:

Do not deprive the foreigner or the fatherless of justice, or take the cloak of the widow as a pledge.  Remember that you were slaves in Egypt and the Lord your God redeemed you from there.  That is why I command you to do this.

When you are harvesting in your field and you overlook a sheaf, do not go back to get it.  Leave it for the foreigner, the fatherless and the widow, so that the Lord your God may bless you in all the work of your hands.  When you beat the olives from your trees, do not go over the branches a second time.  Leave what remains for the foreigner, the fatherless and the widow.  When you harvest the grapes in your vineyard, do not go over the vines again.  Leave what remains for the foreigner, the fatherless and the widow.  Remember that you were slaves in Egypt. That is why I command you to do this.  (Deut 24:17-22)

When looking at passages like this, we can indeed agree with the Psalmist that:

The judgments of the LORD are true, being altogether righteous.  They are more precious than gold, than much pure gold; they are sweeter than honey, than honey from the comb.  (Psalm 19:9-10)

Yet, although much in the Torah is splendid and righteous, and many of its ceremonies seem beautifully significant, other provisions are difficult to justify except as concessions to the prevailing culture—as in the case of divorce, where Jesus justified his own teaching on the subject by saying that “Moses permitted you to divorce your wives because your hearts were hard.  But it was not this way from the beginning” (Matt. 19:8).

It is then, an option for a Christian to critique other morally repugnant provisions in the Torah, as making similar allowances to the barbaric conditions of the time, rather than being perpetually prescriptive norms.  Such provisions might include e.g. the rules allowing warfare to be waged against civilians (Deut. 20:10-15), the rules allowing Israelites to buy non-Israelite slaves (Lev. 25:44-46, but cf. Deut 23:15-16 for a contrasting rule concerning refugees), and indeed the subordinate position of women in a patriarchal society (not that this is a major topic of legislation in the Torah, it’s more that it’s taken for granted).

Of course this raises questions for Christians (like myself) who believe that these commandments were revealed by God to Moses.  It might be possible to justify these legal provisions as “perfect” in the limited sense that it these were the best set of laws that could be given to the Israelites at the time God gave them.  However, there’s been considerable moral progress since then.  Thus—although it remains in the Christian Bible as a perpetual record of God’s past guidance to his people—in its literal application, the Torah is simply no longer a contender for the best moral code for humanity.

(Given Christian ethics, the hardest commandment in the Torah to defend is probably the order to wipe out the Canaanite tribes.  Now defending genocide is one of those things that is no longer quite so respectable as it used to be, and rightly so!  Nevertheless, I tried my hand here at explaining several ways in which this divine command is meaningfully different than what e.g. Hitler did.)

Turning to Judaism in its modern rabbinic form, it is still somewhat racially narrow, and often more concerned with technical legalistic observances than with the heart.  After the destruction of the Temple, the Pharisees—the spiritual ancestors of modern day Rabbinic Judaism—reformed and modernized their religion, but also took many liberties of interpretation, some of which are staggering in their perverseness.  For example, the Pharisees interpreted Exodus 23:2:

Do not follow the crowd in doing wrong.  When you give testimony in a lawsuit, do not pervert justice by siding with the crowd.

as implying the right of a majority of rabbis to effectively (re)interpret Scripture, even though the literal meaning of the text specifically says not to follow the majority in doing wrong.

Of course, this rabbinic flexibility does allow for religious mores to be progressively updated in response to social changes, but it also tends to produce a game in which each new rule spins off an increasingly complex chain of further legislation via interpretation.  Since this process has been going on for thousands of years, the results can get very strange.

For example, the rabbinic prohibition on mixing milk with meat somehow emerged from the Torah commandment: “Do not cook a baby goat its mother’s milk” (a better generalization might be: Don’t be a jerk to beings that are totally in your power).  This in turn spun off the additional rule to keep separate dishware for meat and dairy, and so on.  Then one identifies various loopholes, allowing you to get around certain rabbinic rules when they become too onerous, and so on.  All of this seems like a major distraction from actual ethics and spirituality.

Although, taking a more positive point of view, there is a certain attractiveness (at least in an outsider’s view) of an Orthodox Jewish piety; in which minute decisions are continually referred back to the Talmud and to divine law; so as to dedicate the smallest mundane details of family life to the service of a Name that is too sacred to even be spoken out loud.  From the Christian perspective, this is indeed very instructive as an image of what the word “holiness” means, total dedication to God.  But to take such a lifestyle as a matter of obligation differs from the Christian relationship to God which is based more on the guiding presence of the Holy Spirit than in following a particular code of laws.

Another positive effect of all these rabbinic disputations, which should probably be mentioned, was to produce a culture of vibrant intellectual debate.  Even separated from its original religious matrix, this culture of questioning seems to persist in the case of secular Jews.  This is one possible explanation for the enormous Jewish impact on philosophy, science, and culture (far exceeding what one would expect from the total Jewish world population).

IV.  Zoroastrianism

In Zoroastrianism, the commandments seem to be more concerned with ritual purity than with ethics, to a far greater extent than in Judaism.  Yes, honesty and fair-dealing are considered important, but the most important rules concern things like burial practices and hygiene codes.

While I don’t think these punishments are enforced in modern times: in the Venidad (part of traditional Zoroastrian scripture), many purely ceremonial offenses are considered worse than murder, and are punishable by being flogged with hundreds or even thousands of lashes of the whip.  Unforgivable sins (those which cannot be expiated with any amount of punishment) include: burying the corpse of a man or dog, homosexuality, and voluntarily committing “the unnatural sin” [masturbation, according to some translators].  For these acts there can be no atonement whatsoever!  (At least for those who are already members of the religion.  Those who converted, back when that was a thing that happened, apparently got a pass, as long as they promised never to do it again.  Though nowadays, I imagine that most of these rules about punishments aren’t seriously practiced.)

Zoroastrians are Dualists: they believe the world was made by two gods, one of them good and the other evil.  Unlike the Judaeo-Christian worldview, which affirms the essential goodness of creation, Zoroastrianism teaches that certain aspects of Nature were created by the Devil, and are inherently evil and impure.  For example they believe that cats were created by the Evil God, while dogs were created by the Good God.  Therefore it is considered is a righteous deed to kill cats, but a grievous sin to kill a dog.  Speaking as a cat person, I think this is pretty clearly drawing the line between good and evil in the wrong place!  It is simply not ecologically or ethically sound to simplistically divide animal species into “good” and “evil”, as if we lived in a children’s animal fable.  Even if there is a good case to be made for fewer bloodsucking mosquitoes!

(Islam has a completely different take on this, as Mohammad seems to have also been a cat person.)

However, Zoroastrians also strongly emphasize the importance of free will, and the ability of rational creatures (even the gods!) to choose between good or evil.  There is even an amusing Zoroastrian legend that the Devil created the Peacock just to prove that he could make something good, if he wanted to.

(Oddly, this is not the only Devil-Peacock connection one comes across in comparative religion.  The Yazidi venerate the “Peacock angel” Melek Taus, whom they identify with Iblis—an Arab word for the Devil.  In the Quran, Iblis refuses God’s command to prostrate himself before the newly created Adam, and as a result loses his position as chief over the angels.  But in Yazidi mythology, Iblis refuses to venerate Adam out of a misguided loyalty to God, and he is eventually restored to his former position as the most exalted manifestation of God’s glory.  Needless to say this belief, easily confused with a more malign Satanism, has led to considerable misunderstandings with the surrounding Muslim cultures, and the Yazidis have suffered many severe persecutions, most recently under ISIS.)

So, if you want to think of yourself as a participant in an epic battle between good and evil, Zoroastrianism is a pretty cool religion.  But the lines between good and evil are drawn in some pretty arbitrary seeming places.  I don’t really see much ethical wisdom here which can’t be obtained more easily from Judaism (plus Judaism actually accepts converts if you ask persistently enough).

V.  Islam

The Islamic religion preaches racial harmony, generosity to the poor, and sincere piety.  In the tradition of Ethical Monotheism, the Quran proclaims that God is firmly on the side of moral behavior and fair conduct:

God commands justice, doing good, and generosity towards relatives and He forbids what is shameful, blameworthy, and oppressive.  He teaches you, that you may take heed.  Fulfil any pledge you make in God’s name and do not break oaths after you have sworn them, for you have made God your surety: God knows everything you do.  Do not use your oaths to deceive one another—like a woman who unravels the thread she has firmly spun—just because one party may be more numerous than the other.  God tests you with this, and on the Day of Resurrection He will make clear to you the things you differed about.  (Haleem translationSura 16:90-92)

On the other hand, the Quran does not pass modern standards for the treatment of women.  It permits the sexual exploitation of women through slavery, polygamy, and easy divorce; and in several cases its laws discriminate explicitly against females, e.g. Sura 2:282, which considers the testimony of two women equivalent to one man.  (Although Mohammad must be given credit for banning infanticide against female babies.)

In the Hadith, Mohammad legislated the death penalty for apostates (those who stop believing in Islam).  And in numerous passages, the Quran encourages warfare and violence against pagans and those viewed as enemies of Islam, sanctioned by reward and punishment in the afterlife:

God has purchased the persons and possessions of the believers in exchange for the Garden [i.e. Paradise]—they fight in God’s way; they kill and are killed—this is a true promise given by him in the Torah, the Gospel, and the Quran.  Who could be more faithful to his promise than God?  So be happy with the bargain you have made, that is the supreme triumph.  Those who turn to God in repentance; who worship and praise Him; who fast, bow down and prostrate themselves; who order what is good, forbid what is wrong and observe God’s limits.  Give glad news to such believers.  It is not fitting for the Prophet and the believers to ask forgiveness for the idolaters—even if they are related to them—after being shown that they are the inhabitants of the Blaze [i.e. Hell].  (HaleemSura 9:111-113, brackets are my own added interpretation)

It is certainly possible to exaggerate the extent to which the Quran commands religious warfare.  There are also some passages which advocate for peace (although many of these were from the early stages of Mohammad’s ministry, leading some Muslim scholars to argue they were abrogated by later revelations).  But no one can deny that warfare is a frequently recurrent theme; even if the applicability of these verses to the modern day is, of course, a matter on which different Muslims have many different opinions.

