Author Archives: Aron Wall

About Aron Wall

I am a physics professor at Syracuse University, as of 2026. Before that, I read Great Books at St. John's College (Santa Fe), got my physics Ph.D. from U Maryland, and did my postdocs at UC Santa Barbara, the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, and Stanford. My first faculty position was at the University of Cambridge. The views expressed on this blog are my own, and should not be attributed to any of these fine institutions.

Mathematical Physics Maxims

Most of this will be completely incomprehensible if you aren’t mathematically trained.  I’m putting it out there anyway.


Thou shalt not confuse a vector space with its dual.  Thou shalt not add unnecessary structure without good cause.  Be careful not to identify objects related by noncanonical isomorphisms.  When composing isomorphisms, bear in mind the possibility of a “twist” when thou comest back to the same object again.

Do not favor subspaces over quotient spaces, nor quotient spaces over subspaces, but give equal justice to all methods of reduction.

Never be unjust to a mathematical entity, lest it rise up against you.  When something is taken away from a system, it is often needful to add something as well, to compensate it and to preserve its integrity.

Study a nonlinear thing by passing to a bigger linear algebra.


0 is a natural number.  Always include the identity, or the empty object, when you allow more than one of a thing.  Almost everything there can be two of, there can also be zero of.  But, if thou allowst only 1 of a thing, do not consider 0 to be a special case!  This rule of “0” holds in additive contexts; in multiplicative contexts “1” is nothing.

Know the properties of nothing.  Not by memorization, but in your soul.


“I came to wonder how much understanding anything (a term, a system, etc.) meant merely being used to it.  (Similarly I have observed with anything new in art, that when people say either that they cannot understand it or that they have come to understand it, that seems to mean largely either that they are not habituated to it or that they are).”  — St. T.S. Eliot.

You feel like you understand a thing, when you can represent it to your mind in multiple ways, and can also convert between them in your mind as needed.

Try to reverse premises and conclusions.  See if it still works.

You do not know a thing, until you know how it behaves in a greater and smaller number of dimensions.

real : complex : quaternionic :: orthogonal : linear : symplectic.

Temptation

[rough notes pulled from an old note in my email]

I now see why, as a person progresses in virtue, they become subject to increasingly subtle temptations.

Actually it isn’t about virtue per se, but about achieving any great task.  There is a series of increasingly convincing counterfeits to the goal, and accepting any of them, or giving up, leads to losing the goal…

Why does Aristole think virtue is a noble and rare thing?  Almost anyone, who isn’t unlucky in their temperament, can achieve the “mean” along some trait, if this simply means being nearish the center of a normal distribution.

The difficulty arises when you need to get through a very tiny, and hard to find, door.  The only way, other than astonishing luck, is feedback from reality.  Something must tell you when you are getting “warmer” or “colder”.  Virtue is paying attention to this feedback, and adjusting your search accordingly.  (Actually the process can tolerate quite a bit of error as long as you keep checking which direction you need to go from here!)

Inventing a lightbulb.  First you have to want something weird that doesn’t yet exist.  Then you have to try a bunch of things that don’t work.  Because they don’t work, you have to eventually give up on ALL of these attempts, until you find the thing that does work.  But you can’t give up too early, or too late.

Failures (fatal errors):

– giving up on the task entirely
– never attempting a concretely testable idea
– NOT eventually giving up on any specific implementation that can’t work.

Failures (recoverable):

– spending too much time on a bad idea, or too little time on a good one.
– walking past the right idea without noticing it, as long as you don’t reject it forever.

This also operates on the meta level.  Feedback loops surrounding and regulating feedback loops.  You have to detect if you are trying an infinite series of ideas that can’t work, to break out of the cycle.  (But not too soon!)  You have to detect if your way of doing feedback is itself subtly wrong.

In general the opposite vices are: clinging to unreal greatness, vs settling for mediocrity.

Presumption vs Despair.

Need to have obstinacy with respect to the goal, but not with respect to the specific means to the goal.

Not everybody can invent a lightbulb.  Most people should give up!  (But not on whatever task they eventually find to do instead.)

