Did the Universe Begin? II: Singularity Theorems

Our best theory of gravity is classical General Relativity.  "Classical" is physics-speak for not taking into account quantum mechanics.  So we know that classical GR has to break down during the Planck era, if not later.

Classical Big Bang cosmology predicts that there is an initial singularity at the first moment of time.  In fact, there are some theorems to that effect.  These are the Penrose and Hawking singularity theorems, which will be the subject of this post.

In GR, attractive gravity is caused by the energy or pressure of matter.  Tension (which is negative pressure) produces antigravity (repulsion rather than attraction).

Very crudely speaking, the singularity theorems say that if you assume that matter obeys some energy condition restricting the amount of energy and/or pressure, then you can deduce that under certain conditions there has to be a place where your spacetime has an edge and cannot be extended any further.  This we call a singularity.  Typically, some component of the curvature becomes infinite at the singularity.

There are several different singularity theorems, pioneered by Hawking and Penrose.  One of them says that singularity theorem says that all expanding cosmologies like our own have to begin with a singularity.  Roughly speaking, it says that if there is only gravity and no antigravity, then tracing the universe backwards in time there is no way to stop it from crunching down to zero size.   Hence there must exist an initial singularity (at least somewhere, perhaps everywhere).

However, this Hawking-Penrose theorem uses something called strong energy condition, which says that the repulsive antigravity from tension is not allowed to be greater than the gravity from energy.  It turns out that the strong energy condition can be violated by lots of different types of otherwise reasonable physics theories.  In particular, it was violated during inflation, and it is violated by the cosmological constant today.  So no one really takes this theorem very seriously anymore.

There is another singularity theorem (proven originally by Penrose) which is better, because it only uses the null energy condition, which says that nearby lightrays are always focused by gravity.  This turns out to be a much weaker condition, which is satisfied by most respectable classical matter theories (although it is violated quantum mechanically).  However the Penrose singularity theorem only says that there has to be a singularity if space at one time is infinite.

If space at one time is finite in size (for example, if it is shaped like a 3-sphere) then there might be a "bounce" where the universe contracts to a small size and then starts expanding again.  The de Sitter cosmology is an example of this, although there are also examples of finite cosmologies that begin with singularities.  We don't really know whether space is finite or infinite, since inflation stretched it out so much that even if it were a giant sphere, the radius is so large that it seems flat today.

A few years ago I wrote an article in which I argued that the conclusions of the Penrose singularity theorem should continue to hold in quantum gravitational situations.  Even though the null energy condition can be violated by quantum fields, it turns out that you can get the same conclusions if you instead assume something called the "Generalized Second Law" (GSL), which says that the Second Law of thermodynamics applies to black holes and similar types of horizons.

(I described the application of this result to time travel in a  recent Scientific American blog post.  Technically, you have to use the time-reverse of the GSL, which I mentioned in the comments here, but if the GSL is true, its time-reverse should also be.  This may seem weird because normally we think of the Second Law as something which only works in one time direction, but I promise you that one can make sense of it.)

The advantage of using the GSL is that it makes it more plausible that the conclusions of the Penrose singularity theorem apply even in fully quantum-gravitational situations, e.g. during the Planck era.  In my article, I showed that the results apply "semiclassically", meaning when the quantum corrections to spacetime are small but still taken into account.   I then argued (and not everyone would find this part of my article persuasive) that under certain assumptions one might expect the result to hold even in full quantum gravity, when these quantum fluctuations are large.  But remember, all statements about quantum gravity are speculative.

I am a little reluctant to even bring up my own work, since personally I think it is more persuasive that clearly established (but incomplete) physics predicts a beginning, than that speculative new physics says this.  I think of it more as laying the groundwork for a possible future understanding, then a totally conclusive result.  Still, I think that the Penrose theorem is connected to enough other deep principles of physics that something like it will probably be true and important in the final theory of physics.  Other physicists think that singularities are so disturbing that any "complete" theory of physics should eliminate them.

Funny story.  One time I was arguing with an atheist grad student about God and the question of the universe's beginning came up.  I mentioned my own work (and I am quite sure that I put in some caveats about the potential limitations, since I always do this).  A few weeks later I found him posting on some atheist website cocky statements along the lines of "Theists believe that the universe had a beginning because of the GSL, but this is silly for the following reasons...".  And this at a time when practically no one else had even heard of my work!  So just in case it isn't clear: many smart people believed in God before I came along, and the case for Theism is hardly dependent on my tiny contributions to physics!

In conclusion, to the extent that the singularity theorems are relevant, they tend to point to a Beginning, although it might be possible to evade this conclusion either by (a) having space be finite, or else (b) through quantum gravity effects, if my speculative arguments for a quantum singularity theorem are wrong.