The time has long passed when I last had the experience of finding a new book in my Bible.  If the voice that spoke in the Quran, had been the same voice that speaks to me in the Bible; if it had wooed me with divine paradoxes that call out to the depths of the spirit, cutting through all my excuses like a sword, and dazzling me with the promises of hidden glory; then I think I would have gladly listened to it, even if the price it asked me to pay (leaving behind my own family’s religious convictions, and joining a new community) was high.

But as I see it, the Quran is not even trying to reveal a paradoxical reality or an awe-inspiring ethical code; it is really just a kind of civilization-building compromise; a simplification which attempts to combine the universalism of the Christian message with some of the ritualism of the Jewish system.  Despite the intense focus of the Quran on the rewards and punishments of the afterlife, Mohammad’s kingdom was very much of this world; therefore his followers do fight.

Despite being later in time, Islam does not uphold nearly as bracing a moral standard as Christianity, and it is arguable whether it is even a moral improvement on the Torah.  In this respect it appears to be a moral retrogression—which might be justifiable if it had been intended for a limited cultural setting, but it is a severe problem in a supposedly final revelation for all humanity until the Day of Judgement.

Even Muslims can see that much of the legislation in the Quran is merely concerned with being good enough, setting a minimum standard of decency for what had previously been a barbaric time and place.  As one thoughtful Persian argued in a medieval debate with a Christian:

I have said, I say and I will say that good and beautiful is the Law of Christ and much better than the earlier Law, but that mine [the Quran] is superior to both.  Therefore consider what I am going to say, you may hear something that you do not condemn altogether.  Your law, I say, is beautiful and good, but it is very hard and very burdensome and can not easily be useful.  These remedies are too bitter to taste.  So there is no error in believing it is not completely perfect.  The Law of Mohammed follows the middle path and proclaims ordinances which are bearable and in sum gentler and more humane.  Hence it is moderate in all respects and takes precedence over other laws.  Indeed, the shortcomings of the old Law it fills by the supplements which it brings; on the other hand it reduces the exaggerations of the Law of Christ.  There is also what it prunes visibly from both Laws, and suddenly it quite prevails over them.

It also avoids, I think, the mediocrity and the imperfection of the Law of the Jews on the one hand, and on the other hand, the elevation and height of the precepts of Christ, their harshness, that they are excessive and impractical so far for men, because they force, so to speak, our terrestrial nature to mount up to Heaven.  It thus avoids both faults and strives for moderation in everything.  Thereby it appears better than all the Laws that have preceded it.

The virtues, you know, consist of avoiding excesses and keeping exactly to a happy medium.  That’s what we call virtue, and what virtue is.  What is virtue is a happy medium, and what is not such is not virtue.  This is the doctrine of all the ancients, and you yourself have said the same earlier.

But tell me, is it to stay in the happy medium—’to love one’s enemies, to pray for them’, to provide them with food when they are hungry;—And what is amusing—allow me this freedom—to ‘hate his parents and brothers and even his own soul;—’to he who took your shirt, to give him also your coat’;—’to give without distinction to he who asks’ until you appear more naked than a stick and ridiculous in the eyes of those who would then make your property the loot of the Mysians, by pretending to be in need;—to he who strikes ‘on one cheek, to turn the other; to never stand up to evil’;—to have ‘no stick, no bag, no money, nor two tunics’;—‘to not worry about tomorrow’?  “Who is the man of iron, diamond, more insensible than stone, who will bear all these things,—who will bear the offence and cherish the insulter;—who will do good to he who is ill-disposed towards him;—who by his extra bounty will invite the people of this species to gorge on him like vultures on the corpses of the dead?

[We should probably make allowances for the fact that this debate was hosted by Christians, and recorded by them, so that the Persian scholar might not have felt free to attack Christianity in the strongest possible terms.  Nevertheless, the viewpoint being argued seems plausible enough as an honest statement of opinion by a real Muslim.]

From a Christian perspective, the basic mistake here is thinking of the law of Christ as if its main purpose was to be a terrestrial law code.  From this perspective, a law could deviate from perfection either by being “too strict” or by being “too lax”, given the realities of human nature.  Yet Christianity is not primarily meant to be a new code of laws, but rather it is a means of experiencing supernatural grace.  From that perspective it is an attraction, that the law of Christ cuts deeper than anything we could obey by our own efforts.  Suppose that our “terrestrial nature” is indeed destined “to mount up to Heaven”; not indeed by our own efforts, but rather by the grace of God redeeming sinful people, and conforming us to the supernatural standard of goodness set by Jesus?  Then we need to know what truly heavenly people would look like, and Jesus provides that picture.

Muslims admire Islam for the reasonableness of its requirements.  For example, if you are physically unable to prostrate or to go on pilgrimage, then God understands that, and you can just do whatever you can do.  On the other hand, while Christians certainly believe God makes allowances for our weakness, we admire the Gospel message more for its unreasonableness by human standards.  God demands that which exceeds our abilities; but then gives us the grace to fulfil his commands.

Islam and Prophets

This issue is closely connected to the Islamic theology concerning prophets.  Most Muslims believe that all prophets are sinless, which would blatantly contradict the Bible in numerous places.  However, I have come to conclude that this doctrine was never taught by Mohammad; in particular it seems to explicitly contradict the Quran, which contains multiple examples of prophets sinning (e.g. there is a story of Jonah similar to the Bible, Mohammad is rebuked by God for doing certain things, etc).

Nevertheless, there is still a significant difference when it comes to the overall tone of respect which the Quran has for prophets, as compared to the Bible which consistently emphasizes the flaws and sins of nearly all of its major protagonists, except for Jesus.  Leave aside the villains; let’s look at the saints: Noah gets drunk; Abraham lies about his wife; Isaac plays favorites; Jacob tries to trick everyone; Joseph’s brothers sell him into slavery; Judah visits a prostitute; Aaron makes a golden calf; Moses loses his temper; Jephthah swears a rash vow; Samson is a violent hothead; David commits adultery with Bathsheba; Solomon is led astray to idolatry; Hezekiah boasts to the Babylonian envoys; Zechariah doubts the angel; Peter repeatedly wavers in his faith; Paul is quarrelsome.  Even Mary, the Blessed Mother of the Lord, comes to try to take Jesus home to cool off, after the rest of his family decides he’s gone nuts!  This is all rather astonishing, especially given the tendency of other religious literature (including later Christian chronicles and legends) to succumb to pious hagiography.  To my mind this moral realism is one of the most striking effects of divine inspiration, in the narrative parts of the Bible.

(Conversely, one of the most striking aspects of those parts of the Bible in which humans talk to God—like the Psalms and Job—is the brutal honesty with which the saints are allowed to express their feelings to their Lord.  Here too, I know of no real parallel outside the Judaeo-Christian tradition.  It is certainly not a common practice in Islam.)

The Muslim attitude is, how can you trust a prophet if he’s a sinner?  Which makes perfect sense if you think that sin is just a matter of disobeying some reasonable code of conduct which any decent person is capable of following.  But the Bible provides the more bracing truth that everyone is a sinner who needs salvation (Christ alone excepted).  Even heroes of nonviolence, like Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr., can commit quite serious sins (as a close look at their biographies will reveal).

The Gospel passes judgement even on its own messengers, “so that every mouth may be silenced and the whole world held accountable to God” (Romans 3:20).  The Christian doctrine of original sin is much maligned, but as St. Chesterton pointed out, its actual effects are to promote sympathy and solidarity between human beings.  We are all in the same leaky boat, and we all need rescuing!  Righteousness is something which we cannot achieve by merely human efforts, even if those efforts take the form of religious rituals (praying X times a day, going on pilgrimage, donating to charity etc.)

What is Grace?

Another way of putting this: Islam is inherently Pelagian in its theology of human nature.  (St?) Pelagius—despite the fact that he was himself a very devout and pious man—was condemned for his heretical and destructive teachings by the Catholic Church.  The problem was that he taught that human beings are morally capable of obeying the law without needing to undergo a radical spiritual transformation.  On a Pelagian (or Islamic) view of salvation, the main spiritual need of humanity is to be educated and informed about what it is that God commands.  Having learned the correct way to live, our task is choosing to submit to God’s commands and obey them, which we have the power to do.  But orthodox Christianity teaches, that what humans need is not primarily instruction, but rather an infusion of new life which comes from on high.

What kind of grace do we need?  The Quran portrays God as merciful to believers, but he does not show extravagant love to sinners as he does in the Bible.  Indeed the Quran seems more frequently to relish in the damnation of evildoers, rather than mourning them.  Compare this to the biblical tradition: “As surely as I live, declares the Lord God, I take no pleasure in the death of the wicked, but rather that they turn from their ways and live!” (Ezekiel 33:11).

In my experience, it can be a bit difficult for Christians to communicate our theology of grace to Muslims, since it is easy to overstate the difference between the two religions, when in fact there is a lot of common ground.

If you try to tell your Muslim friend that it is impossible to be good without divine help, they will almost certainly agree with you!  This is just common sense, in any tradition of ethical monotheism.  Pelagius himself would never have said that God doesn’t help us to do good works, or that it is wrong to pray for his assistance in being good.  After all, God created us, and nothing in the world can even continue to exist without his active sustenance.  (Even the most hard-core Calvinist ideas about divine predestination have parallels in Islamic theology.)

If you try to talk about God’s mercy—well it is also very important to Muslims that God is merciful.  In all five of their prescribed daily prayers, they invoke “the Name of Allah—the Most Compassionate, Most Merciful” (Sura 1:1).  If you ask them whether it is always possible for even the most sinful person to repent and be forgiven by God, again your Muslim friend will probably agree.  Assuming the sinner is sincere in their repentance, and they earnestly desire to live a righteous life going forwards, why wouldn’t God accept them?