Physics.  Crackpots cling to a “revolutionary” idea that doesn’t work.  Incremental researchers never try to do the great thing.  Genius will try out a sequence of increasingly promising ideas, right on the edge of being “crackpot”, but without clinging to any of them, and continually testing and refining their intuition about what works.  Until finally they get “lucky”.  It really happens because they tried a thousand things.  But the luck never finds those without skill in defeating temptation.  Again, natural talent is also required.

Those who never stop being students (in bad ways).

Those who never stop being students (in good ways).

Once an obviously great thing is discovered, things open up a bit.  Feedback from reality is still needed, but becomes much easier when the overall contours of what is correct have become clear.  Eventually the great inventor leaves the task to others and looks for a new project…

Does this also apply to other, more obvious temptations?  Avarice collects, but fails to appreciate the increasing pile of dead desires.  In contrast, a no longer desired lust raises questions about its purpose much more quickly…  phantasy vs biology.  We want different things in different ways.  Complete mental unity is not possible, only a dynamic search.  If your ideal of being virtuous is inherently impossible, don’t be surprised if you find yourself choosing vice instead.

Necessarily, religion is subject to similar temptations, as there are an enormous number of superstitious counterfeits to an authentic faith in God.

The agnostic who gives up on the search, but also the hypocrite who wants their concept of God to flatter their own ego.  The anxious fundamentalist who just wants a list of rules and safe beliefs, not seeing that God wants a change of heart that could never be accomplished by those means.  The sellout to worldly ambition, with a charade once a week, to appease the religious instinct.

In fact we are told salvation would be impossible, but for the fact that it is actually God who is seeking us.

To enter into any spiritual ministry is to increase the number of temptations.  This happens, not just because of opposition, but because of the nature of the task itself.  It simply is not enough to have an overall intention to seek the will of God, as if putting yourself on the right “team” suffices.  It is also needed for both character and methods to reflect the gospel of Christ.  In this case, loyalty requires obstinacy with respect to Christ’s chosen means as well as Christ’s ends.  (But, in a way that is still modulated to some degree by feedback.)

Those who confuse lust for the supernatural as love for God.  The fanatic with a persecution complex, who interprets himself being found annoying, as positive feedback that he is doing God’s will.  But also, the worldling who can’t bear to be unpopular.  The visionary, with a “message” from God, that might well be coming from their own brain noise.  The caring pastor, who comes to conflate success in ministry, with the will of God.  The pastor who thinks of “faith” as making reckless decisions about the congregation’s money and buildings, in light of a future “revival” that will justify his ministry (to the glory of God of course).

The pastor who only tells people what they want to hear.  The pastor who only tells people what they don’t want to hear.  The pastor who speaks the word when he should be listening for it.  The pastor who assumes everyone experiences temptation in the exact same way he does.

The three temptations of Christ.  (Or, the temptation of not trying to be like Christ at all.)  Mixing any political agenda whatsoever with the Gospel (except in rare cases, with fear and trembling).

To reject a path that includes temptation—thinking that this danger is the most important feature of the path—can itself be a serious temptation.  Because the goal of seeking the path is not to avoid temptation altogether.  The goal isn’t even to never succumb to temptation—as long as we are able to recover from it.  (Remember: feedback.)  The goal is to reach the goal.

Idol Hours

Idol Hours

When you see the abomination
Standing where it should not be
The phone in your hand
Where prayer should be
Come out of her, my people
Put your phone down and talk to me
Be separate, be clean
And you will be sons and daughters to me
Not at the table, dears,
Not at the dinner table.

Atheology and Contempt

1. Assume the best arguments for Atheism include one or more of the following:

a) the Argument from Evil
b) alleged defects in religious scriptures
c) alleged contradictions between divine attributes
d) negatively, the claimed absence of sufficient valid evidence for theism (where “valid” is often taken to mean “scientific”).

It is not necessary to assume that all of the above arguments are good.  (Indeed, claims (c) and (d) are in significant tension with each other, since without good evidence for any specific divine attributes, a fortiori there cannot be evidence for contradictory attributes.)  Minimally, the claim is only that if ALL of (a)-(d) fail, it is unlikely that one can reasonably be highly confident that Theism is false.