Posted in Physics, Reviews | 20 Comments

Did the Universe Begin? I: Big Bang Cosmology

The next topic from the Carroll-Craig debate which I wish to discuss is what Science has to say about whether or not there was a beginning.  Was there a first moment of time, before which the universe did not exist?  What does Modern Cosmology have to say about this question?

I think that Modern Cosmology gives a fairly clear answer: probably, but not almost certainly.  But, rather than try to argue only for one particular conclusion, I will instead try to provide the evidence in both directions, on which my opinions are based.

The reason why I say probably is that, given our current best theories of the universe, there are some decent reasons to think that the universe had some type of beginning at the so-called "Big Bang".  However, once you get to an early enough moment of time, we don't really understand anything anymore, so really anything might have happened.  That is why the term "Big Bang Model" refers to the (very well-confirmed) theory of the expansion of the universe after the Big Bang, rather than to the Big Bang singularity itself.

Given our current best understanding of particle physics, we think we can describe fairly well the history of the universe starting at around 10^{-6} seconds after the Big Bang.  We're certainly on-base in the period from about 10 seconds to 20 minutes, since this is when Big Bang nucleosythesis occurred (creating the first atomic nuclei), and we can check that the current abundances of H, He, and Li atoms are in agreement with what our theory of nucleosynthesis predicts.

Inflation (which would have happened at a much earlier time) is somewhat less certain, but it makes pretty good predictions so almost everyone believes in it these days.  The recent BICEP2 results indicate that the energy scale of inflation was just a couple orders of magnitude below the Planck scale seem to have been contaminated by too much dust to be reliable, although most models of inflation still place it at a ridiculously high energy scale.  This is a much higher energy scale than anything else we can measure in physics, although it is comparable to the GUT scale (where most particle physicists, but not I, believe that the forces probably unify into one force).  During the inflation era, the universe grew in an extremely rapid way, stretching out and diluting any information about what the universe was like before inflation.

The Planck era was approximately the first 10^{-43} "seconds after" the "Big Bang".  This is the era where strong quantum gravity effects become important.  In other words, the quantum uncertainty in concepts of "space" and "time" become so large that our classical concepts break down.  That's why I put scare-quotes around things in this paragraph—we no longer know what on earth (or in the heavens) we are talking about.  This is the point when everything is pretty much up for grabs.

So, even if we can say there appears to have been a beginning based on an extrapolation of the Big Bang Model to early times, there are also reasons why we can't be completely sure, so long as we don't completely understand quantum spacetime (or the initial conditions for inflation).  Certainly the universe as we know it began, but we cannot completely eliminate the possibility of a pre-Big-Bang stage.

Nevertheless, in the next few posts I will discuss the limited evidence which we do have, especially those points which were mentioned in the debate.  In particular I will cover singularity theorems, the BGV theorem, the 2nd Law of Thermodynamics, the quantum eternity theorem.  Oh, and the Hartle-Hawking no-boundary proposal.  That too.

[Updated description of BICEP2 results]

Posted in Physics, Reviews | 9 Comments

Time Machines and Event Horizons

I've written a pop-article about Time Machines and Event Horizons, which has appeared on the Scientific American blog Critical Opalescence.  George Musser, my host, is an editor at Scientific American, and kindly gave me this opportunity to talk about some of my ideas in my article, The Generalized Second Law implies a Quantum Singularity Theorem.

If you have any questions about the physics in the article, please feel free to leave comments on this post here.  (Questions left on the Scientific American website will be answered in the comments to this post, if anywhere.)

Posted in Links, Physics | 15 Comments

Gaps at the Dinner Table

Speaking of the God of the Gaps™, I was myself accused of believing it just the other day.  I was at dinner with Raphael Bousso, Eva Silverstein, Ori Ganor, and some other physicists, and they were discussing fine-tuning and questions involving the precise way in the Multiverse is supposed to explain it.

Well, eventually I got tired of remaining in the closet, and I asserted: "Given that I believe in God for other reasons, I think it's most likely that God chose the Laws of Nature to be conducive to life".  Well, this got everyone pretty worked up (in a friendly way) and Raphael tried to apply that ominous phrase: the God of the Gaps™.

Well, it isn't.  In my comment, it was completely manifest that I did not believe in a God whose sole purpose was to fill the fine-tuning "gap".  I believe in God primarily for other (good, evidence-driven) reasons.   Once you already believe in God, it is seems totally natural (supernatural?) that he should pick laws of Nature which support life.  Theism isn't an ad hoc hypothesis invented solely to fix the problem of fine-tuning.   Whereas the Multiverse is, so I guess I should have made a counter-accusation regarding the Multiverse-of-the-Gaps!

Or perhaps it should be called Naturalism-of-the-Gaps, that touching faith that Naturalism can explain away the apparent meaning and purpose of the Universe (something which is perfectly obvious to many ordinary people, who haven't been trained out of this intuition by a Naturalist worldview masquerading as "Science").