But as we have seen, what the Bible means by grace goes deeper than this.  In the New Testament, God pours out his love and grace even to those who are currently his enemies.  There is no analogue in the Quran to divine “love” in the sense of: “For God so loved the world that he gave his one and only Son” (John 3:16), nor to “sacrifice” in the sense of: “While we were still sinners, Christ died for us” (Rom 5:8).  In fact, there can’t be any parallel, because it would be considered blasphemous to say that God has a Son, or that anything which God does, can be compared to being a crucifixion victim.  (As discussed previously, Islam does not even seem comfortable with the idea of purely human prophet experiencing such a fate.)

And as for the human response to God’s grace… suppose we consider the most law-oriented book of the New Testament: the epistle by Jesus’ brother James.  This letter considers its most essential task, to be convincing Christians to obey Christ’s “perfect law of freedom” (1:25), and it says that “faith without works is dead” (2:26).  If a Muslim scholar wanted to identify the stratum of early Christian teaching which is most compatible with Islam, they would probably pick this letter.  And yet, even in this book, St. James strikes a note totally incompatible with Islamic (or Pelagian) theology:

Every good and perfect gift is from above, coming down from the Father of the lights, with whom there is no variation or shadow of change.  By his own choice, he gave us birth by the word of truth” (1:17-18).

Or as Jesus said to a Jewish religious leader, “You must be born again” (John 3:7).  This refers not to our natural birth, but to a spiritual birth into a new life which comes from God!  Receiving this new life from God, makes us truly children of God.

While obviously this does not refer to literal procreation in an earthly sense, Jesus’ use of a biological metaphor here still communicates something deeply important.  When Christians call God “Father”, we do so not as a mere title of respect (though he is worthy of all respect, nor do we call him “Father” simply because he looks after our needs as a parent does (though he certainly does that as well).  Neither of these would require any notion of “new birth”.  Rather, we call God Father because he has enabled us to participate in his own spiritual life, which we receive from Christ.  This divine life cannot be replicated simply by human effort.  (This would be just as impossible, as for a woman to get pregnant by looking at pictures of babies.)  This is why, throughout the Gospels, Jesus continually talks about receiving the word of God using agricultural metaphors: seeds growing into plants, vines nourishing branches, etc.

We come to Christ because we have had the experience of being unable to live up to even our own moral standards; and we find forgiveness and hope there, and a grace that seems to touch our point of need.  To say: “the problem is you were trying to follow moral rules that were too hard, just do these other rituals instead, and remember that God is merciful” seems like it is missing the point.  My own spiritual needs cry out for something deeper than that.

And then Christianity offers something far greater than we had any right to expect.  We believe that those who are in Christ, become spiritual sons and daughters of God, living by the power of God’s own life.  Even though we are human and not divine—and however inadequate our current strivings may be—the purpose and goal of our sainthood is nevertheless to become, in some inconceivable manner, spiritually united to divinity.  As closely as a husband is united to a wife, or as a mother to her unborn child, or the soul to the body.  This is a relation to God that Islam does not offer, and cannot offer, given its other theological commitments.

Hence, from the perspective of someone who believes this central Christian gospel (the good news about Jesus), the Islamic religion simply doesn’t come across as a mere extension or addition of new material.  Rather, it is a denial of what Christians consider to be the good news: that God did for us, and will do in us, a work of righteousness which goes beyond human capabilities.  In the moral realm, we need somebody who can say to us, what Jesus said to the crippled man: “Pick up your mat and walk!” (John 5:8).

VI.  Hinduism

To find a religion which competes with Christianity in its desire for mystical union with the divine, we now turn to the East, to the religions of India.  In this section we will look “Hinduism”, although in fact this is a pretty broad target, containing a very eclectic group of different philosophical traditions, which are really only regarded as “one thing” as a result of being grouped together by British Imperialists.  As these traditions are practiced by different groups of people, there is no obligation for these ideas to all be compatible with each other, so it is very difficult to discuss Hinduism in any sort of unified way.  There is a lot going on here.  Some of it good, and some of it bad.

Traditional Hinduism is fairly closely bound up with a system of racial subordination, which it grew up around.  It’s hard for me to get too worked up about this at the personal level, not being Indian, and I don’t want to overstep when judging a culture different from my own.  But if there were a hypothetical American religion which taught that black people shouldn’t necessary aspire to the same religious goals as white people, but should follow the duties of their own traditional station in life, in hopes of being reincarnated as a white person… then I think that religion would strike me as being pretty evil!

By contrast, the popular Bhakti (devotion) movement in Hinduism teaches that one can gain salvation through devotion to a particular deity (or set of deities), and that this devotion transcends caste divisions.  These reform movements became very popular in India, starting in the 15th century.  Perhaps this was in part due to influence from Western religious concepts.  Different religions do not actually exist in watertight compartments; they influence each other in various ways.

The mythology associated with Hinduism, like other pagan mythologies, often does not portray its deities as holy and righteous, but rather as petty, selfish and sensual.  This shows that these gods are only idols, made in the image of our own flaws in order to tell a good story.  Even if they were real, they would have no moral authority, because they behave no better than the powerful and rich rulers of our own species.

My friend Sudipta is an agnostic from India; he doesn’t consider himself Hindu, but he is from a Hindu cultural background.  Although not a Christian, he says “I have no problem calling Christ divine, because he forgave those who crucified him.”  We’ve had several conversations in which he minimized the differences between religions, saying they’re all equally good, no way to know who is really right, etc.  On one occasion, after I invited him to my church in Maryland, we were walking back to the Metro station, and he was telling me about a religious festival (I think Diwali) involving one of the Hindu goddesses.  Suddenly he started coughing and sputtering as if he had something in his throat (we looked for a drinking fountain but none was available).  “Maybe I said something about the goddess she didn’t like,” he said. “They aren’t merciful, like your god is!”

As St. E. Stanley Jones (a Christian missionary to India who was close friends with Gandhi) wrote:

Moreover, in Hinduism the moral law is not rooted in God, God is not the basis of morals.  It is to be found in the law of Karma which operates independently of God.  God is lifted above the law of Karma, and has nothing to do with it.  If God is lifted above morals, the devotee gets to the place where he, too, transcends morals.  He is not affected by good or evil.  Both for God and man morality has no eternal significance.

In the Gospel the moral life is founded in the very nature of God.  Both God and man are bound by the same moral attitudes.  “Follow me as I follow God,” Paul could say, and when he said this he was saying the highest thing he could say.

By all that God requires of me
I know that He Himself must be.

This makes the moral universe a universe and not a multiverse.  Morality has permanent meaning and does not vary from age to age and from circumstance to circumstance.  What we have seen of God in Christ becomes the standard for God or man.  To be Christlike is the highest attainable or even imaginable goodness.  Our morality then is firm—fixed in the nature of God and in historic fact the nature of Christ.

But this is not true of Hinduism.  You are not supposed to follow the Incarnations in their moral actions.  I asked a priest at a temple on which was depicted the escapades of Krishna, “Can you follow this as your own example?”  “No,” he said very thoughtfully, “unless you are very strong when you come here you will go off and do the same things.”  The devotee’s safety must lie in the fact that he is strong enough not to do what his Incarnation did.

Of course, the more philosophical side of Hinduism does not concentrate on these mythological indiscretions; it tries to get to a more transcendent concept of the Divine which is beyond both gods and men.  But here again, its morality continually founders on the rock of Pantheism, the idea that God is in everything, and is therefore indifferent to good and evil.  How can it be considered “good” to try to conform your own life to a reality which is indifferent to goodness?

(Here I am speaking to the majority Hindu position of “Non-Dualism”; however you can find Hindu schools of thought which have almost any set of views on the divine, including that God and the world are totally distinct e.g. the Dvaita school founded by Madhvacharya, who claimed to be an avatar of the wind god, but did not identify himself with the ultimate reality, Brahman.)

For example, the Bhagavad Gita was clearly written by a poet with a strong intuition concerning the grandeur and majesty of the One who is above all, and in that respect it is a spiritually insightful work.  But it continually waffles on this important issue, of whether God really is benevolent and loving, and whether creation is to be regarded with joy or suspicion.  Krishna sometimes speaks as if he were to be identified with the best and most noblest of things, but in other parts he claims to be identical with everything, both high and low.

The book certainly makes a distinction between those who cultivate good desires and rise in their next life, and those who act ignorantly and fall in their next life.  But the best and noblest thing is to be indifferent to any such rewards, and so to transcend the system altogether, going straight to love of Krishna alone.  At one point, the text gets within striking distance of Christian morality:

A person is said to be still further advanced when he regards all—the honest well-wisher, friends and enemies, the envious, the pious, the sinner and those who are indifferent and impartial—with an equal mind.  (Gita 6:9)

But reading the context makes it clear that this is more about indifference than benevolence:

For such persons heat and cold, happiness and distress and honor and dishonor are all the same.  (Gita 6:7)

Yes, one is to regard enemies as equal to friends, but only as one is to regard pain as equal to pleasure—the point is not to regard them at all!

Thus, at the end of the day, Arjuna still ends up killing his friends and family in battle.  He is to do so without any concern for them, because it is really God who is swallowing them up with his many mouths; Arjuna is merely fulfilling his duty in life.

VII. Buddhism

I suppose that Buddhism has the most noble type of ethical system (the Stoic type) that could possibly be expected from a wise philosopher without the benefit of divine revelation.  Like Christianity, it is concerned primarily with the heart, not with external regulations.  (In theory, if not always in practice.)  As Buddha said to an inquirer:

“What do you think, Kalamas?  When non-greed, non-hatred, non-delusion arise in a person, is it for his welfare or for his harm?” — “For his welfare, venerable sir.”  “Kalamas, a person without greed, hatred, delusion not overcome by them, his mind not obsessed by them, does not destroy life, take what is not given, transgress with another’s wife, or speak falsehood; nor does he encourage others to do likewise.  Will that lead to his welfare and happiness for a long time?” — “Yes, venerable sir.”  (Discourse with Kalamas)

The structure of this idea is very similar to the Christian doctrine of the unity of ethics:

The commandments, “You shall not commit adultery,” “You shall not murder,” “You shall not steal,” “You shall not covet,” and whatever other command there may be, are summed up in this one command: “Love your neighbor as yourself.”  Love does no harm to a neighbor.  Therefore love is the fulfillment of the law.  (Romans 13:9-10),

yet in another respect it is the exact opposite since Buddha posited dispassion (negative) rather than love (positive) as the root of moral conduct.