2. Note that every one of these arguments requires doing some theology to assess its validity:

(a) requires constructing a concept of “God”, and using it to make “predictions” (or really “retrodictions”) about what God would do.

(b) requires reading said Scriptures, and figuring out the best interpretation of their meaning.  Note that when deciding between 2 possible interpretations of a text, even in non-religious contexts it is usually more rational to select the interpretation with fewer defects (principle of charity).

(c) requires constructing the most plausible concept of “God”, using either natural theology (evidence from Nature) or revealed theology (evidence from putative divine revelation).

(In particular, note that no divine attribute should be added to the list without there being, at least provisionally/hypothetically, one or more reasons to think God would, if he exists, have that attribute; and the precise phrasing of the attribute should be tailored to those reasons.  Thus, the analytic philosophy habit of discussing various divine attributes apart from their contextual justifications, is fruitless and silly, because removes from the discussion any reason—apart from mere logical consistency—to accept one formulation over another.)

(d) requires understanding sufficiently what various religious people take as evidence for God, prior to assessing its validity.   And note that this is not just one type of thing, but rather a plurality of widely divergent kinds of sources of belief.  Being rationally highly confident of (d) requires showing that ALL such evidences are bad!

3. Like other intellectual endeavors, theology is a skill.  It can be done either well, or poorly.  If it is done poorly, then one might well wrongly draw out implications, that a more competent handling of the subject would not deduce.

This is for the exact same reason that e.g. a person making an “intelligent design” argument that some feature could not have evolved, would need to have some knowledge of biology and Darwinian evolution.   If they have errors in their understanding of biological evolution, this could well lead to them incorrectly identifying such features.

4. From 1-3, it follows that it is impossible for a person to reasonably be highly confident of Atheism, unless they are either:

i) good enough at theology to reasonably trust their own theological judgements, or else
ii) they believe in Atheism on the authority of some other person(s) who does meet criterion (i).

It certainly does not follow that an atheist would have to be highly interested in every aspect of theology, no matter how technical or unrelated to the epistemic justification of Theism.  The theological competence required to assess the validity of religion, is not exactly the same as the theological competence useful for a religious practitioner.  But a certain sort of genuine and deep (non-superficial) competence in the domain of religious philosophy is nonetheless required, to evaluate said arguments.

5. It is essentially impossible to become an expert at a subject, if you have contempt for everyone who does it, and you are unwilling to learn the subject in any significant detail.

It is also difficult to become good at studying theology when your main goal in studying it is to derive a contradiction, so as to refute theology.  This is because, in EVERY intellectual subject (including math, physics, biology…), progress arises by confronting apparent conflicts among truths, and then identifying a more comprenensive viewpoint which resolves the conflict.  Proceeding immediately to dismissing the entire subject, short-circuits this process in a way that makes acquiring genuine expertise impossible.

6. It is also highly unlikely for the contemptuous person described in 5 to disbelieve in religion on the basis of a good argument from authority, as such individuals are likely to select authorities on the basis of them being good at rhetorically expressing contempt, rather than on the basis of them being good at theology, as described above.

7. Nothing above rules out that there might be people who are rationally justified in being highly confident of Atheism.

However, 4-6 above show that the set of such justified atheists is going to be nearly completely disjoint, from the set of atheists who express great contempt for all religion, especially if their dismissal of religion relies heavily on rhetorically expressing such contempt.

8. One possible loophole in the above would be if the emotional reaction of contempt happens only AFTER the atheist first acquires sufficient theological expertise to become highly confident of atheism on rational grounds.  (Just as, it is not an ad hominem fallacy to insult an opponent, after providing a logical refutation on other grounds.)

However, it is highly suspicious if this contempt appears:

A) soon after a deconversion from a fundamentalist religious tradition, or
B) prior to the age of 20, or
C) in a person who has not closely studied philosophy of religion (at least as a hobbyist) for at least 1 decade.

From a sociological perspective, such contempt is more likely to be a rhetorical maneuver, designed to shore up hidden doubts, rather than a considered and expert response to the full state of the evidence.