Of course, for all I know God did create gazillions of other universes besides ours, and this is the explanation for the fine-tuning of our universe.  But I'm certainly not required to believe that the laws of physics are ultimately due to blind processes which don't care about us.  Without that premise, a fine-tuned universe just doesn't seem like as big of a problem.  Hence there is no need to fill the gap with elaborate new physics.

(But don't worry, if I think of a wonderful physical explanation with experimental consequences, I'll still be perfectly happy to publish it and collect my Nobel prize... just because I am open to supernatural explanations, does not mean my mind is closed to natural ones.)

The other thing the dinner conversation made clear is that some physicists get seriously nervous about the fact that God can't be described by equations, and is therefore (in their eyes) ill-defined.  I'll have something to say about this later, in response to Sean Carroll's debate comments.  For now I'll just say that it seemed rather insular to me—there are only a small number of people who are capable of using equations to describe the world, yet everybody else manages somehow.  As they say, if all you have is a hammer, everything starts to look like a nail.  It is our job as physicists to describe the world as completely as we can using equations, but it does not follow that there are no other ways of gaining knowledge about the world.

Perhaps I should have asked whether any of them had ever had a mystical experience.

On the other hand, somebody else (I think it was Ori) pointed out that Monotheism is the ultimate example of a unification hypothesis—explaining diverse things in Nature based on the operation of a single principle.  The elegance of Monotheism seemed to have some appeal to him.

It's a funny thing.   These days, the Multiverse is taken seriously by theoretical physicists, yet God isn't.  (Although the more old-fashioned types attack both concepts as equally unscientific.)  And yet, there is at least some observational evidence for the existence of God (in the way of claimed miracles and visions and so on).  On the other hand, there is no observational evidence for the existence of the Multiverse.

Apart from fine-tuning itself, the best that can be said about the Multiverse is that certain types of speculative new physics (such as string theory) might also predict multiple universes with different laws of physics (depending on certain other factors).  But it's not like there's any actual experimental evidence for other universes, or for any specific theory which predicts them.  It's almost as if people care more about whether an idea has the flavor of Science (or science-fiction) than if there is any actual evidence for it.  The most important aspect of Science is always observational support!

(It's important for people like me who study quantum gravity to remind ourselves of this point from time to time.  It's always especially ironic when people in my field dismiss concepts for lack of observational evidence, since there isn't much in the way of quantum gravity experiments.  10^{-35} meters is just way too tiny to see!)

Posted in Theological Method | 29 Comments

God of the Gaps

Then there is the phrase "The God of the Gaps"™.  In any long discussion on "Science and Religion", this phrase must eventually be deployed by one or the other party, either by the skeptic (with a triumphal tone as of one finally deploying his most powerful weapon) or else by the articulate and educated defender of a modern faith, showing his sophisticated ability to rise above primitive superstitions: "But that's the God of the Gaps™!" they say in response to a proposed act of the Deity, "We can't possibly believe in that!"

In the debate between Carroll and St. Craig, both participants had their obligatory five seconds of hate towards this idea.  Craig:

This is not to make some sort of naïve claim that contemporary cosmology proves the existence of God. There is no God-of-the-gaps reasoning here. Rather I’m saying that contemporary cosmology provides significant evidence in support of premises in philosophical arguments for conclusions having theological significance.

Carroll:

It is certainly a true issue that we don’t know why the early universe had a low entropy and entropy has ever been increasing. That’s a good challenge for cosmology. To imagine the cosmologist cannot answer that question without somehow invoking God is a classic god-of-the-gaps move. I know that Dr. Craig says that is not what he’s doing but then he does it.

It is difficult to fight against a slogan delivered so frequently and with such conviction, especially when for some perverse reason educated and intelligent people on both sides insist on attacking the same strawman.  But it is worth pointing out, that if the detractors of an idea could be defeat it simply by labeling it with a silly-sounding alliterative phrase, we wouldn't be able to believe in the “Big Bang” theory either.

As Carroll quotes the philosopher David Lewis as saying:

I do not know how to refute an incredulous stare.

These references to the God of the Gaps™ often function as a similar incredulous stare, not any kind of actual argument.  (Mind you, the incredulous stares Lewis got were because of his belief in modal realism, i.e. every single logically possible world is equally real.  Perhaps those incredulous stares just meant that ideas which flagrantly violate common sense should be assigned a tiny prior probability?)

Anyway, if the God of the Gaps™ is a fallacy, it's a very strange one.  It is not any one of the standard textbook logical fallacies, and it is only ever brought up in theological contexts.   On the surface, it sounds awfully like claiming that inference to the best explanation is a fallacy.  Let me pull out some home truths here, and make the following bold statement:

Any time we ever believe in anything rationally, we do so because there is some kind of "gap" in our understanding of how the universe works, which is filled by postulating the existence of that thing.