These quotations illustrate the fact that religions do not differ very much in their account of the most basic ethical obligations to other humans—the behaviors prohibited by Buddha are basically identical to the second half of the Ten Commandments—but they do differ essentially in their account of how and why we are to be ethical, and indeed what a supremely ethical person would look like.  They differ at the heart, but more or less agree on the basic outward observances.

Having said that, it is noteworthy that most sects of Buddhism (like many Hindus) take the rule against killing much further, by requiring vegetarianism; which Christianity generally regards as an optional practice.  There is certainly an obvious ethical case to be made for vegetarianism, given that most animals raised as livestock seem to be capable of experiencing affection and suffering, and are therefore appropriate objects of empathy.  On the other hand, many animals in Nature are naturally carnivorous, and our own human teeth imply that we evolved to be an omnivorous species, so that is some evidence we are “meant” to eat meat.  It seems to me this ethical difference may come down partly to different beliefs about facts—if you happen to believe that people can reincarnate as animals, then the case for not eating meat is a lot stronger.

(Please note, that I am talking about vegetarianism in the abstract, as the issue would have been presented in the ancient world.  We are not currently discussing modern industrial “factory farms”, which were created only about 100 years ago.  These seem like an obvious moral abomination, which I assume would have horrified most ancient religious leaders in the West as well as the East.  Anyway, I am not denying that the suffering of factory farmed animals is a grave evil, despite the fact that I have only made the most pathetically minimal attempts to modify my own diet in response—mostly I only try to reduce the amount of chicken I eat.)

Buddha also rejected the caste system of Hinduism, observing wryly that:

Whoever from a noble, priestly or royal family, bringing an upper piece of fire-stick of teak or sāl or of a sweet-scented tree or of sandal or lotus, lights a fire and gets it to give out heat — this fire has flame and hue and brightness and is able to serve the purposes of a fire.

And too, whoever from a despised family, a trapper family, a bamboo-plaiter family, a cartwright family, a scavenger family, bringing an upper piece of fire-stick from a dog’s trough or a pig’s trough or a trough for dyeing or dry sticks from a castor-oil shrub, lights a fire and gets it to give out heat — this fire too has flame and hue and brightness and is able to serve the purposes of a fire.  (Discourse with Asalayana)

And yet, Buddhist texts do not contain the same denunciations of social injustice that you find in Abrahamic religious scriptures.  (Indeed they could not, given their views about avoiding attachment to worldly goals.)  Indeed, I may be giving a false impression by selecting out a few Scriptures that touch on what Westerners would recognize as ethical themes.  In general, ethics are discussed much less frequently than questions about how to organize monastic communities, and the techniques for attaining enlightenment.

This brings us to the key point.  Buddhism correctly recognizes—from observation—that there is a serious flaw or mistake in human nature which needs to be rectified by extreme measures.  People cannot be happy because, regardless of what we have already attained or experienced, we are left unsatisfied and desire more.

From the Christian point of view, its main fault is that it proposes a type of despair; it assumes that the human condition is essentially bad, and that we need to escape from our desires, cravings, attachments, and illusions, into something more closely akin to apathy.  Benevolence is a virtue, but all forms of emotional attachment (including love for family and friends) are to be rejected.

Please understand that I am here talking about real Buddhism, not the vaguely exotic Eastern ambiance which Westerners use as a foil to project their ideas of what a non-Christian wisdom tradition ought to look like.  According to David Chapman (himself a rather eccentric modernizing Tantric Buddhist), much of what passes for Buddhist ethics was simply reimported from the West.  Chapman writes:

By the Victorian era, Christianity’s beliefs had become obviously false…

Rationally-inclined liberal Victorians developed secular moral philosophy, trying to find new, rational foundations for more-or-less the same morals.  (Current secular morality, both left and right, derives primarily from Christian morality.)

Romantically-inclined Victorians hoped for analternative spiritual foundation for ethics.  Rejecting rationality, they were sure Truth lay in the mystical connection of the True Self with the Absolute Principle of the Universe.  Some great civilization, in a land less barbarous than the ancient Middle East, must have discovered a correct system of ethics, and must have based it on this mystical unity.  Surveying the world’s religions, Buddhism looked most promising. (Buddhist morality is surprisingly un-bad compared with pre-modern alternatives.)  Ah, the ancient wisdom of the exotic East!

Unfortunately, traditional Buddhist morality is plainly inferior to liberal Victorian morality.  And, Buddhism does not use mysticism to justify its morals.  But, these are mere details! Buddhism must have the correct ethics—so we need to look harder to find it.

In fact, since it is not there, the Victorians wrote the ethics they wanted onto Buddhism, creatively hallucinating the object of their desire.

But this was not just a European project.  Asian Buddhist modernizers had their own reasons for inventing “Buddhist ethics,” and they collaborated vigorously in the project.

First, educated Asians recognized that European morality was, in fact, superior.  It was at minimum a stage 4 ethical system: a rational structure of justifications that eliminates arbitrary rules and assigns sensible weights to different moral considerations.  Traditional Buddhist morality goes no further than stage 3, which aims only at communal harmony, not justice.  Although Asian intellectuals disagreed with some specifics, they could see the value of a justifiable structure; so the idea of a Buddhist version was compelling.

Second, Asian rulers constructed modern Buddhism as a defense against colonialism.  Europe’s moral justification for colonialism was “bringing the benefits of civilization to the benighted savages.”  Demonstrating that an Asian country was fully civilized successfully prevented the colonization of Thailand and Japan.  One of the greatest benefits of civilization was a just system of ethics, for which Christianity was the standard.  Christianity was an instrument of colonialism, so it was urgent for Asians to invent an alternative system of ethics that would compare favorably with Christianity on Europe’s own terms

(How Asian Buddhism Imported Western Ethics, some formatting changes)

At a later state of the same process, we get the wishy-washy American Buddhism, which is really just therapeutic moralism with a side of meditation.  It is easy enough to find some hippie teacher who says that Buddhism is just about getting rid of unhealthy attachments while living the life you always wanted, but this is completely foreign to the complete renunciation of all pleasures demanded by most of the historical forms of Buddhism.

In particular, Buddha’s “Middle Way” does not refer to a comfortable middle class existence; rather it refers to Buddha’s conclusion that severe ascetic practices intended to torment the body are just as distracting and unhelpful as pleasure-seeking.

If you are looking for a sex-positive religion, Buddhism isn’t it!  When an early disciple named Sudinna had intercourse with his wife, solely because his family wanted an heir, the Buddha rebuked him severely:

Worthless man, haven’t I taught the Dhamma in many ways for the fading of passion, the sobering of intoxication, the subduing of thirst, the destruction of attachment, the severing of the round, the ending of craving, dispassion, cessation, unbinding?  Haven’t I in many ways advocated abandoning sensual pleasures, comprehending sensual perceptions, subduing sensual thirst, destroying sensual thoughts, calming sensual fevers?

Worthless man, it would be better that your penis be stuck into the mouth of a poisonous snake than into a woman’s vagina.  It would be better that your penis be stuck into the mouth of a black viper than into a woman’s vagina.  It would be better that your penis be stuck into a pit of burning embers, blazing and glowing, than into a woman’s vagina.  Why is that? For that reason you would undergo death or death-like suffering, but you would not on that account, at the break-up of the body, after death, fall into deprivation, the bad destination, the abyss, hell.  But for this reason you would, at the break-up of the body, after death, fall into deprivation, the bad destination, the abyss, hell.  (from the Vinaya Pitaka, quoted here)

[Note that as discussed previously, my quotations are from the Theravadan Pali canon, to keep them as close as possible to the historical Buddha’s teaching.]

To a monk who questioned whether it is really necessary to give up all sensual acts (perhaps thinking he would do them without becoming attached to them) the Buddha replied:

For a person to indulge in sensual pleasures without sensual passion, without sensual perception, without sensual thinking: That isn’t possible.  (Discourse on the Water Snake Simile)

Of course this is extremely difficult to do if you aren’t a monk; so it was understood (even in the Theravada traditions) that most laypeople would still eat nice food, and have sex with their spouses, and love their kids—but that just means they are currently failing to become enlightened in this life.  Hopefully, by being decent and moral people (ideally by taking vows to abstain from killing, sexual immorality, stealing, lying, and drinking alcohol), they can improve their chances to succeed in the next reincarnation!  (Hence Buddhist texts like the Advice to Sigala, encouraging householders to adhere to a sort of conventional-bourgeoisie work ethic.)  But it was generally understood that actual enlightenment was not really compatible with fulfilling such social roles.  In this respect, Buddhist monasticism is not like ordination in other religions, where you can be e.g. a fully practicing Jew without becoming a rabbi, or a fully practicing Catholic without becoming a priest, monk, or nun.

(A lot of later schools of thought in Buddhism can be understood as reacting to the difficulty of this Theravada teaching by adding mitigating features—for example Mahayana adds to Buddhism the idea that bodhisattvas (Buddhist saints) can intercede on behalf of ordinary people to make Enlightenment easier for them; while Tantric Buddhism allows for the indulgence of sensuality and for breaking traditional Buddhist vows as an alternative path towards enlightenment.  But as far as I can tell, both of these are departures from Buddha’s original teaching.)

Seeing that the human condition is full of suffering, Buddhism looks around for the door marked Exit.  (In a system with reincarnation, you can’t just top yourself.)  The goal is to permanently escape from the cycle of births into cessation of suffering, returning (if at all) only to help other people also escape from life.

