First read this piece by St. Feser: Now take the following argument scheme, making suitable choices as needed:<\/p>\n For example, in the debate<\/a>,\u00a0St. Craig’s kalam<\/em> argument used “comes into existence” as X, and then used a lumping strategy (3C) to talk about the universe as a whole and ask whether it had a cause.\u00a0 This form of the Cosmological Argument ended up being strongly dependent on what the Science of the Big Bang actually shows, but most forms don’t really depend that strongly on Science.<\/p>\n Other traditional X’s include “changing with time”, “contingent” (something that might or might not exist), “composite”, and some other possibilities mentioned in the link above.\u00a0\u00a0 The idea is that there are some features of objects which make us seek out causes for them, for example if an object is composed of several disparate objects, we naturally want to know what brought them together.\u00a0 Depending on what you pick for X, the Cosmological Argument may be more or less plausible.<\/p>\n You will also want to consider what type of causal concept you want to include in your argument.\u00a0 A key question is how we know there is such a thing as causation?\u00a0 If it is primarily for empirical <\/em>reasons, then presumably we know about it through some type of inductive* argument from experience, in which case we could wonder how applicable it will be in unusual situations.\u00a0 On the other hand, if it is primarily motivated <\/em>by reason<\/em>, through analyzing what types of explanations would make sense of the universe, it may be less dependent on observation.\u00a0 Or perhaps the truth is somewhere in the middle.<\/p>\n [* Footnote: I somewhat regret using the term “inductive” here, given my previous usage of “Inductive Premise” to label premise 3.\u00a0 In both cases one is moving from specific applications to more general applications, but for premise 3 I had in mind something closer to mathematical<\/em> induction, a step which (given the right background premises) is logically necessary, whereas in the paragraph directly above, I am referring to something more like scientific<\/em> induction, where if you observe something happening enough times you guess that maybe it always happens that way.]<\/p>\n Another thing to figure out is what types of entities are connected by cause-effect relationships.\u00a0 Does a cause have to determine <\/em>the effect with certainty, or is it sufficient if it in some way produces <\/em>it?\u00a0 For example, if we want to argue that all contingent things were caused by something which is necessary, this is a contradiction in terms unless a necessary thing can produce contingent things, i.e. if causes don’t have to be deterministic.\u00a0 A related question: when we talk about causes, are we primarily talking about beings<\/em> causing things to happen (a.k.a. agent-causation), or states of affairs <\/em>causing things to happen (a.k.a. event-causation), or both? Regarding step (5), note that excessively glib atheist baiting obscures the fact that nearly everyone should accept some type of Cosmological Argument, even if they don’t necessarily take it to a Theistic conclusion!\u00a0 If you are going to talk about causes\/explanations\/reasons AT ALL (and I really don’t see how to avoid this) then you really need an account concerning the domain to which the concept is applicable.\u00a0 And then it is an interesting fact, that either you must accept infinite <\/em>or circular<\/em> chains of [causation\/explanation\/reasons] or you end up going outside the domain to something else which is different.<\/p>\n This type of reasoning should be interesting<\/em>, even if you are an atheist.\u00a0 The trouble is, if people only encounter Cosmological Arguments in the context of Theism, then Atheists adopt an argumentative approach where they just feel the need to poke a few holes in the arguments and then retreat to where they were before.\u00a0 This doesn’t do justice to the fact that there are numerous X’s for which the argument’s premises are at least plausible, even for people who don’t start out committed to any particular religious doctrine.<\/p>\n For example, Carroll himself gives an account of the scope of causation when he says:<\/p>\n Why should we expect that there are causes or explanations or a reason why in the universe in which we live? It\u2019s because the physical world inside of which we\u2019re embedded has two important features. There are unbreakable patterns, laws of physics\u2014things don\u2019t just happen, they obey the laws\u2014and there is an arrow of time stretching from the past to the future. The entropy was lower in the past and increases towards the future. Therefore, when you find some event or state of affairs B today, we can very often trace it back in time to one or a couple of possible predecessor events that we therefore call the cause of that, which leads to B according to the laws of physics. But crucially, both of these features of the universe that allow us to speak the language of causes and effects are completely absent when we talk about the universe as a whole. We don\u2019t think that our universe is part of a bigger ensemble that obeys laws. Even if it\u2019s part of the multiverse, the multiverse is not part of a bigger ensemble that obeys laws. Therefore, nothing gives us the right to demand some kind of external cause.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n There seem to be some question-begging moves in this paragraph, but leave that aside.\u00a0 My point is that Carroll gives a positive account of when he thinks makes the notion of [cause\/explanations] make sense.\u00a0 He endorses a version of (1) whereby the concept of causation makes sense if (a) there are laws of nature, understood as unbreakable regularities, and (b) there is a thermodynamical arrow of time whereby entropy increases, making a distinction between the past and the future.\u00a0 (Since causes normally precede effects, but the laws of physics don’t strongly distinguish between the two directions of time except through thermodynamics, it seems clear that the arrow of time has to play some role in distinguishing causes from effects in physics.)<\/p>\n He also allows (2) that this concept\u2014though not fundamental in his opinion\u2014nevertheless makes sense for certain particular cases.<\/p>\n Then for (3) he allows us to lump together the universe taken as a whole, but claims that this whole does not meet his criterion (1).\u00a0 He thus comes to an object\u2014the whole universe, apparently\u2014for which, in his view, it wouldn’t make sense for it to have a cause (4), although he does not identify it with God (5).\u00a0 Thus his reasoning has an implicit atheist <\/em>version of the Cosmological Argument behind it.\u00a0 Though one can certainly question<\/a> whether the metaphysical assumptions<\/a> behind this claim are right.<\/p>\n But it’s just possible you came here hoping, not to construct your own Cosmological Argument, nor to deconstruct Carroll’s, but instead to find out what I think about it, something which you may think I have postponed saying for quite long enough.\u00a0 Well, it just so happens that I’ve written a 16,000 word essay on the Cosmological Argument and related topics, and will be posting it in installments<\/a> over the course of the next few weeks.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" First read this piece by St. Feser: So you think you understand the Cosmological Argument? about the traditional structure of Cosmological Arguments, rebutting several popular misconceptions. Now take the following argument scheme, making suitable choices as needed: (Major Premise) Every … Continue reading
\nSo you think you understand the Cosmological Argument?<\/a>
\nabout the traditional structure of Cosmological Arguments, rebutting several popular misconceptions.<\/p>\n\n
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\nA.<\/strong>\u00a0 argue that an infinite regress of [causes\/explanations\/reasons] for the X’s is unreasonable, OR
\nB.<\/strong> argue that such an infinite causal chain would itself have property X, OR
\nC.<\/strong>\u00a0 argue that the entire set of X’s taken together (which might, depending on X, include the entire physical universe we know and love) has property X.
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\n<\/em><\/p>\n