In other words, all valid arguments that something exists are based on Of-the-Gaps type reasoning.  This is just how reasoning (scientific or otherwise) works.

This is not to say, of course, that all gaps are best filled by postulating specific divine intervention.  Of course not.  Admittedly, Monotheists do believe the following:

All phenomena which occur in Nature do so because God sustains the world in being, thus (at least indirectly) causing everything.

But this hardly implies that all phenomena make equally good evidence for God's existence.

To the best of my knowledge, no Christian apologist has ever made the following argument: 1) Science cannot explain high temperature superconductivity [a puzzling phenomenon in condensed matter physics], 2) therefore an intelligent designer must have caused it, 3) therefore God exists.  The reason is that it is obvious in this case that there should exist in principle an ordinary scientific explanation for this phenomenon.  Superconductors involve complicated, messy physics and there is no particularly good reason to be surprised that we don't understand them fully yet.

(When an Intelligent Design theorist such as St. Behe argues that: 1) there exist phenomena in Nature such as bacterial flagellum which could not plausibly have evolved naturally because they have irreducible complexity, 2) therefore they must have been created by an intelligent designer, he is not committing any type of logical fallacy, let alone God of the Gaps™.  The problem with his argument is that biologists have shown that his premise (1) is false, but it's a perfectly good type of argument, if its premises were really true.)

In other cases, such as the seeming low-entropy beginning of the Universe, or the fine-tuning of the constants of Nature to permit life, or why certain forms of life have conscious experiences, or why murder is wrong, or for that matter why there is a material Universe at all, it is at the very least not completely obvious that there will exist a natural explanation of the usual scientific type.  There is a reason that theistic philosophers (not being totally stupid) latch onto these types of "big" or "fundamental" questions rather than questions about superconductivity.

It's actually the exact same reason why many atheistic philosophers will deny that these are meaningful questions to which one has a right to expect an answer.  (Carroll does this in the debate, regarding the question of why the Universe came into existence.  Assuming for the sake of argument that it did, he argues that this is not the sort of thing one needs an explanation for.)  One could imagine a hypothetical physics which is in one sense a complete system of equations, and yet fails to answer some or all of these questions.  In that case the Naturalist will (because of his conviction that Science is the only ultimate path to truth) deny that the questions are meaningful, while any person who feels unable to swallow this will have for themselves an argument for the existence of God.

Other, more optimistic Naturalists may hold to the belief that "Science will one day explain that".  Since data about what Science will do in the future is sadly unobtainable, this type typically appeals to one of those historical just-so stories I mentioned in my previous post.  To rephrase it once more (note that I do not accuse Carroll of making the following argument in all particulars; as I said I am using the debate as a springboard to talk about larger issues):

"Our superstitious ancestors thought that nearly all natural phenomena—the rising of the sun, the growth of the crops, etc. were attributable to numerous supernatural beings. Science has discredited nearly all of these ideas, but of course Science is not yet complete. The modern day defenders of religious traditions, therefore, although their original motivation for belief is gone, cling to these holes in our understanding as keeping a place for the divine activity. If only evolution or Big Bang cosmology or something leaves a place for God's activity, these religious types argue, then we have some role for Religion. But as Science continues to discover more and more, the gaps get smaller and smaller, and eventually these claims will disappear as well. To cling to this sort of Religion is worthless."

This type of reasoning (which is quite common, although I phrase it in my own words) tends to glide imperceptibly from popular pagan polytheists (who thought there was a divinity for every major or minor phenomenon) to the Hebrew monotheists (who resisted this trend as superstitious and wrong).

It was perfectly obvious to any pagan philosopher or early Christian that Nature proceeds according to orderly laws, and natural processes. Modern Science can take credit for unifying the description of many phenomena into common mathematical frameworks, but to act as though the existence of order in Nature is a modern discovery is simply absurd. It is true that this fact is in considerable tension with certain forms of Animism or Nature Polytheism. But certainly almost any astute monotheist living in the last two thousand years, is going to admit that God causes most things to happen, not through whim but through the operation of certain natural processes, which can be understood to some extent by human reason.

In this sense, Naturalism and Monotheism have a shared (and highly successful) common heritage.  Both of them imply that the material world is not to be understood as divine, and that therefore it is fair game for impersonal study and observation.  To act as though the fruits of this shared common presupposition is some type of falsification of one of these two positions is completely unfair.

So then, everyone should stop using this phrase, God of the Gaps™.  In addition to being confusing and condescending, and not really a logical fallacy, it almost always indicates the presence of a strawman opponent.  Very few religious people believe that God exists only to fill gaps in our understanding of Science.  Let's argue against the real positions on the table.

Posted in Reviews, Theological Method | 15 Comments