I take it that Nirvana (literally “blowing out” or “quenching”) is not necessarily regarded as quite the same thing as nonexistence, but it would at least seem to involve the ceasing of all that makes us uniquely human.  No Christian would ever use the word “extinguished” to refer to the state of heavenly glory, let alone the state of the resurrected saints reigning with Christ in the New Heaven and Earth.  By contrast, Buddha himself refused to say whether the enlightened person persisted after death, holding that any possible viewpoint on the issue would keep one entangled in suffering:

[Note: the repetitiveness of many Buddhist sutras was designed to make them easier to recite by memory.  In the following quote I retain this feature, despite its awkwardness in written text.]

Vaccha, the position that “after death a Tathagata exists” is a thicket of views, a wilderness of views, a contortion of views, a writhing of views, a fetter of views.  It is accompanied by suffering, distress, despair, & fever, and it does not lead to disenchantment, dispassion, cessation; to calm, direct knowledge, full Awakening, Unbinding.

Vaccha, the position that ”after death a Tathagata does not exist” is a thicket of views, a wilderness of views, a contortion of views, a writhing of views, a fetter of views.  It is accompanied by suffering, distress, despair, & fever, and it does not lead to disenchantment, dispassion, cessation; to calm, direct knowledge, full Awakening, Unbinding.

Vaccha, the position that ”after death a Tathagata both exists & does not exist” is a thicket of views, a wilderness of views, a contortion of views, a writhing of views, a fetter of views.  It is accompanied by suffering, distress, despair, & fever, and it does not lead to disenchantment, dispassion, cessation; to calm, direct knowledge, full Awakening, Unbinding.

Vaccha, the position that ”after death a Tathagata neither exists nor does not exist” is a thicket of views, a wilderness of views, a contortion of views, a writhing of views, a fetter of views.  It is accompanied by suffering, distress, despair, & fever, and it does not lead to disenchantment, dispassion, cessation; to calm, direct knowledge, full Awakening, Unbinding.

(To Vacchagotta on Fire)

Thus, while Buddhism encourages many noble virtues, its core goal is what some Christians might refer to as a “mortal sin”, which (unless it is repented of) is inconsistent with salvation.  By this I do not mean that it is a vice for which God arbitrarily withholds salvation.  Rather, I mean that, if any Buddhist in fact succeeded in their quest to unmake themselves, it would be a logical contradiction for them to also receive the Kingdom of God, as Christians understand it.  (The sins of the flesh, like sexual immorality, are quite trivial in comparison to the existential despair that causes a person to seek spiritual suicide.)

But I don’t want to be misunderstood as making a judgment about the final state of salvation of Buddhists, since not all of them will succeed in damning themselves.  I would not be very surprised to find out that a great many Buddhists (perhaps even Buddha himself) were sincerely trying to follow the best they knew, and will be rewarded with a fuller knowledge of the truth in the age to come.  But this will necessarily require them to stop chasing after annihilation, and instead go through the gate of life.

The Goodness of Creation, and Suffering

Christianity believes that physical existence is good; because it was created by a God who is good.  Redemption is not about escaping from physicality, instead it is about God assuming human nature in Christ and healing it from within.  It is true that we are called to die to our selfishness, and to be willing to sacrifice anything else if it conflicts with our relationship to Christ, but only so that we may become the holy people who God truly created us to be, more human than ever before!  Unlike Buddhism—and most sects of Hinduism—it does not preach the destruction of our essential individuality.  We are not to be merely absorbed into something impersonal.  The Christian message is called the gospel (good news) for a reason.  Our good news is better than their “good news”!

To be fair, I should probably note that in the past, many Christian monastics came very close to a “Buddhist” interpretation of Christianity, where the ideal monk is supposed to renounce every sort of earthly pleasure or desire, for the sake of seeking Christ alone.  Many early church fathers spoke out against “passions” in general.  And there are passages in Roman Catholic spiritual classics such as  The Imitation of Christ (by St. Thomas à Kempis) or the Ascent of Mount Carmel (by St. John of the Cross) which seem to advocate a total renunciation of everything that is not God.  It must be remembered that Christianity developed in a world which was—partly due to cultural influence from the East—far more sympathetic to asceticism than most moderns are comfortable with.

But this was only one strand of Christian tradition.  At least in theory, Christianity has always affirmed the goodness of the physical creation, including marriage and procreation.  The emotions expressed by St. David in the Psalms, crying out to be delivered from earthly troubles, are representative of a much older view: that you can put God first without having stoic indifference towards the world.

(On the other hand, modern Christians, especially Protestants, are far more likely to fall into the opposite mistake, thinking that the point of worshipping God is to live a fulfilling earthly life; while ignoring all the scriptural passages cautioning us not to set our hopes on this world, but to store up treasures in heaven.)

Zooming out more broadly, it is actually kind of surprising to me how many religions teach that suffering is, in one way or another, basically our own fault.  Pagans look to propitiate the gods whenever something goes wrong; Buddhists say it is our own desires that cause suffering; the doctrine of karma implies that we deserve whatever we get.  Even the medieval Rabbis, somehow overlooking or misreading the Book of Job, taught that all misfortune is a punishment for sin (although I gather that the Holocaust has led most modern Jews to reconsider this idea).

But Christianity has always allowed for the existence of unjust suffering.  It follows a Messiah who was not ashamed to be seen weeping, who felt the full range of human experiences, who went to the Cross in order to suffer on behalf of others.  Instead of karma, it offers grace, undeserved favor.  We get something unimaginably better than what we deserve, including the privilege of suffering with Christ, alongside the needy and oppressed.  And if we share in his sufferings, we will also share in his joy.

Next: Spiritual Experience

Followup on the Moral Argument for Theism

A commenter named Nikki argued against my post Fundamental Reality XII: The Good, and the Not.

Nikki writes:

I don’t think the post’s argument works – I’d argue that non-theistic morality can be objective and well-grounded, or at least be no worse off in those regards than theistic morality is.

So the first part of this post that really jumped out at me is the claim that if morality is objective, it must be like a mind. Frankly, to me this seems not only false, but a category error. Morality is things like systems, principles, rules, etc. – I’m not sure what the exact best word choice is. The point, though, is it is a thing that minds use, but not in and of itself a mind. You describe morality as approving or disapproving certain things, but this seems to be conflating things like “this abstract system contains claims that X is good/bad,” which could validly be said about morality, and “this abstract system itself consciously judges that X is good/bad,” which could not. It is us who use morality to consciously make those judgements.

As an analogy, personality traits are part of minds, but not minds themselves – to speak of them, by themselves, being conscious, thinking, willing, etc. would be a fundamental mistake. (Though Inside Out was a pretty fun movie). I’ll admit though, I don’t actually think that’s the best analogy. I’d argue the set of laws of logic or mathematics are an even better example of something that is a feature of minds – but is not, and could not possibly be, a mind in itself. However, you’ve said in an above comment that logic is also a description of God’s character.

(Perhaps a bit of a sidetrack here, but I don’t think this could be true either. I believe that you’ve stated elsewhere that while you believe God is metaphysically necessary, he is not logically necessary – but of course, it is logically necessary that the laws of logic or mathematics are true. I don’t think the dependence you’re arguing for could work, even if God exists in some sense. That said, as one might guess, I don’t think God is metaphysically necessary in the first place.

In fact, I have doubts that there is even a “metaphysical necessity” distinct from logical necessity at all. I find Chalmers’ arguments in his paper “Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?” fairly convincing in this regard. I do think there are some weak points, but it seems to me that at least it shows that even if there is a metaphysical modality separate from logical modality, we don’t currently have a good reason to believe in it. I know there are several relevant arguments on this blog, but well, I can’t discuss every single reason for and against the existence of God in this post, so here I’m trying to stick with things related to the original topic/what’s been mentioned in previous comments on it. I might debate the other arguments later.

As a note, Chalmers’ arguments there are important for the case he makes that consciousness is not physical, because they counter the reply of some materialists that consciousness is metaphysically the same as a physical property, even if it cannot logically be derived from other physical facts. Others have argued that this causes problems for theists who both defend the metaphysical necessity of God and the non-physicality of consciousness. I suppose this may not apply to you because you’ve said you can’t rule out that consciousness is physical in some sense, as in what Chalmers calls “Type-B Materialism,” but I did think it was interesting).

Alright, back to the main topic. Does an objective morality depend on God? The whole field of moral philosophy is certainly not something I can fully describe in one post, but I’ll start with something interesting you said in your own previous post in this series:
“Even people who say there’s no such thing as ethical truth suddenly sound quite different when somebody treats them unfairly.”

I suspect that in that statement is at least a hint at what the basis for a nontheistic objective morality might be like. If there is an objective morality, I think it has something to do with the symmetry between you and others – if you don’t treat others well, what’s to prevent them from doing things to you that you don’t want? Even if evil may sometimes have short-term rewards, people committing acts like theft or murder or terrorism ultimately make things worse for everyone, including themselves. Note that these statements do not depend on God to make them true. And I think several strands of thought, such the Golden Rule, Kantian morality, Rawls’ veil of ignorance, and even some game-theoretic analyses, among others, all point towards something like this in a sense.

Now, this may not be very compelling – I’m being vague and have not spelled out a fully detailed nontheistic system. Furthermore, many of the systems I’ve cited actually contradict each other. Nevertheless, I think that there are important shared elements that don’t depend on a belief in God to be convincing (well, Kant’s morality was theistic and the Golden Rule is a part of many religions, but I don’t think everything along the lines that I’ve mentioned is). So it seems that the claim that no secular account of morality can possibly succeed isn’t very certain. I’ll note that you linked in your previous article to the SEP’s article on Moral Naturalism, but merely said those systems were “problematic” without really discussing the individual ideas presented there, although there are many important nonreligious thinkers whose ideas on morality are much more detailed than mine. (I won’t complain about that too much though – after all, I’m not discussing every form of theistic morality in this post myself).