Furthermore, even if the contempt appears later in time from the rational justification of a person’s Atheism, it will still have the psychological tendency to prevent valid theological reasoning in the future, downstream of that contempt.  Thus, as soon as the person becomes contemptuous, their degree of justification will naturally tend to corrode and decay over time, as they begin to rely on it more.

This might not be so big of a problem if their initial reasons were completely unimpeachable.  But it means they lose the benefits that might otherwise have accrued from a greater increase in maturity and understanding over time.  (One could easily imagine a scenario where that greater understanding would undermine the original arguments against religion, but the person never learns this because they are frozen in their understanding at a particular point.)

9. One could try to make a parallel argument concerning religious believers. But an important difference is that most religious epistemology makes unapologetic use of arguments from authority, parallel to (ii).  Being religious because you have faith in God, and you trust some specific religious authorities appointed by God to be doing theology well, is not IN GENERAL a self-undermining attitude, in the same way that contemptuous atheism is.  (Again, that doesn’t mean the authority is actually good, just that the attitude is not self-refuting.)

(Though there might well be parallels with respect to certain specific arguments for religion, e.g. arguments against evolution by people who don’t want to learn about evolution.)

An atheist making a general objection to religious epistemology would need to be based on circularity rather than self-defeat.  But circular arguments can often be turned into valid chains of reasoning by finding some alternative justification for one of the premises.  In particular, the theist does need some reason to believe in God’s existence that isn’t just a bare “trusting God that he exists”!  But there are many candidates for such reasons, which people who do good theology know about.

10. The atheist with contempt will probably respond to this post by making a comparison with some totally bunk subject like Astrology or Homeopathy, and trying to make the case that religion is parallel.  I don’t think this parallel works.  In order to know that Astrology or Homeopathy is bunk, you certainly do NOT need to be an expert in reading people’s charts or the exact details, but you do need to be conversant with the main ARGUMENTS for why they can’t work, which largely come down to arguments about physical causality that are widely accepted throughout the sciences by people with a wide variety of philosophical views.  The arguments are largely disconnected from the details of precisely how to use these systems (even though, in principle, a sufficiently amazing argument based on the empirical details could in principle overcome the causal details).

The arguments against religion are (if taken seriously) much more involved and subtle than this—as can easily be seen by making an even cursory effort to follow what the smartest philosophers (including professional atheist philosophers!) say about the topic.

Convertibility of Transcendentals

This post is more exploratory than something I am confident of.  The medieval scholastics had a concept called the “convertibility of transcendentals” (CoT), in which certain terms (e.g. “good”, “true”, “one”, “real”) are all in a certain sense interconvertible with each other.  In this post, I wish to explore the implications of this idea.

Sometimes we use the phrase “a good X” to mean an X that is more fully an X.  A good drawing of a circle is one which is more uniformly round (closer to being a perfect circle) than a sloppy circle is.  This depends on the prior judgement that you actually wanted the drawing to be a circle rather than something else (e.g. an oval, or an outline of a pumpkin).  That is one sense in which goodness might be considered subjective; yet it is not inconsistent with saying that when we see an object as good we are seeing something objectively true about it, nor does it commit us to saying that all ways of perceiving objects are equally fruitful and meaningful.

From a hypothetical imperative perspective, whenever you want an X as an X, then what you want is a good X, which is the same as a true X.  (Although we are more likely to say “good” when X-ness is a matter of degree, and more likely to say “true” when it is a yes/no question. In this linguistic sense, goodness is more subjective than truth.)  CoT takes this usage of the word “good” as being a clue about the nature of what is categorically good, i.e. that which we morally ought to want.

Scholastic definitions: Goodness is being, insofar as it is capable of being willed.  (Just as truth is being, insofar as it is capable of being known.)

CoT commits one to the surprising claim that everything that exists is good, simply because it exists, even though it does not deny that some things may, on top of that, also be (truly) bad.  (Linguistically, a true evil is an evil that really is evil; one could even call it a good example of an evil even though we would probably balk at calling it a good evil!)  More precisely and less paradoxically, each thing is a good X for some value of X, but this is compatible with it being both bad for itself under another (and more important) description Y, and also bad for other things in the universe; hence good for us to condemn, eliminate, or reform.