Some more notes: 1. Speaking of moral naturalism, even on atheism, that isn’t the only option available for an objective morality. While I agree naturalism and atheism are often found together in practice, it is still possible for an atheist to be a non-naturalist, including about morality. So even if morality cannot be justified on naturalism, you would have to show that God specifically is the only one who can ground morality, not some other non-natural element.

2. Above, Scott Church argues that on naturalism, the universe does not care about us and we are fundamentally unimportant, so it cannot ground objective morality. But the universe itself does not have to care about us/be a moral agent for morality to be objective! I’d argue that if morality, say, applies to all rational beings, it is objective, and the universe not obeying it does not matter because the universe is not a rational agent. The laws of rationality themselves are a good analogy for this – the universe, itself, does not reason, and it requires minds to use reason, yet the standards of rationality are fully objective (and not derivable from physical equations, by the way). And even on theism, it is agreed that some things, like inanimate objects, are not and cannot be moral, yet again, that does not prevent morality from being objective. Related, while pure pleasure-maximization/pain-minimization has several well-known problems, so I doubt that’s the full objective morality, I do think there are non-arbitrary reasons why those are at least important. They are necessarily important to us by their very nature – no one can truly be indifferent to them even if they claim to be. And even if the universe does not care about them, I take the anti-nihilistic view that it is precisely the fact we care that matters – it’s not as if the universe has any rule against that!

3. I’ve seen this part stated before in some other comments on the blog, but I think it’s important enough that I’ll state it again (especially since unless I’m missing it, I don’t think I’ve seen a response). Escaping the Euthyphro dilemma by saying that God is identical to goodness can only work if we have good reasons to believe that the two could possibly be identical. I don’t think we have those (unlike for the triangle case, in which we do have reasons to believe that “having three sides” and “having three angles” are the same, even though those are logically necessary), but we do, in fact, have reasons to believe the opposite. As I wrote at the beginning of my post, if God is to be viewed as even like a mind, he cannot possibly be identical to morality even if he is an (ultimately) moral agent. For instance, one of the important reasons to consider God like a mind is that he is supposed to be able to take actions, but morality cannot, by itself, take actions. (Also, I’ll admit I don’t know whether your analysis of Plato is accurate, but even if it is, it’s generally fine to take inspiration from an argument and adapt it to your own views. After all, in the original article, you said you used “Hume’s Is-Ought dictum in a manner which he would have thoroughly disapproved of!”)

As a final statement, I don’t think theism is actually better at convincing people of being moral than secularism. There’s some evidence that nonreligious people are even more moral than very religious people, but interpretations are controversial and I’m focusing more on purely philosophical points here. (I do suspect nonreligious people being more moral than the religious, if true, would be a particularly big problem for theism and theistic morality. I think the evidence at least shows that the nonreligious are generally not less moral than the religious, but you’ve agreed in another article that for some senses of “good,” religion is not strictly necessary for it, so that may not be a big problem for you). But anyway, you’ve agreed that not all rational people might be convinced by theistic arguments, and it’s been pointed out above that you can always ask questions like “Why should you follow God’s commands?” so that seems to be an issue. Of course, you might very well always be able to ask similar questions about any nontheistic system, and rational people might not find it convincing. But my point was that secular morality is at least equal to theistic morality in this regard, and while this is a bit speculative, perhaps some of the reasons above might make the former even more convincing than the latter.

My reply got pretty long, so I’m turning it into a blog post.

Dear Nikki,
Welcome to my blog, and thanks for your interesting comment. However, I am not sure that your arguments are actually directed against the specific argument I am making. Here are some replies (not in the order of your points):

I. Objective Morality is a Premise in the Moral Argument

You make a good case defending this proposition: It is possible for a non-theist to rationally come to believe in the existence of an objective ethical system, without thereby coming to believe in God. However, I also believe that this is the case!

In fact, if this were not true, there would be little rhetorical point in presenting a Moral Argument for God’s existence.  In order for an argument for God’s existence to be capable of being convincing, there have to be some people out there who agree with the premises of the argument, but have not yet realized that the conclusion follows (or at least, is made more probable) by the premises.  I obviously do not deny the existence of non-theistic moral realists, because they are the target audience for my post!  (That is why I presented an argument for ethical realism in part XI before describing how  I think Theism grounds ethics in part XII.)

Now obviously, if the a nontheistic argument for objective ethics happened to take the form of an entirely satisfactory reduction of concepts like ethical obligation into naturalistically acceptable terms—e.g. in terms of physical facts of the sort that even Sean Carroll would accept—then the Moral Arguments for Theism would fail, since there would be no additional work for God to do in terms of grounding ethics.  (There might still be a need to ground the laws of physics in some way, but no additional and separate need to ground ethical truths.)  But of course, if you could show that this were true, you would have just solved a very famous and important problem in philosophy!  So I sort of doubt you really think that we can know this to be the case.  And if we cannot know it to be the case, then there is room for discussing non-naturalistic groundings of ethics, in a probabilistic argument for Theism.

You sketch some ways in which you think an non-theistic grounding for objective ethics might work (which fall into the rough family category of what I called “Kantian approaches” to ethics in part X).  As I explicitly stated in that post, Kantianism is not as friendly to the Moral Argument, as Platonism or Aristotelianism is; although I don’t think it is utterly hopeless on that front.  (Kant himself made a sort of pragmatic argument for Theism from Morality, but he didn’t agree with metaphysical arguments of the sort I’m discussing.)   The only conclusion I explicitly drew from Kantianism was:

If Ethics can be deduced rationally as in the Kantian system, then one can at least deduce that if the Universe originates from something like a mind, that mind should also be able to appreciate ethical truths.

So the point you are making was to some extent already acknowledged in this series.  (Of course, on classical forms of Theism, where God is something like the ultimate Reason or Logos behind the Universe, this would still end up identifying God with moral goodness in some deep sense; but such classical views are necessarily bordering on Platonism anyways…)

B. Moral Naturalism and Non-Naturalism

By the way, I revisited the SEP article, and found to my dismay that it had been edited in a way that removed (without refutation) some of the critiques of Moral Naturalist positions. Here is the original version of the article.  If you look, for example, at the original article’s section 4.3, you can see what appears to me to be a pretty desperate attempt by Jackson to make naturalistic ethics work, together with (what appears to me to be) a pretty strong refutation in terms of the permutation problem.  But the main point is not the refutation of that particular idea, but that I don’t see any way forward mentioned in the article which doesn’t seem to have serious problems.

You write:

Speaking of moral naturalism, even on atheism, that isn’t the only option available for an objective morality. While I agree naturalism and atheism are often found together in practice, it is still possible for an atheist to be a non-naturalist, including about morality.

Yes, obviously.  Such views exist (which is why I mentioned them in part X of this series). In fact, individuals with such views (e.g. Moral Platonists) are closer to being the target audience of this post, then perhaps you are.

So even if morality cannot be justified on naturalism, you would have to show that God specifically is the only one who can ground morality, not some other non-natural element.

No, because as I tried to make it clear at the beginning of this series that I wasn’t trying to present a deductive, logically watertight argument for Theism.  As I said in Part I:

Even if there are no strictly deductive arguments (from indisputable premises), there are still going to be plausibility arguments pointing in various directions.  It’s irrational to put too much faith in plausibility arguments, but it’s also irrational to be completely insensible to them.

So the mere existence of logically possible positions, besides the one I argue for, doesn’t bother me.  The question is which positions are most credible.

On the plausibility front, it seems to me that once you start modifying your metaphysics in order to accommodate objective ethics, it would be irrational not to take that into account when assessing the probability of other metaphysical hypotheses.  Ethical Monotheism is, among other things, the belief that a fundamentally good being exists.  The plausibility of this statement depends in part on what we think moral goodness is.  For example, on the view that:

1. “Morality is a emergent and subjective set of feelings found in some of the higher apes, conducive to their evolutionary survival, but having no basis in any metaphysical reality”

then the idea that there exists a fundamentally good being outside the physical universe—which did not evolve—is totally absurd.  On the other hand, if:

2. “moral facts are necessary truths, which tell us something substantive about the structure of non-physical realities”,

then the idea of a fundamentally good being is, though not logically compulsory, at the very least far more plausible than on viewpoint (1) than (2).  Do you agree with that?  If so, then you are necessarily agreeing with me that the Moral Argument for Theism has significant probabilistic force.

[Notes: I am not saying these are the only possible views.  Also, hypothesis (2) does not necessarily deny biological evolution, as it is possible for evolved systems to recognize necessary truths such as mathematical theorems.]

C. The Role of Analogies

Let me remind you a bit of the context of my argument in the Fundamental Reality series.  In parts II-VI, I argued that it is plausible that there exists some fundamental reality which explains everything else, I discussed some properties this entity should have, and after reviewing various candidates I suggested that (based on the mathematical character of the laws of physics) the two most plausible metaphors for understanding this fundamental reality are:

* something like an equation
* something like a mathematician

Now it is important to remember that both of these ideas involve metaphors!  Obviously, if a Naturalist says that some equation provides the deepest truth about the Universe, that doesn’t mean this assertion is being made about a set of chalk lines on a blackboard.

Similarly, if a Theist says that God is like a mind, that doesn’t mean that this Mind is like our mind in every respect.  In particular, Classical Theism proposes a mind for whom there is no distinction between its subjective beliefs and objective reality, and also no distinction between its subjective preferences and objective morality.  This is obviously very different from evolved primate minds like our own!

You wrote:

So the first part of this post that really jumped out at me is the claim that if morality is objective, it must be like a mind. Frankly, to me this seems not only false, but a category error. Morality is things like systems, principles, rules, etc. – I’m not sure what the exact best word choice is. The point, though, is it is a thing that minds use, but not in and of itself a mind. You describe morality as approving or disapproving certain things, but this seems to be conflating things like “this abstract system contains claims that X is good/bad,” which could validly be said about morality, and “this abstract system itself consciously judges that X is good/bad,” which could not. It is us who use morality to consciously make those judgements.

and

As I wrote at the beginning of my post, if God is to be viewed as even like a mind, he cannot possibly be identical to morality even if he is an (ultimately) moral agent. For instance, one of the important reasons to consider God like a mind is that he is supposed to be able to take actions, but morality cannot, by itself, take actions.

I think perhaps you missed the amount of qualifying words I put into my reasoning.  What I wrote was (emphasis added):

But now observe that morality is at least a little bit like a mind, insofar as it approves or favors certain things, and disapproves or disfavors other things. So a fundamental morality would have something analogous to will or desire, and in that respect it would be more like a mind than like an equation, as in Theism.

The point here is not that an objective morality is exactly like a mind, but that it in certain respects more similar to a mind than (say) the equations of the Standard Model are, namely that the Standard Model does not encode any judgements that certain states of affairs are desirable or undesirable (as opposed to probable vs. improbable).

Now, obviously, when we say that God is personal, and can do things like forgive or create, we are adding more to our concept of God then is implied by the mere abstract notion of a metaphysical objective morality.  In my understanding of God, we are adding more to our idea of divinity than the idea of a Platonic form of the Good, but we are not necessarily taking anything away.

In other words, in my conception of God, God is such that he is good, not in an accidental (happenstance) way, but in an essential way, because all goodness in the universe in some sense participates in his goodness, just as all existence participates in his existence.  (The latter claim, of course, obtains for any fundamental reality which is taken to explain all other things.)

D. God Transcends the Abstract/Concrete Divide

Another commenter, St. David Madison, replied to your comment by saying (in part):

“You draw an analogy between morality and personality traits and then point out that personality traits are not conscious and do not themselves think. However, personality traits cannot exist without a personality that possesses those traits.”

This is certainly a reasonable distinction to draw in general; and we could indeed escape from the supposed category error by simply replacing the words “objective ethics” with “that which grounds objective ethics, whatever it is.”  But I think I am instead going to double down on this idea, and say that this supposed category distinction between abstractions and concrete objects breaks down when one is speaking about divinity, just as the distinction between particles and waves breaks down at the subatomic scale.  If God is the source of all else that exists, he must unify within himself the perfections of both abstractions (necessary, eternal, unchanging) and concrete realities (which are causally active, definite, individual etc).

This is indeed, already implied by certain sorts of religious language, in which God is portrayed not as some good or beautiful thing, but as the Supreme Goodness or Truth or Beauty or Life etc.  For example, in the Gospel of John, Jesus asserts his divinity by saying that he is the Way, the Truth, and the Life, which is not the sort of thing that a Positivist philosopher would consider a well-formed statement (a person cannot be an abstract quality).  But I am not convinced we can restrict our language in the way the Positivists wanted to do (I don’t think Positivism even satisfies its own criteria of meaningfulness).  What this religious language points to, is an insight into the nature of divinity as a necessary being, in which all other realities are grounded.  A proposition about a created being can be true, but only the ultimate reality can be the Truth.  In other words, denying the applicability of the concrete/abstract distinction is not something I am doing merely to avoid a logical puzzle, but is already implied by standard religious language about God.

This sort of language about God makes Classical Theism radically different from traditional forms of polytheism, in which the gods are simply regarded as more powerful individuals than us, who still can be born/killed, have conflicts with each other, make mistakes etc.  Yeah, obviously the preferences of finite beings like ourselves can’t possibly ground objective ethics, which was the whole reason why Plato went in a platonic direction instead.

Furthermore, I don’t think we can avoid postulating this sort of concrete/abstract unification, simply by rejecting Classical Theism, as Naturalism seems to me to imply exactly the same thing.  For example, if the fundamental reality is something like a mathematical equation, then we are asserting that it is both an abstract piece of mathematics—which can in principle be understood by humans—AND ALSO the governing principle controlling the universe.  In other words, when a Naturalist does physics, they are still are postulating that the fundamental reality is a λογος, i.e. a rational principle.

Of course, I’m not saying that the equations we write on the blackboard, or in our minds, are strictly identical to the actual laws of physics, which obviously exist whether or not we ever discover them.  But if we asked, “what are the fundamental laws of physics like” we can’t point to anything other than to our abstract human formulation of the equations, and then lamely add “except that it also exists as an actual concrete reality, in a way which transcends our human abstractions”.

In the same way, objective morality exists even apart from human processes to reason about what is or is not moral—So I’m not saying, that this latter, social process of reasoning is equal to God.  Rather it is goodness as it actually exists (which our human reasoning is a mere approximation of) that is rooted in God’s nature, as the ultimate Goodness that other things participate in.

E. Implications for Euthyphro

Escaping the Euthyphro dilemma by saying that God is identical to goodness can only work if we have good reasons to believe that the two could possibly be identical.

This is a strange way to discuss this subject, given that the (modern) Euthyphro dilemma is typically phrased, not in the form of a deductive argument, but in the form of a challenge to Theists to explain their beliefs more clearly.  It’s phrased in the form: “Do you believe A, or B?” (both of which have unpalatable consequences).  But if A and B are not, in fact, exhaustive possibilities, because some other option C is conceivable—and if in fact C was the belief of most ethical monotheists historically, as well as myself—then merely pointing this out is sufficient to defuse the dilemma.

That being said, there is a good reason to think that, if God exists at all, he can ground morality.  Recall that God is, by definition, the explanation for all entities other than himself.  (That’s the whole point of Mono-theism, to have only one ultimate entity.)  So if God exists at all, he either grounds or creates all other realities.  Now if there is objective ethics, then ethics counts as one of these realities.  Since it doesn’t make sense to create ethics (since at least some ethical principles are non-arbitrary, necessary truths) then he must ground it.  (The same argument would hold for logic or mathematics.)

Now, to be clear, this is an argument that God grounds ethics.  It is not an argument which explains how God grounds ethics.  To understand how God grounds ethics we would have to first have direct perception of the divine essence, which we don’t possess.  Instead, we only know the things which proceed from the divine essence, and we have to learn about what God is like, as best we can, from that.

If you like, you can take “a concrete reality which grounds ethics” as a defining property of God, and then ask questions like i) what other properties would such a being need to have, and ii) is there good reason to believe that such a being exists?

If you will allow me to make a more meta-level argument.  It seems to me that giving the Euthyphro dilemma as an objection to Classical Theism is historically obtuse.  It’s like proposing the Equivalence Principle as an objection to General Relativity, when the Equivalence Principle was in fact the motivating thought experiment that led to GR in the first place.  In the same way, the question of what the gods (or really God) has to be like in order to justify treating piety as a virtue, was the underlying question motivating the Euthyphro dilemma.  But somehow atheists never say to themselves, “Geez, the fact that this famous philosophical argument was introduced in a Platonic dialogue, by a theist whose ideas laid the groundwork for the most mainstream philosophical formulation of Monotheism, maybe is a reason to think I’ve missed something and the argument isn’t actually a knock-down in favor of Atheism.”

(To be sure, arguments aren’t “owned” by philosophers and there is no reason in principle why an argument by a philosopher P can’t sometimes be turned against P’s own worldview.  So sure, maybe there is some very subtle reason why GR is still inconsistent with the best formulation of the Equivalence Principle.  But if somebody sends me and email about why they think GR is inconsistent with the EP, and it shows no awareness of why some people have historically thought that GR satisfies the EP, then it’s unlikely that their “gotcha” question about how the EP refutes GR has much merit.  Ditto for Classical Theism and Euthyprho.)

F. Metaphysical vs Logical Necessity

Now to be fair, you did explain why you don’t believe in scenario C.  In addition to your “category error” assertion, you add this:

In fact, I have doubts that there is even a “metaphysical necessity” distinct from logical necessity at all. I find Chalmers’ arguments in his paper “Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?” fairly convincing in this regard.

So on your recommendation, I read through this Chalmers article and I found it pretty unconvincing.  Why should reality be fundamentally scrutable to us?  Or said another way, why can’t there be propositions P which are necessary, but only a mind fundamentally more powerful than the human mind could see why they are necessary?  It seems hubristic to think that human reasoning has access to every possible necessary truth.

Ironically, the reason I don’t believe in Chalmers’ thesis here, is actually very similar to the reasons why I side with Chalmers over Dennett when it comes to Consciousness.  While Dennett makes an interesting philosophical case for the reducibility of conscious experience to neurological facts, ultimately I concluded that Dennettism can only work if Dennettism is true by logical necessity.  In other words, that once you’ve specified all the physical facts then Dennett’s views on consciousness follow automatically.  And it seems to me that this is simply not the case.

Similarly, Chalmers’ idea that if we specify all the physical nonmodal facts, then a single set of views about modal necessity must logically follow (to idealized human reasoners) seems plainly false to me.

(Assuming it even makes sense to distinguish between “modal” and “nonmodal” facts in this way.  This is an important distinction between analytic philosophy and traditional medieval philosophy.  Analytic philosophy sees modality as primarily a feature of certain propositions, and only secondarily as a property of things.  While Aristotelian/scholastic philosophy sees modality as primarily as a property of things, while only secondarily as an attribute of propositions.  A scholastic might argue that the analytic habit of immediately jump to always reasoning about maximal “possible worlds” obscures the role that modal concepts play in causal reasoning, which involves specific concrete entities.)

Anyway, since you hold to something like Chalmers’ view, here’s a dilemma for you: Is the proposition expressing this view itself a logically necessary truth?

(P) There are no metaphysically necessary truths, other than logically necessary truths.

If you say that P is logically necessary, then there must be a proof that it is true which follows deductively from the definitions of the words.  What is that proof?  As far as I can tell, none exists.  Certainly Chalmers doesn’t give a logically conclusive proof in that article, he just gives some reasons why he considers belief in P to be plausible, which is not the same thing.

On the other hand, if is not logically necessary, then either it is contingent (which is inconsistent with the usual S5 rules for modal logic) or else it is an example of a metaphysically necessary (but not logically necessary) truth, in which case it refutes itself.