For example, a good thief is somebody that fully succeeds in being a thief.  (E.g. if you hire a thief but he gets caught and has to return the goods, he has failed to steal anything in the desired sense.)  In this respect:

good thief = true thief = real thief.

If we make a moral critique of theft (and we should) it can only be because by being a good thief, he thereby fails to be a good member of society, and thus also fails to fully actualize his nature as a human (a rational social animal), which is more essential to him than his nature as a thief.  Thus:

good thief => bad man = false man = fake man.

Sin is then, the fact that humans can act as if they were not humans.

Taken to the extreme, damnation is the possibility that by becoming permanently attached to sin, a human being could eventually cease to be human in some crucial respect, thus making happiness impossible for them (insofar as they cannot fully cease to be a sort of thing that can only be happy by being human, even as they fail to be human).

On the other hand, Heaven is the fulfilment of human personhood, which (in the Christian account of virtue) essentially includes union with the divine.  This is, among other things, a statement about the best (most good, most true) meaning of the word “person”, namely that personhood is a way of being in the divine image.

Persons have intellect and will.  CoT implies that these faculties are (or at least ought to be) in harmony.  Just as truth is the goodness of the intellect, so too, goodness is the truth of the will.  CoT thus puts reality in an essential relation to personhood.

The convertability of transcendentals, if true, makes Theism more plausible, and vice versa.  God is analogous to a person, in that he has something analogous to intellect and something analogous to will.  However, unlike us, his intellect just is truth, and his will just is goodness.  Also, in God these two faculties are the same as each other.  God is the only being that has existence in himself; in other words the only being that is completely a being.  Hence, by CoT, there is also a sense in which only God is good (cf. Mark 10:18).  Other beings are said to be good only insofar as God shares his being with them, which is creation.

To be created, is nothing more nor other nor different, then to be known by God (as other than God). To be created, is nothing more nor other nor different, then to be loved by God (as other than God).

A Naturalist is somebody who believes that reality (the Universe) is convertable with truth (“Science”), but that it is not convertable with goodness (“Fiat lux!”).  Naturalism in this sense makes it exactly half way towards Theism.  Therefore, Naturalism is only 50% true and 50% good.

Since persons have both intellect and will, a Naturalist is necessarily alienated from their own personhood, and internally divided against themselves.  If they allow their Naturalism to influence their self-image, then they will regard their morality as false (hence not really moral).  Alternatively, to the extent that they cannot allow their Naturalism to influence their self-image (and arguably humans are mentally incapable of fully accepting all the implications of Naturalism) then they regard what they take as true to be bad for their self.

Hence Naturalism is unavoidably bad for us, since it is incompatible with full human flourishing.  From the Theist perspective, this is a convincing intellectual (not just pragmatic!) argument that Naturalism is also false (since for the Theist the deepest reality is always good).

But from a Naturalist perspective, this doesn’t count as an argument that Naturalism is false.  Since the Naturalist believes that the deepest reality cares nothing for goodness, and hence there is no good reason why believing the truth cannot be bad for us.

Yet almost all Naturalists instinctively assume that if Naturalism is true, it must also be good to convince others it is true, and healthy for society to reject beliefs incompatible with it.  And indeed, if Naturalism were true, I believe it would be less bad to believe it than to believe a pious falsehood, even at the price of being divided against oneself.  Since “good” in reference to the intellect means “what the intellect seeks”, i.e. the true.  Also, a false belief cannot be a worthy foundation for society since a person with false beliefs will systematically act imprudently, in ways that are harmful to others (because their data is bad).  So I would want to believe Naturalism if it were true, although perhaps this only implies that even Naturalism wouldn’t be capable of causing me to stop believing in something that amounts to the CoT.

Some additonal linguistic evidence for CoT:

* English speakers use the words “right” and “wrong” to refer both to true/false and good/bad.

* We also use the word “belief” both to refer to thinking that something is true, and to our beliefs about morality.