One could make a similar, superficially less “meta” argument for the same conclusion by considering the proposition:

(N) A necessary being exists.

A standard analytic argument from S5 modal logic implies that either: i) N is necessarily true, or ii) N is necessarily false.  So which of these is logically necessary?  I say neither, but if you disagree then what do you think the proof of N or its negation would look like?

G. Can God be the grounds of Logic?

I believe that you’ve stated elsewhere that while you believe God is metaphysically necessary, he is not logically necessary – but of course, it is logically necessary that the laws of logic or mathematics are true. I don’t think the dependence you’re arguing for could work, even if God exists in some sense.

This is a little compact, but I’m guessing your argument is something like the following:

1. A contingent truth cannot ground a necessary truth.*
2. God’s existence is logically contingent.
3. But logic itself is logically necessary,
4. Therefore, God cannot ground logic.

[*I suppose there is some sense in which, if a Cat walks onto a Mat, this arguably grounds the necessary proposition: “Either the Cat is on the Mat or the Cat is Not on the Mat” by virtue of being a truthmaker for one of its disjunctives.  But I won’t pursue this possible counterexample further, since I don’t think it is relevant to the sense in which God grounds logic.]

But this argument is fallacious, because when I say that God grounds logic, I am making a metaphysical statement rather than a logical one.  From the perspective of metaphysics, both logic and God are (in my view) metaphysically necessary, and it is not at all impossible for a necessary statement to ground another necessary statement.  In other words, we have to distinguish between:

1a: A logically contingent truth cannot logically ground a logically necessary truth.

which is true, and:

1b: A logically contingent truth cannot metaphysically ground a logically necessary truth.

which does not in any way follow from 1a, and I would say it is false.

H. What Metaphysical Necessity Means

Actually, there is a better way to put this which makes the concept of “metaphysical necessity” somewhat less mysterious.  The right way to talk about this is to make Aristotle’s distinction between that which is necessary to us (axioms of human thought) and that which is necessary in itself (propositions which could not have been otherwise).

When we say that a proposition is metaphysically necessary, we merely mean it falls into the latter category.  The adjective is misleading since, unlike the cases of “logical necessity” or “nomic necessity” (which mean necessary given certain specific principles), the phrase “metaphysically necessary” simply means whatever is necessary simpliciter, i.e. that which (without adding any qualifications) could not have been otherwise (whether or not the reason for its necessity is known to human beings.)

On the other hand, logical necessity is an example of what is necessary to human beings, i.e. an axiom of human reasoning, or a particular technique L used to prove the impossibility of certain propositions.

So, the proposition P from earlier boils down to:

(Equivalent to P): If a proposition cannot be proven to be impossible by technique L, then it really is possible.

while I see no reason to believe that technique L is sufficient to uncover all possible cases of necessity.  Especially since technique L does not even seem to be powerful enough to refute the statement that no concrete entity whatsoever exists.

This relates of course to cosmological considerations as well.  As is well-known, if P is true, then the basic principles of existence are just contingent “brute facts” which means they are not true for any reason at all.  So there is an obvious reason to postulate a necessary concrete entity, which is that it serves as a starting point to explain why anything else exists at all.

This reason to want a necessary being, does not seem to depend on us being able to know why the being is necessary.  This is the Thomistic viewpoint on the Cosmological Argument, and it seems to me to be the only possible middle ground between Anslemian positions (there is a valid Ontological Argument for a necessary being from pure logic) and explanatory nihilism (there is no good reason why the universe exists, it just does).

(Now you could just double down and say, I have no idea what you mean by the phrase: “could not be otherwise”, please explain it to me; and then refuse to accept any answer I give other than one which reduces it to logical implication.  But the same technique could be done to motivate skepticism towards practically any other concept, including the other concepts in this discussion like “mind” or “good” or “abstract” or “grounds”.   (It is not even clear that logical necessity can be fully explained without an infinite regress, as  St. Lewis Carroll pointed out in his Achilles and the Tortoise dialogue.)  I don’t claim to have a definition of metaphysical necessity that would satisfy Socrates, but if we make that the standard, there aren’t going to be very many philosophical terms left!)

I. An Irrelevant Topic

As a final statement, I don’t think theism is actually better at convincing people of being moral than secularism.

This is just so totally irrelevant to the metaphysical questions behind the Moral Argument for Theism, that perhaps I should simply refuse to respond to this entirely.  It’s really just a complete change of topic.

God could be the metaphysical grounds for morality, even if every single human being on Earth were an atheist, or even if every single theist were morally worse than every single atheist.  These motivational questions really have nothing whatsoever to do with the question about what metaphysical theses are made more plausible, if we subscribe to moral realism.  I wrote my blog post Is it Possible to be Good without God? precisely because I was annoyed by how regularly people seem to conflate these totally unrelated questions.

(I’m not saying that the degree of goodness of religious people can’t potentially be used as an evidential argument for or against the existence of God.  What I am saying is that it is a mistake to allow such sociological questions to contaminate our interpretation of the thesis that God grounds ethics.)

That being said, I”ll take the bait and say I do think there is some pretty serious question begging required for a non-circular argument that atheism is fully compatible with moral behavior.  For one thing, if a being such as is described by Classical Theism in fact exists (a perfectly wise and holy and good being, who created us and is the source of all our goodness), then we have the moral obligation to worship and obey that being, and to reflect God’s holiness through a life of prayer and repentance, dedicating our earthly activities to the glory of God.  It is difficult to see how an atheist can satisfy that obligation, because for the atheist these activities are just distractions from a different, more secular understanding of what the good life consists of.

(To be sure, if the atheist has some intellectually honest reasons why they think God does not exist, then this may well be a mitigating circumstance that reduces—or even eliminates entirely—their culpability for this omission.  But if we are discussing the question of which beliefs make it easier to be moral, then usually mitigating circumstances are considered mitigating precisely because they make it harder to be moral.  Furthermore, a lack of culpability does not remove all of the causal consequences of trying to place our ultimate happiness in things other than God—what Christians call idolatry.)

I do suspect nonreligious people being more moral than the religious, if true, would be a particularly big problem for theism and theistic morality.

From the standpoint of Christian doctrine, it is not actually clear why this should be.  Merely having knowledge of God’s existence does not necessarily translate into obedience, and in some cases knowledge can make people morally worse since they ought to behave better but don’t.  As Jesus’ brother St. James said:

You believe that there is one God. You do well. Even the demons believe—and tremble!  (James 2:19)

and as Jesus himself said:

“Not everyone who says to me, ‘Lord, Lord!’ will enter the kingdom of heaven, but only the one who does the will of my Father in heaven.  On that day many will say to me, ‘Lord, Lord, didn’t we prophesy in Your name, drive out demons in Your name, and do many miracles in your name?’  Then I will announce to them, ‘I never knew you! Depart from me, you lawbreakers!’ ”  (Matthew 7:21-23)

The Pharisees were among the most “religious” people in Jesus’ day, and many of their leaders handed Jesus over to Pilate to be crucified.  See also St. Paul’s observations of religious people in Romans 2.

According to Christianity, what people need to be transformed morally, is not so much knowledge as grace.  Knowledge is good if it helps us acknowledge our need for grace, but not so much if it makes us look down on other people.

I think the evidence at least shows that the nonreligious are generally not less moral than the religious…

I’m not sure what evidence you are referring to here, or how you could actually know this to be the case.  If your claim is just that religious people can be morally weak and inadequate, well I already knew that from my own life, without looking at anybody else’s.

If it refers to survey data, you have the problem that what many polls of religious affiliation captures a lot of individuals who only identify as religious in a nominal sense.  Polling nominally religious people, and asking about their rates of divorce, adultery etc. is sort of like asking whether watching the Olympics on TV makes people more physically fit!  It’s the wrong question to study.

If you are referring to personal experience, I can only say that while I know good and bad seeming people (emphasis on “seeming”, it’s not my place to judge them) who are both religious and non-religious, the most loving and self-sacrificial people I know seem to be religious.  And religion also often plays a significant role when very bad seeming people repent and turn their lives around.  Furthermore I have very often heard people refer explicitly to God when they explain why they did something morally difficult, while I cannot ever recall in my personal experience ever hearing somebody say that they did something morally difficult because atheism is true.  (I mean, I could imagine such a motivation: e.g. God isn’t going to save this person, so I have to.  But I don’t think I’ve ever heard anyone explicitly say this “in the wild” so to speak.)

By comparison, studying secular ethics seems to itself have little observable consequences in terms of making people better.  This could be taken as a critique of secular ethics, but it might be better taken as a critique specifically of what modern analytic philosophers mean by ethics as a discipline (as opposed to ancient philosophies, which were typically viewed as a way of life that had to be put into practice, in order to be understood).  I mean, why should studying little numbered arguments about whether ethics is objective, or arguing about what to do in some controversial edge case involving trolleys, actually help one to build habits of life that make one treat your fellow human beings better, and a community which helps support you in doing so?  Religion is one of the few ways of getting such support in the modern era.  (There are some others, but they are getting sparser in an increasingly disconnected age.)  While this isn’t necessarily an argument for God’s existence, it does make your thesis that serious religious practice is totally orthogonal to ethical accomplishment seem pretty implausible.

I called this an “irrelevant topic” because it isn’t terribly relevant to the validity of the Moral Argument.  But of course, from the perspective of what ultimately matters, it is this section that is most important, and the rest which are of lesser relevance.  If Christianity is true, then what will matter the most in the end is not whether you are persuaded by this or that specific argument for Theism, but more whether your heart is open or closed to God at a deeper level than that.  Jesus has promised that those who truly seek God will find him.

If you take it as a goal to be as moral of a person as you can possibly be, then that is at least a start along that road—even if the final destination is going to be, in some ways, quite different than what you expected when starting out on that journey.  But somewhere along the way comes the recognition that you can’t actually be good, and need help to do better, and that is where concepts like grace and salvation start to make more sense…

Blessings,
Aron